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Abstract 
This study investigates why Kenya, unlike other states around the world, did not enact anti-
terrorism legislation that would have enabled it to have counterterrorism measures in the 
aftermath of 9/11 and only did so in 2012. Previous studies argue that concerns about the 
negative effects of anti-terrorism laws on Kenya’s nascent democratic system and its civil 
liberties were the main reasons why Kenya’s government could not enact proposed anti-
terrorism legislation in 2003 and 2006. However, these studies do not explain why those 
who had previously opposed anti-terrorism legislation supported the enactment of an anti-
terrorism law in 2012 even though their views about the importance of civil liberties and 
democracy had not changed.  
Similarly, previous studies which suggest that Kenya enacted anti-terrorism 
legislation in 2012 because of the detrimental effects of terrorism on the country’s security 
and economic interests do not explain why these factors did not elicit the same response in 
2003 and 2006. Departing from previous studies, this research hypothesises that Kenya’s 
enactment of counterterrorism measures was dependent on consensus building among the 
country’s executive and legislative arms of government. To test this hypothesis, this thesis 
proposed six contextual factors that were used to explain how and why perceptions about 
the terrorism threat in Kenya developed and changed.  
 Two methods, discourse analysis and process tracing, were used to establish the 
relationships between the variables in this study. In this regard, discourse analysis provided 
rich descriptions of the construction and evolution of the terrorist threat in Kenya. The rich 
descriptions were initially derived from written texts including the Kenya National 
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Assembly Hansard, policy documents, court documents and public testimonies. The data 
was then triangulated with descriptions obtained from spoken texts including semi-
structured interviews, archival press conferences and media recordings. The recurring 
linguistic patterns obtained from these descriptions formed the narratives that explained 
how Kenya’s government framed terrorism and the impact that this had on the enactment 
of anti-terrorism legislation. Process tracing supplemented discourse analysis by 
pinpointing the conditions under which the securitization of terrorism occurred.  
In addition to unravelling Kenya’s puzzling counterterrorism behaviour, this thesis 
contributes to knowledge in two ways. First, it identifies and expounds on new variables 
that explain Kenya’s puzzling counterterrorism behaviour. Second, this thesis extends 
literature in securitization studies by explaining how contextual factors can be used to 
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Research Puzzle and Significance of the Study 
The shocking terrorist attacks in the United States (US) on September 11, 2001 (9/11) had 
a profound impact on the fight against terrorism around the world. Many states, including 
democratic ones, reacted to these attacks by developing counterterrorism measures that 
transcended traditional policing and legislative practices (Roach 2011; Jenkins and Godges 
2011).  
Counterterrorism measures essentially involved two things: 1) Legislative 
measures that greatly expand the definition of terrorism-related offenses, the scope of 
punishment for terrorism-related crimes and police powers to deal with terrorism offenses; 
and 2) Greater use of force and coercive measures to prevent, minimize and eliminate 
terrorism and terrorism-related offenses. As a result, the post-9/11 fight against terrorism, 
commonly referred to as “the war on terror,” was characterized by the use of military force, 
the use of diverse surveillance methods and technologies, enhanced interrogation 
techniques, the indefinite or prolonged detention of terrorist suspects, the prosecution of 
terrorist suspects with a lower burden of proof in comparison to other criminal cases, 
extraordinary rendition as well as warrantless and blanket police searches (Simmons 2010; 
Tsoukala 2008; Boot and Kirkpatrick 2011).  
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This section of the study expounds on Kenya’s pathway to counterterrorism 
measures as two successive research puzzles. It begins by highlighting how 9/11 changed 
the way many states in Africa combated terrorism before discussing how Kenya’s 
behaviour initially differed from, and then resembled, that of other African states. The 
section then explains why Kenya’s behaviour is puzzling and lays out the focus of this 
thesis. The last part of this section briefly states the potential benefits of this research and 
the overall impact it will have on scholarship and policy in the field of terrorism and 
counterterrorism.  
Several African states enacted counterterrorism measures after 9/11. In East Africa, 
Uganda, Tanzania and Mauritius passed counterterrorism laws in 2002 while Ethiopia and 
Rwanda enacted counterterrorism legislation in 2009 (Whitaker 2010; Ploch 2010). 
Although these pieces of legislation were unique to each East African state, there were 
salient similarities between the laws. In Ethiopia, for instance, the Proclamation on Anti-
Terrorism Law, 2009 gave law enforcement agencies the right to gather evidence through 
interception and surveillance, the power to detain terrorist suspects for a period of up to 
four months as well as the right to “make a sudden search in order to prevent the act [of 
terrorism]” (Proclamation on Anti-Terrorism Law 2009 [Ethiopia], part 3[16]). These 
provisions were similar to those in Uganda’s Anti-Terrorism Act, 2002 which stated that 
“subject to this Act, an authorised officer shall have the right to intercept the 
communications of a person and otherwise conduct surveillance of a person under this Act” 
(The Anti-Terrorism Act 2002 [Uganda], part VII [19]). The law also gave Uganda’s police 
force unlimited stop and search powers and allowed for the indefinite detention of terrorist 
suspects without trial.  
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Other African states also enacted counterterrorism legislation to deal with the 
growing terrorism threat in the continent. In West Africa, for instance, Ghana and Gambia 
enacted their counterterrorism laws in 2002. Within the same region, Nigeria included 
counterterrorism provisions in its Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Act in 2002 
and later developed aspects of this law into the Terrorism Prevention Act in 2011 (UNODC 
2011). All countries in the Sahel and northern part of Africa enacted counterterrorism 
legislation by 2008. While some countries in this region, such as Mali, Niger, Tunisia and 
Mauritania, passed new counterterrorism legislation in 2008 (Alexander 2016; UNODC 
2009, 121-137), others, including Egypt and Algeria, revised their counterterrorism laws 
in the wake of 9/11 (Blaydes and Rubin 2008).  
As states in Africa aggressively enacted laws to combat the spread of terrorism, 
Kenya appeared to be indisposed to this new wave of counterterrorism measures and only 
enacted counterterrorism legislation in 2012. The contrast between Kenya’s behaviour and 
that of other African states was clearly demonstrated in Kenya’s lacklustre attempts to 
enact two proposed counterterrorism laws, namely the Suppression of Terrorism Bill in 
2003 and the Anti-Terrorism Bill in 2006. In his examination of counterterrorism practices 
in Kenya, Fisher (2013) noted that unlike several African countries, such as Uganda, which 
passed counterterrorism laws quickly and without controversy, Kenya’s government gave 
in to opposition from several Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and politicians 
who campaigned against the country’s proposed counterterrorism laws in 2003 and in 
2006.  Lind and Howell (2010) made similar observations when they noted that the Kenyan 
government quickly and silently withdrew both bills amidst opposition from civil society. 
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  Another indication that Kenya did not want to enact counterterrorism measures 
was its reluctance to use military force against terrorist groups. Even though Kenya was a 
significant facilitator of peace in Eastern Africa and had a long history of being at the 
forefront of peacekeeping missions in many parts of the world, the country was reluctant 
to include its troops as part of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) - a 
regional peacekeeping mission that was created in 2007 to battle Al-Shabaab militants in 
Somalia (Fisher 2012; Olsen 2014; Ahere 2015).  
Close to a decade after 9/11, Kenya shifted its approach to counterterrorism in 2012. 
Three key events mark 2012 as a watershed in Kenya’s counterterrorism approach. First, 
it was in October of this year that Kenya enacted the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2012 
which was the country’s first counterterrorism legislation. Second, the enactment of 
Kenya’s first counterterrorism legislation appeared to embolden the country’s Anti-
Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU), which significantly increased its counterterrorism 
operations in 2012 leading to the arrest and detention of hundreds of terrorist suspects 
(Whitaker 2014). Third, it was also in 2012 that Kenyan troops became part of the 
AMISOM forces in Somalia (Fisher 2013; Mwangi 2016a).   
Kenya’s reluctance to enact counterterrorism measures between 2001 and 2011 and 
the subsequent shift in its policy in 2012 presents two puzzling scenarios for this study. In 
the first scenario, Kenya’s behaviour is puzzling for several reasons. First, the country bore 
the brunt of terrorism in East Africa. Between 1998 and 2011, Kenya was the victim of 
several large and small-scale terrorist attacks. While large-scale attacks included the 1998 
bombing of the US Embassy in Nairobi as well as the 2002 suicide bombing of a hotel in 
Mombasa, small-scale attacks involved sporadic kidnappings, grenade attacks, 
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indiscriminate shootings and bombings in various parts of Nairobi, Mombasa, Garrissa, 
Wajir and Mandera (Meservey 2013; Miyandazi 2012). These attacks not only resulted in 
hundreds of deaths and thousands of injuries but also huge financial losses for Kenya and 
the entire East African region. Although direct financial losses, such as the destruction of 
property, were mainly experienced in Kenya, other losses, such as disruptions and 
stagnation in the tourism sector, as well as significant reductions in the flows of Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI), were felt in most parts of the East African region (Morris 2015; 
Were 2015; Business Monitor International 2014).  
Kenya was also under considerable pressure from its development partners to enact 
counterterrorism measures. This is largely because the country has been a key geopolitical 
partner of Western democracies since it gained independence in 1963. Not only is Kenya 
home to some of the largest diplomatic missions in Africa, including the US Embassy and 
the British High Commission, it also hosts the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP), which is one of four major United Nations (UN) offices in the world. Kenya also 
serves as the headquarters of several key international NGOs in Africa.  
Furthermore, the country has signed several formal security agreements with 
Western states, such as the US, the UK and Germany. These agreements allow these states 
to use Kenya’s military facilities in counterterrorism operations and to set up military 
bases, training grounds and surveillance teams for purposes of promoting the security 
interests of Western states (Global Security 2016). In fact, in 2005, the former US 
Ambassador to Kenya, Johnnie Carson, stated that “no other country in East Africa or the 
greater Horn of Africa is more important to the United States [in the fight against terrorism] 
than Kenya” (Carson 2005, 173). He went on to say, “although the United States has 
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developed increasingly close ties with the armed forces of Ethiopia and Uganda, Kenya 
remains a core partner and ally in tracking down Al Qaeda affiliated terrorists in East Africa 
and preventing any further anti-terrorist Western attacks in Kenya and the region” (Carson 
2005, 173).  
Consequently, the US expected Kenya to support the war on terror by enacting 
counterterrorism measures. This was not only because of Kenya’s long-term relations with 
the US and its allies, but also because both Kenya and the US had been victims of Al Qaeda 
terrorist attacks. On its part, the US provided economic incentives to facilitate the 
development of counterterrorism measures in Kenya. These included generous financial 
aid packages as well as training and technical support for Kenya’s security agencies 
(Prestholdt 2011; Olsen 2014; Ploch 2010). Despite this, the Kenyan government did not 
demonstrate a great deal of enthusiasm for counterterrorism measures until 2012.   
Kenya’s development partners also expected the country to enact counterterrorism 
measures in line with its obligations as a member of the UN. The UN Security Council 
reacted to 9/11 by adopting Resolution 1373, which obliged all states to enact measures 
that would prevent and punish acts of terrorism. Two key factors, besides the significant 
terrorism threat that Kenya faced, made Resolution 1373 important to the country’s 
security. First, there were indications that transnational terrorist groups, such as Al Qaeda, 
had established recruitment, training and financial hubs in African states including some 
of Kenya’s neighbours. For instance, Osama bin Laden, who was Al Qaeda’s leader until 
his death in 2011, not only set up businesses worth millions of dollars in Sudan but also 
established training camps in the country where “hundreds of his followers were tutored in 
paramilitary tactics” (Bergen 2001, 82). In fact, the Clinton administration held Sudan 
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responsible for the 1998 US Embassy bombing in Kenya and had retaliated against Sudan 
with a series of missiles aimed at a pharmaceutical company that was suspected of 
manufacturing a toxic nerve agent (Guyatt 2000; Lobel 199).1 It, therefore, seemed logical 
for Kenya to domesticate Resolution 1373 to protect itself from terrorist threats emanating 
from within East Africa.  
The second factor that made Resolution 1373 significant to Kenya as well as Africa 
was concern over the rise of religiously-inspired terrorist groups in some African states and 
the capacities of these groups to carry out attacks beyond the states of their origin. These 
groups included the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) from Uganda and the Islamic Maghreb 
from Algeria (formerly known as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat [GSPC]2). 
Indeed, three years before the enactment of Resolution 1373, concerns about the violence 
meted out by these groups led the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to adopt the 
Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism3 in 1999. This Convention 
defined what constituted a terrorist act, codified counterterrorism norms and outlined 
common strategies for combating terrorism in Africa (OAU 1999). When the OAU 
transformed into the African Union (AU) in 2002, it urged its members to adopt a unified 
counterterrorism framework that was in line with Resolution 1373 (UN 2001; Allison 
2015; Makinda, Okumu and Mickler 2016). Despite these developments, Kenya did not 
enact counterterrorism measures until 2012. 
 
1 On August 20, 1998, the US launched several Tomahawk missiles against the Al-Shifa pharmaceutical 
company in Sudan to retaliate against the 1998 US Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. The US 
alleged that the pharmaceutical company had links to Al Qaeda and was manufacturing the toxic VX agent 
that can be used in chemical warfare (Lobel 1999). 
2 GSPC was founded by a former commander of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA). 
3 Also known as the Algiers Convention.  
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The Kenyan government’s decision to enact counterterrorism measures in 2012 was 
equally puzzling. This is because several politicians and members of civil society who 
supported counterterrorism measures in 2012 had aggressively opposed similar measures 
when they were proposed in 2003 and 2006. Indeed, influential members of Kenya’s 
parliament, together with prominent members of Kenya’s civil society, blocked efforts to 
enact the Suppression of Terrorism Bill in 2003 and the Anti-Terrorism Bill in 2006. These 
individuals publicly declared that they would not support the proposed counterterrorism 
laws because the laws would compromise human rights and civil liberties in the country 
(Whitaker 2008, 2010; Lind and Howell 2010; Carson 2005; Mogire and Mkutu 2011). 
Hence, it is surprising that those who opposed the enactment of counterterrorism laws in 
2003 and 2006 played a key role in the successful passage of a similar law, the Prevention 
of Terrorism Act, in 2012 (Whitaker 2014; Lind, Mutahi and Oosterom, 2015). 
Furthermore, it is puzzling that the reasons that led to the enactment of counterterrorism 
measures in 2012, such as concerns over Kenya’s security and the effects that terrorism 
was having on its economic interests (Whitaker 2014; Mwangi 2016 a and b), did not 
prompt a similar response between 2001 and 2011.  
The two puzzles discussed above raise two important research questions that this 
thesis will answer. First, why did the Kenyan government fail to enact counterterrorism 
measures between 2001 and 2011 when it had good domestic and external reasons for 
doing so? Second, why did the Kenyan government shift its position in 2012 and enact 
counterterrorism measures? 
Answering these questions will contribute to knowledge about Kenya’s national 
security decision-making process, which could, in turn, enrich the discipline of terrorism 
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and counterterrorism studies in several ways. First, the study provides a better 
understanding of how and why terrorism threats have been unsecuritized and securitized 
in Kenya. In the context of a securitization process, unsecuritization is the rejection of 
extraordinary security measures, whereas, securitization is the acceptance of extraordinary 
security measures to address an existential threat.4 As is explained in the literature review 
section, even though previous studies identify several causal factors, such as protecting 
Kenya’s nascent democracy, that may explain why Kenya did not enact counterterrorism 
measures between 2001 and 2011, they do not explain why these factors ceased to be 
important in 2012 resulting in the enactment of counterterrorism measures that year. 
Moreover, the reasons that the studies identify as causal factors that led to the enactment 
of counterterrorism measures in 2012, such as concerns over Kenya’s security and 
economic interests, were also present between 2001 and 2011. Yet, Kenya did not enact 
counterterrorism measures during those years. Explaining how and why terrorism threats 
have been unsecuritized and securitized in Kenya will, therefore, provide insights into these 
gaps.  
Second, the study will critically evaluate the conventional belief that after 9/11 
governments in developing states tended to bandwagon with the US in the war on terror. 
Indeed, in a book chapter on “African Agency in International Relations,” Blaauw (2016) 
noted that “because of their relative weakness African states are expected to bandwagon 
with stronger or greater power(s)” (Blaauw 2016, 97) on security issues in international 
relations. Within the context of counterterrorism measures, the discussions in the preceding 
pages showed that even though the behaviour of several African states conformed to this 
 
4 Unsecuritization and securitization are explained further in the theoretical framework section. 
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assumption, between 2001 and 2011 the Kenyan case did not. The investigation of Kenya’s 
puzzling behaviour will provide a better understanding of why some African states, such 
as Kenya, did not join the war on terror in the wake of 9/11. 
Lastly, the study will provide a better understanding of the development of Kenya’s 
counterterrorism measures by drawing inferences from primary data about the 
phenomenon. It has been noted by several scholars in the field of terrorism and 
counterterrorism studies, such as Schuurman and Eijkman (2013) as well as Crelinsten 
(2009) that one of the key weaknesses of research in the field is its overreliance on 
secondary data. While there is nothing wrong with the reviewing of literature in 
scholarship, “the overreliance on this form of research has starved terrorism studies of the 
empirical data needed to validate the claims and theories being presented” (Schuurman and 
Eijkman 2013, 2). The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to 
Terrorism (START) in the US has made similar observations. In 2015, START reviewed 
all scholarly works on terrorism and counterterrorism in Africa and noted that a key 
weakness in most studies was the shortage of empirical analyses (START 2015). Indeed, 
the commentaries and conclusions made in several studies that were reviewed during this 
research were problematic because they did not have an empirical research base.  
The information that was analysed in this thesis was, therefore, drawn from a wide 
variety of both primary and secondary sources. The sources used in this research included 
records from Kenya parliament’s Hansard, court records, interviews with key informants 
who have knowledge of or have participated in the securitization of terrorism in Kenya, 
audio and video recordings as well as written material from Al Kataib which is responsible 
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for Al Shabaab’s media productions, video recording from individuals who were 
responsible for radicalizing young people in Kenya and material that was obtained from 
the archives of major media houses  including the Nation media group, Standard media 
group, Royal media services, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and Al Jazeera. 
Literature Review 
This section reviews studies about the development of counterterrorism measures in Kenya. 
It is organized into five clusters that represent the themes that previous studies have used 
to explain Kenya’s counterterrorism behaviour. These themes are: civil liberties and 
democracy; the role of Kenyan Muslims; perceptions about terrorist threats in Kenya; 
Kenya’s economic interests; and anti-American sentiments.  
Civil Liberties and Democracy 
Several studies have examined how concerns about civil liberties and democracy 
influenced the development of counterterrorism measures in Kenya. Lind and Howell 
(2010) argued that Kenya failed to enact counterterrorism measures from 2001-2011 
because a few influential members of Kenya’s civil society protested against the illiberal 
nature of the country’s proposed anti-terrorism bills. They noted that Kenya’s attempt to 
pass its first counterterrorism bill, the Suppression of Terrorism Bill, in 2003 elicited strong 
opposition from a coalition of human rights organizations, the media, Muslim groups and 
members of the Parliamentary Committee on Justice and Constitutional Affairs. These 
groups, Lind and Howell (2010) argued, were opposed to the Bill because of the 
discriminatory language that was used to define and identify terrorism activities and 
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suspects. In their view, such language, including the criminalization of modes of dressing 
that might raise suspicion, was prejudicial against the Muslim community in Kenya. In this 
context, human rights organizations accused Kenya’s government of using the proposed 
laws “to enhance intelligence gathering as well as policing and surveillance of suspect 
communities” (Lind and Howell 2010, 341). 
In addition to this, some civil society groups believed that the discretionary powers 
that the proposed Bill had allocated to law enforcement agencies was subject to abuse and 
would reverse the democratic achievements that Kenya had gained after 24 years of 
despotic rule by its second president Daniel arap Moi. Instead of the draconian provisions 
in the proposed Bill, the civil society groups suggested that “mechanisms for fighting 
terrorism must safeguard human rights and that counterterrorism should be a partnership 
between the state and society and not a unilateral extension of bureaucratic and policing 
powers” (Lind and Howell 2010, 345). In conclusion, Lind and Howell (2010) observed 
that even though the majority of Kenya’s civil society was indifferent to the proposed 
counterterrorism measures, Kenya’s government withdrew the Bill in 2003 due to the 
opposition that it faced.   
According to Mogire and Mkutu (2011), organizations such as Amnesty 
International and the East African Law Society (EALS), as well as some members of 
Kenya’s opposition parties, campaigned against attempts to enact counterterrorism laws in 
Kenya. These organizations criticized the proposed laws because their ambiguous 
description of terrorist acts could be used to stifle the activities of opposition parties and 
undermine fundamental rights and freedoms in Kenya. Concerns over human rights and 
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democracy were brought to the fore when the government could not garner support for two 
proposed counterterrorism laws namely; the Suppression of Terrorism Bill in 2003 and the 
Anti-Terrorism Bill in 2006. These laws were rejected for being “unconstitutional, 
incompatible with international human rights standards, discriminatory towards Muslims 
and a threat to democracy as well as national harmony” (Mogire and Mkutu 2011, 477).  
Whitaker (2007, 2008, 2010, 2014) also argued that the main reason Kenya failed 
to enact counterterrorism measures between 2001 and 2011 was because political leaders 
and other members of civil society wanted to protect the country’s emerging democratic 
system. She noted that the country’s transition from autocratic to democratic rule in 2003 
emboldened political leaders to challenge any policies that they thought would roll-back 
Kenya’s democratic achievements. One such policy, Whitaker (2007) argued, was Kenya’s 
proposed counterterrorism legislation. She pointed out that political leaders in Kenya 
opposed counterterrorism legislation because the concerns that they had about the moral 
and legal implications of some of the counterterrorism laws superseded their fears about 
terrorist threats in Kenya.  
Whitaker’s analysis of Kenya’s experience drew parallels between concerns that 
were raised about counterterrorism measures in the US and Kenya. The US 
counterterrorism law, known as the Patriot Act,5 “limits individual freedom in the name of 
national security” (Whitaker 2007, 1018). For instance, the Patriot Act permits law 
enforcement agencies in the US to carry out enhanced surveillance and detain some 
 
5 Some of the provisions in the Patriot Act were changed when the US Freedom Act was enacted into law on 
June 2, 2015. The new Act put restrictions on how US law enforcement agencies collect mass data from the 
public (USA Freedom Act 2015).     
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terrorist suspects indefinitely. Like the Patriot Act, Whitaker (2007) contended that, 
Kenya’s proposed anti-terrorism legislation, which included the Suppression of Terrorism 
Bill, 2003, and the Anti-Terrorism Bill, 2006, placed constraints on individual freedoms 
and rights as trade-offs for security. Whitaker (2007, 2008, 2010) further noted that while 
various organizations and individuals started litigation processes to oppose the Patriot Act; 
human rights groups, politicians and some members of civil society were at the forefront 
of opposing counterterrorism legislation in Kenya. In a nutshell, Whitaker (2007, 2014) 
asserted that democracies, be they advanced, as is the case in the US, or emerging, as is the 
case in Kenya, cannot easily enact counterterrorism measures because of opposition from 
various groups, including civil society, that operate in a democratic space. 
 
Most of the works reviewed argued that civil liberties and human rights were 
important considerations in the development of counterterrorism measures in Kenya. 
However, there are two substantial issues that warrant further investigation. First, even 
though previous studies contend that Kenya did not enact counterterrorism measures to 
protect civil liberties from 2001-2011, there are no studies that explain why Kenya, which 
was still a democratic state in 2012, suddenly changed its position. In other words, was the 
protection of democracy ever important if civil liberties were quickly relegated to the back 
burner in favour of counterterrorism measures in 2012?  Second, there is disagreement on 
the impact that civil society had on Kenya’s decision not to enact counterterrorism 
measures after 9/11 and by extension protect the country’s emerging democracy. While 
some researchers give prominence to the role played by civil society (Mogire and Mkutu 
2011; Whitaker 2007, 2008, 2010, 2014) others are more cautious and point out that several 
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civil society groups were surprisingly unperturbed by the possibility of having draconian 
counterterrorism laws (Lind and Howell 2010). The conflicting arguments about the role 
of civil society and the importance of civil liberties weaken the assertion, made in most 
studies, that civil society blocked the enactment of counterterrorism measures.  
The Role of Kenyan Muslims 
Several studies have examined whether and how Kenyan Muslims have influenced the 
development of counterterrorism measures in Kenya. In her assessment of the development 
of counterterrorism measures in Kenya, Whitaker (2010) contended that Kenya’s political 
leaders were unwilling to enact counterterrorism measures after 9/11 because they did not 
want to alienate Muslims who make up a significant voting bloc in Kenya’s presidential 
election. She noted that multiparty politics and the constitutional requirement that 
presidential candidates were expected to win a minimum of 25% of the votes in every 
province (and every county after the promulgation of the new constitution in 2010) made 
it difficult to win Kenya’s presidential race without the Muslim vote. Politicians, therefore, 
had to be sensitive to the views of Kenyan Muslims, who were opposed to the proposed 
counterterrorism laws.  
Whitaker’s (2010) arguments concurred with those of Mogire and Mkutu (2011) 
who argued that the only reason why Kenya attempted to develop counterterrorism 
measures was because “US [military and economic] assistance was dependent on the 
country’s support of the Global War on Terror (GWOT)” (Mogire and Mkutu 2011, 484). 
Nevertheless, authorities in Kenya did not enact the counterterrorism laws in 2003 and 
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2006 “because of concerns about the reaction of [Kenyan] Muslims” (Mogire and Mkutu 
2011, 477). 
When examining why Kenya enacted counterterrorism laws in 2012, Whitaker 
(2014) argued that support from the Muslim community that had campaigned against 
counterterrorism legislation in the past boosted the government’s efforts to enact 
counterterrorism measures. She observed that Kenyan Muslims, including those from the 
Association of Muslim Organizations in Kenya, supported the Prevention of Terrorism Bill 
when it was tabled in parliament in July 2012. In addition to this, senior politicians as well 
as military and intelligence officials from Kenya’s predominantly Muslim Somali 
community appeared to support the country’s efforts to enact counterterrorism measures in 
2012. In this context, Whitaker (2014) observed that ethnic Somalis in Kenya’s 
government wanted Kenya to fight against Al Shabaab terrorists in Somalia. They, 
therefore, lobbied for Kenyan troops to create a buffer zone 6  that would separate Al 
Shabaab controlled areas in Somalia from Kenya, and supported Kenya’s military 
incursion into Somalia in 2011.   
The reviewed studies highlighted the significance of the Muslim community in 
Kenya’s quest to enact counterterrorism measures. Nevertheless, it is unclear why 
Muslims, who vehemently opposed counterterrorism legislation after 9/11 because they 
believed that they would be unfairly targeted by the laws, later supported a similar law in 
2012. In fact, contrary to the arguments made in previous studies, there were Muslims who 
opposed the enactment of the Prevention of Terrorism Act in 2012. For instance, a month 
 
6 The proposed name for the buffer zone was Jubaland (Whitaker 2014, 95). 
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before Kenya’s president assented to the new law, senior politicians from Kenya’s Somali 
community and other Muslim leaders held a press conference to protest against what they 
described as “a foreign agenda being imposed on the government of this land [Kenya] 
through threats of sanctions” (Citizen TV September 23, 2012, 0:39).  They also stated that 
the law was “draconian … and that it would reverse our hard gains of fundamental 
freedoms and civil liberties provided by our constitution” (Citizen TV September 23, 2012, 
0:59). The conflicting reactions towards counterterrorism measures among prominent 
members of Kenya’s Muslim community warrant further investigation.   
Perceptions about the Terrorist Threat in Kenya 
Several studies draw a link between how the terrorist threat was perceived in Kenya and 
the effects that this had on the country’s decision to enact counterterrorism measures. 
According to the former US Ambassador to Kenya, Johnnie Carson (2005)7, Kenya was 
reluctant to enact counterterrorism legislation after 9/11 because its political leaders did 
not believe that terrorism was a significant threat to Kenya’s security. Although Carson 
(2005) pointed out that Kenya cooperated with the US in the area of intelligence sharing, 
he wondered why top Kenyan politicians refused to acknowledge the existence of foreign 
terrorist cells or the possibility of home-grown terrorists in the country. This was despite 
evidence showing that at least two “Al Qaeda-affiliated cells had been operating in Kenya 
for over a decade” (Carson 2005, 174). Carson (2005), therefore, concluded that the US 
 
7 In addition to serving as the US Ambassador to Kenya from 1999-2006, Carson headed the US State 
Department task force to respond to the 1998 US Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. Carson also 
served as the Vice President of the National Defence University from 2003-2006 before being appointed as 
the National Intelligence Officer for Africa at the National Intelligence Council in the US (The American 
Academy of Diplomacy n.d).  
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and the Kenyan governments had different perceptions about the threat of terrorism in 
Kenya. While US officials genuinely believed that Kenya was susceptible to terrorist 
attacks, Kenyan officials, including top politicians and bureaucrats, thought that the US 
was exaggerating the presence of terrorist cells within Kenya. 
Kenyan officials were not the only ones who did not think that terrorism was an 
existential threat to Kenya. Lind and Howell (2010) pointed out that a section of Kenya’s 
civil society opposed anti-terrorism legislation after 9/11 by claiming that terrorism was 
not a significant threat to Kenya’s national security. Some members of civil society argued 
that the terrorist attacks carried out in Kenya targeted American interests and that Kenyans 
were unfortunate collateral victims of the attacks. Many Kenyans also believed that 
counterterrorism was not a public policy priority when compared to other public problems 
such as “economic disparities, limited access to resources and criminal activity” (Lind and 
Howell 2010, 347). In addition to this, some of Kenya’s political leaders felt that the US 
was forcing Kenya to institute legal and security measures against a war that was between 
the US and foreign terrorists.     
Mogire and Mkutu (2011) made similar observations. They argued that Kenyan 
politicians perceived counterterrorism as an imperialist tool that the US was using to pursue 
its global security agenda. Kenyan politicians and prominent members of civil society 
further believed that the US was the driving force behind the development of 
counterterrorism measures because the US government viewed Kenya as a strategic 
location for its counterterrorism operations in the Horn of Africa. Hence, Kenyan 
politicians and members of civil society claimed that the proposed Suppression of 
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Terrorism Bill, 2003, and the Anti-Terrorism Bill, 2006 were not designed to address 
Kenya’s security needs, but rather to tackle what the US government perceived as terrorist 
threats against American interests in Africa.  
The shift in Kenya’s counterterrorism policy in 2012, from unsecuritization to 
securitization, is attributed to attacks that took place in Lamu in 2011. In a study that 
examined why Kenya enacted counterterrorism measures in 2012, Lind, Mutahi and 
Oosterom (2015) suggested that Al Shabaab’s kidnapping of tourists and aid workers from 
Kenya, in September and October 2011, triggered the Kenyan government’s resolve to 
adopt counterterrorism measures. The kidnappings made the country’s leaders finally 
believe that terrorism was a serious threat to peace and stability in Kenya. This was 
reflected in comments made by Kenya’s Internal Security Minister, George Saitoti, in the 
immediate aftermath of the kidnappings. Noting that Kenya had a right to defend itself 
under international law, the Internal Security Minister observed:  
 
Kenya has been and remains an island of peace, and we shall 
not allow criminals from Somalia, which has been fighting 
for over two decades, to destabilize our peace. The 
kidnappers in Lamu who sneaked in and ran away must not 
be given a chance again (Lind, Mutahi and Oosterom 2015, 
22).   
Following on from the above declaration, Kenya launched Operation Linda Nchi 
(Operation Defend the Nation) and sent troops to Somalia in what became the country’s 
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“first significant cross-border military campaign since its independence” (Lind, Mutahi and 
Oosterom 2015, 22).   
Based on the arguments above, previous studies concur that Kenya did not enact 
counterterrorism measures between 2001 and 2011 because members of Kenya’s 
parliament and the country’s cabinet ministers did not believe that terrorism was a serious 
national security threat (Carson 2005; Mogire and Mkutu 2011; Lind and Howell 2010). 
The studies also argue that many senior Kenyan politicians and bureaucrats, who had 
rejected the idea that terrorism was a national security threat in the aftermath of 9/11, later 
changed their views leading to the enactment of counterterrorism measures in 2012 (Lind 
Mutahi and Oosterom 2015).  
Other than making references to the two kidnapping incidences in Lamu in 2011, 
the studies do not explain what other factors led to the realization that terrorism was an 
existential threat in 2012.  In so doing, the studies overlook the clear disconnect between 
what Kenya’s politicians and cabinet ministers claimed between 2001 and 2011 and what 
was happening in Kenya during that time. For instance, the Global Terrorism Database 
(2018) shows that terrorist threat levels in Kenya remained relatively high between 2001 
and 2011. There was also a sharp increase in the number and severity of terrorist attacks in 
Kenya after 9/11; there were several terrorist attacks in big cities, such as Nairobi and 
Mombasa, as well as in smaller towns, such as Garissa, Wajir and Mandera (Meservey 
2013; Miyandazi 2012). These attacks included: Al Qaeda’s bombing of a hotel in 
Mombasa in November 2002; a suicide bombing at a religious gathering in 2007; the 
kidnapping of a Kenyan worker in Somalia in April 2008; Al Shabaab’s kidnapping of two 
Kenyan aid workers in November 2008; Al Shabaab’s kidnapping of two nuns from Kenya 
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in November 2008; Al Shabaab’s kidnapping of a Kenyan cleric in 2009; an Al Shabaab 
grenade attack on a bus in Nairobi in December 2010; a rocket attack in Garissa in October 
2011; an Al Shabaab bomb attack on a Kenyan security vehicle in October 2011, Al 
Shabaab’s kidnapping of two doctors at the Dadaab refugee camp in October 2011 and 
several grenade bombings in Nairobi in October 2011 (For details see Appendix 1; 
Mickolus 2014; Al Jazeera 2017a; Global Terrorism Database 2018; Institute for 
Economics and Peace 2015).    
 Furthermore, between 2001 and 2011, Kenya featured in several lists of the top ten 
countries most affected by terrorism in the world (Institute for Economics and Peace 2015). 
Given this evidence, why did Kenya’s government reject counterterrorism measures amidst 
the fatalities and destruction caused by terrorist attacks between 2001 and 2011? In addition 
to this, previous studies do not explain why members of parliament, cabinet ministers and 
civil society, who were often deeply divided on several policy issues, could create a unified 
front against counterterrorism measures for almost a decade only to turn around and 
support the very measures that they had earlier opposed. This thesis answers these 
questions by explaining the factors that led to the realignment of the Kenyan government’s 
position on counterterrorism measures.   
 
Kenya’s Economic Interests 
Did efforts to protect Kenya’s traditional and emerging economic interests influence the 
government’s decisions about enacting counterterrorism measures in the country? Carson 
(2005) noted that Kenya’s government was wary that the country’s image as a tourism 
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destination would be undermined if it publicly admitted that terrorism was a security threat. 
Hence, although President Mwai Kibaki supported the proposed counterterrorism 
legislation in 2003, the Kenyan government silently withdrew the legislation as it could 
not garner enough support in parliament.    
Within the context of Kenya’s traditional and emerging economic interests, 
Mwangi (2016b) argued that in addition to security concerns, Kenya’s decision to enact 
counterterrorism measures in 2012 was motivated by economic concerns. By taking a 
stance against terrorism, Kenya hoped to secure Lamu, a coastal town that is approximately 
690 kilometres from the Kenya-Somali border. Mwangi (2016b) gave two reasons why 
Lamu was important. First, Lamu was an essential part of Kenya’s US$1 billion tourism 
industry. Second, Kenya is constructing a multi-billion-dollar port in Lamu that will serve 
the East African region. The Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) 
corridor will pass through Kenya’s north-eastern regions and provide a link between 
Kenya, Ethiopia and South Sudan. It will include “pipelines, rail line, highways, airports, 
an oil refinery and extra deep berths for next generation super tankers” (Mwangi 2016b, 
123; Al Jazeera 2017b). 
There are two limitations with the arguments that link Kenya’s economic interests 
to the decisions that the country made about counterterrorism measures. First, it is 
important to interrogate the claim that Kenya failed to enact counterterrorism measures 
because its government believed that doing so would taint the country’s image as a safe 
tourist destination and have a negative impact on tourism revenue. Even though some 
Kenyan politicians and some stakeholders in the tourism industry held this view, many 
others did not. For instance, after 9/11, political leaders from regions that depended on 
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tourism revenue as well as individuals who had invested in the tourism industry urged the 
government to increase security and take a tougher stance against terrorism as a strategy of 
safeguarding the tourism industry (Munene 2012).  
Besides, from the perspective of its development partners in the West, Kenya’s 
image as a safe tourism destination was pegged to its government’s willingness to be part 
of the war on terror. Therefore, Western states that were among the biggest suppliers of 
tourists to Kenya issued travel advisories against Kenya on the ground that its failure to 
enact counterterrorism measures was tantamount to its unwillingness to fight terrorism 
(Munene 2012; Fisher 2013). The economic consequences of such travel advisories were 
deeply adverse.  As Okumu (2007) noted, “income from tourism-related industries 
[dropped] by at least 70 percent whenever such [travel] alerts [were] issued against 
countries [like Kenya] that are dependent on revenue from tourism” (Okumu 2007, 46).  
Indeed, in 2004, Kenya’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs estimated that the country had lost 
approximately USD 139 million because of the travel ban issued by the UK government 
(Okumu 2007).     
Based on the premises above, enacting counterterrorism measures immediately 
after 9/11 would have pacified Kenya’s development partners and bolstered the country’s 
image as a safe tourism destination. Hence, the argument that Kenya’s government rejected 
counterterrorism measures to protect the country’s image needs further investigation.  
Second, Mwangi (2016b) does not explain why some of the key economic concerns 
that triggered the enactment of counterterrorism measures in 2012 did not result in a similar 
response between 2001 and 2011. Afterall, as Mwangi (2016b) stated, “Lamu has always 
been of strategic importance to Kenya’s US 1 billion coastal tourism industry” (Mwangi 
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2016b, 123).  Given this fact, why did it take Kenya so long to enact counterterrorism 
measures if such measures were integral to protecting the country’s tourism industry? 
Given the shortcomings in the previous studies, what other reasons, economic or otherwise, 
triggered the Kenyan government’s decision to enact counterterrorism measures in 2012? 
Anti-American Sentiments 
A few studies have argued that anti-American sentiments and efforts to demonstrate 
political autonomy from the US were key reasons why Kenya did not enact 
counterterrorism measures in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. According to Whitaker 
(2007, 2014), some Kenyan politicians believed that the US was coercing the government 
to enact counterterrorism laws that were similar to the US Patriot Act. For instance, the 
politicians8 claimed that the US had issued travel alerts against Kenya because the country 
had not given in to US demands to pass counterterrorism legislation.  
A number of Kenyan human rights activists9 also believed that the US was the 
driving force behind Kenya’s proposed counterterrorism legislation in 2003 and 2006. The 
activists claimed that US foreign aid to Kenya was contingent upon the enactment of an 
anti-terrorism law. Whitaker (2007, 2014) disputed this claim arguing that US foreign aid 
to Kenya increased despite the country’s failure to pass counterterrorism legislation after 
9/11. However, she acknowledged that US diplomats tried, without success, to push for the 
 
8 Although Whitaker’s articles do not indicate who the politicians were, parliamentary debates indicate that 
a few members of parliament such as Titus Ngoyoni and Aden Duale, wondered whether the travel advisories 
had been issued with the intention of pressuring Kenya to enact an anti-terrorism law (Kenya. Parliament. 
July 28, 2004, 3029-3031).   
9 They included: 1) Kangethe Mungai, the coordinator of Release Political Prisoners which is a human rights 
group in Kenya and 2) Isaak Hassan, an advocate of the High Court in Kenya and a member of the 
Constitution of Kenya Review Commission (VOA 2009; Hassan 2003). 
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adoption of counterterrorism legislation in Kenya. Whitaker (2007, 2010, 2014) noted that 
US diplomatic efforts did not bear fruit as prominent members of Kenya’s parliament 
reacted to US pressure by vowing to block any attempts by the government to pass 
counterterrorism legislation.  
Whitaker’s studies (2007, 2010, 2014) show that some politicians and human rights 
activists in Kenya rebuffed counterterrorism measures after 9/11 because they believed that 
the US was imposing these measures on Kenya. The anti-American views that were 
expressed can be understood within the framework of post-colonial nationalism. Post-
colonial nationalism is associated with political elites, in former colonies, who share a 
common interest in protecting their states from new forms of economic, political and social 
control by former colonial powers and other powerful states. In the case of Africa, the 
suspicions that political elites have about powerful states (particularly former colonial 
states) is intrinsically tied to the continent’s experiences during the colonial period 
(Ahluwalia 2001). For instance, the term terrorist was used and abused in the context of 
liberation struggles during the colonial period (Ford 2011).  
Another facet of post-colonial nationalism is the belief that Africa’s engagement 
with developed countries is largely based on an exploitative relationship. This belief is 
often used as a lens through which some political elites view policies that have originated 
from Western states. In Kenya’s case, counterterrorism measures, especially 
counterterrorism legislation, was often viewed as an American agenda. As Mogire and 
Mkutu (2011, 485) observed, “critics [of counterterrorism] argue that Kenyan 
counterterrorism policy serves as a cover for US imperialism.”  
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Notwithstanding the compelling arguments above, it is highly unlikely that anti-
American sentiments had a significant impact on Kenya’s failure to enact counterterrorism 
measures between 2001 and 2011. This is because there are several indications that a 
section of Kenya’s politicians had historically encouraged and welcomed America’s 
influence in domestic politics in Kenya. For instance, the US was credited with helping 
some members of Kenya’s opposition to exert pressure on the country’s second president, 
Moi, leading to Kenya’s transition from a one-party state to a multi-party state in 1991 
(Munene 2001). Indeed, several members of Kenya’s opposition, who had campaigned 
against the Moi government before and after Kenya became a multiparty state, were 
prominent members of Kenya’s parliament between 2001 and 2011. Moreover, surveys on 
pro- and anti-Americanism revealed that Kenya was consistently ranked as a pro-American 
state (Datta 2014; Gettelman 2006).  In light of these arguments, it is unclear if anti-
Americanism played a decisive role in Kenya’s rejection of counterterrorism measures in 
the aftermath of 9/11. By extension, it is also unclear if a shift in Kenya’s attitude towards 
the US in 2012 contributed to the securitization of terrorism and the enactment of 
counterterrorism measures.  
 
Organization of the Thesis 
 
This thesis is divided into six chapters that unravel Kenya’s puzzling counterterrorism 
policy. It begins with a detailed account of the theoretical framework and research design 
of the study. This is followed by a critical assessment of political violence in Kenya noting 
that the country’s oscillation between ethnopolitical violence and terrorism had an impact 
on how the terrorism threat was perceived and constructed. Chapter three also explains 
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how several factors that affected counterterrorism policymaking in Kenya emerged. They 
range from the contextual factors that were identified in chapter one to underlying factors 
that were used to instigate ethnopolitical violence and terrorism in Kenya. Essentially, 
chapter three sets the stage for many of the arguments that are made in subsequent chapters.  
  Chapter four focuses on the rise of homegrown terrorism in Kenya. The chapter 
explores whether homegrown terrorism in Kenya is linked to the rise of Al Shabaab, first 
in Somalia and later in Kenya. The chapter examines Al Shabaab’s recruitment and 
radicalization patterns in Kenya and investigates their effects on terrorism attacks in the 
country.  Furthermore, chapter four identifies a new variable which may explain why 
Kenya is the preferred target of Al Shabaab attacks outside Somalia. The new variable has 
not been discussed in previous studies and may provide insights about the way forward for 
Kenya’s counterterrorism policy.  
Next, is chapter five which explains how and why Kenya’s transition from 
autocracy to democracy affected the country’s counterterrorism making process. This 
chapter begins with a brief but critical discussion about how autocratic rule was entrenched 
in Kenya over a period of 40 years before the country elected a coalition of opposition 
parties in 2002. By discussing Kenya’s autocratic past, chapter five identifies the root 
causes of impunity and unprofessionalism in Kenya’s security agencies and institutions 
and examines whether these factors impeded the government’s ability to identify threats to 
national security. Chapter five also examines the intrigues of key actors in Kenya’s 
coalition government as they grappled with the machinations of power-sharing amid efforts 
to enact counterterrorism measures.  
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The last half of chapter five focuses on events that happened after the promulgation 
of a new constitution in Kenya in 2010. The new constitution was hailed as an important 
development because it provided the framework for reforming Kenya’s security agencies 
and institutions. The reforms that were implemented and their impact on Kenya’s 
counterterrorism policy are critically discussed. Additionally, the 2010 constitution 
contains several provisions that safeguard the individual rights and freedoms of Kenyan 
citizens. In many ways, the 2010 constitution was a critical step in the long struggle to 
entrench democracy in Kenya. This chapter examines the effects of democracy on Kenya’s 
counterterrorism policy.  
Chapter six focuses on the economic costs and benefits of enacting counterterrorism 
measures in Kenya. It investigates why the LAPSSET project and the discovery of oil in 
Kenya changed how the country’s securitization actors perceived the terrorism threat. The 
anticipated economic benefits of the LAPSETT project and Kenya’s oil discovery are 
discussed and the vulnerability of their installations to Al Shabaab attacks are analysed. 
Additionally, the chapter discusses the importance of tourism to Kenya’s economy and the 
impact that this had on counterterrorism policymaking.  
    Finally, the last chapter of this thesis is divided into three parts. The first part 
provides an overview of the puzzle that the research sought to solve, the motivations for 
the research as well as its objectives. This is followed by discussions on the key findings 
of this research and some of their policy implications. The third part of the conclusion 
highlights the contributions that this research has made to knowledge about Kenya’s 
counterterrorism policy and securitization theory.  
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Chapter Two 




The aim of this chapter is to critically discuss the theoretical framework, hypothesis and 
methodology that were used to study Kenya’s counterterrorism making process. Security 
policymaking processes can be studied using a variety of frameworks. Given the sheer 
number of frameworks in International Relations, this thesis will only highlight some of 
the alternative theories that have been used to understand security decision making 
processes before focusing on securitization theory as the most appropriate framework for 
this study. This chapter also explains how the hypothesis was developed and elaborates on 
the methods that were used to collect and analyse data.   
 
  Alternative Frameworks for Studying Security Policymaking Processes  
 
Security making processes can be studied using an array of frameworks. They range from 
liberalism which can be used to understand how liberal ideas impact policy decisions to 
pluralism which focuses on the role of non-state actors in policymaking processes.  One of 
the most commonly used frameworks in security research is Graham Allison and Phillip 
Zelikow’s conceptual model on decision making.  According to Allison and Zelikow 
(1999), the behaviour of governments during the process of decision making can be 
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understood and predicted by combining three models of analysis. The first model known 
as the rational policy model postulates that states make decisions based on the selection of 
the most pragmatic policy from several policy choices. The process of selection is guided 
by a logical analysis of the pros and cons of each policy choice until an optimum decision 
is made. While it may appear as if governments are the sole decision makers in foreign 
policy and security matters, they do not act unilaterally rather, other actors play critical 
roles in the decision-making process.  
The role of other actors can be understood by using the second and third models. 
The second model known as the organizational process model views the decision that a 
government makes as a cumulative output of the rules, structures, cultures and procedures 
of all the bureaucratic organizations whose tasks and responsibilities are relevant to the 
policy choice that must be made. Since policy related to security matters such as 
counterterrorism are quite complex, their implementation will often involve several 
organizations, each working to achieve its assigned task. Allison and Zelikow (1999) also 
point out that because governments are made up of several organizations with varying 
standards of procedures, a government policy may not reflect the overall security strategies 
of other key actors in the political system. The third model, referred to as bureaucratic 
politics, focuses on the role of political actors at the top of organizations whose tasks and 
responsibilities are relevant to the policy choices that are under consideration.  These 
political actors engage in various bargaining games that eventually result in a policy that 
represents the interests of the most influential negotiators. Allison and Zelikow (1999) 
conclude that irrespective of the competing policy interests that may exist in a political 
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system, decision making processes must be guided by a state’s capacity to distinguish 
between vital interests and other interests.   
Allison and Zelikow developed a very useful model for understanding how 
different stakeholders in a government influence the policymaking process. However, by 
placing emphasis on the objectivity of security problems and the decision-making process, 
the model leaves very little room for exploring how security policies develop in different 
socio-political contexts. The study is, therefore, founded on securitization theory which 
provides a framework for investigating how varying contextual settings impact security 
policies.     
 
Securitization Theory and Counterterrorism Policymaking in Kenya 
 
This study is grounded in the assumptions of securitization theory which provides a 
framework for understanding the processes through which security threats are constructed 
and addressed. Balzacq (2011b) identified two prerequisites for using securitization theory 
in research. First, the problem being investigated should be “a focus of public attention or 
debate” (Balzacq 2011b, 32). Second, “the issue should be a target for activities related to 
public opinion or legal and/or political actions” (Balzacq 2011b, 32). As discussed in the 
puzzle and literature review of this thesis, terrorism and counterterrorism were key issues 
in Kenya’s public debate for many years. Securitization theory is, therefore, well suited for 
this study.   
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Initiated by Ole Wæver in the early 1990s, securitization theory departs from the 
traditional notion that security issues are objective threats10 and instead views security as 
subjective problems that are socially constructed into threats through discursive processes 
(Wæver 2000, 2003). According to Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998) the discursive 
process is illocutionary and intersubjective. It involves social interactions, referred to as 
speech acts, between: 1) a securitizing actor, who has the authority to formulate a problem 
as a security threat to a referent object;11 2) an audience that endorses a problem as an 
existential threat; and 3) functional actors who have the ability to influence decisions that 
are made during the securitization process.  
It then follows that the selection and conceptualization of the securitization actors 
is dependent on the function that the securitization act is intended to serve (Vuori 2008; 
Balzacq 2011a). On this basis, the criteria for selecting the securitization actors for this 
study stemmed from their functional descriptions’ vis-a-vis the securitization of terrorism 
in Kenya. By virtue of their constitutional role as the key decision makers in matters of 
national security, the executive branch of Kenya’s government which was made up of the 
president, the prime minister (2008-2012)12 and cabinet ministers was the securitizing actor 
for this study. Another reason why the executive arm of government was selected as the 
securitizing actor for this study is because it has the power to propose laws and policies 
 
10 Securitization theory differs from realism and neorealism which objectively define insecurity as 
independent threats that exist in the anarchic international system (Booth 2007). 
11Something whose survival is being threatened (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998, 36).  Huysmans (2006, 
25) elaborates that when framing the security threat, the securitizing actor must demonstrate that the operation 
of every other activity such as the economy, democracy and freedom depends on the survival of the referent 
object.  
12 The position of a prime minister was created in 2008 as part of the negotiations for a coalition government 
after the 2007 post-election violence in Kenya.  
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that affect Kenya’s national security (Constitution of Kenya 2010).  Kenya’s parliament, 
which has the power to approve and enact laws that pave the way for changes in security 
policy were the audience for this study.  
Functional actors included groups and individuals who had vested interests in the 
outcome of Kenya’s counterterrorism policy and were able to influence actors who 
controlled the outcome of the policy namely; members of the executive branch of 
government as well as members of Kenya’s parliament. This study identified civil society 
in Kenya, security agencies and institutions in Kenya, Kenya’s development partners and 
international organizations involved in counterterrorism policymaking as the functional 
actors. They included the US, the United Kingdom (UK), the UN, the EU, the AU, NGOs 
religious organizations and security agencies that are represented in Kenya’s National 
Security Council.   
Although the securitizing and functional actors play important roles in the 
securitization of a threat, it is the audience that ultimately determines the outcome of the 
process. Consequently, even though a securitizing actor may have the power to identify 
and construct a security problem as an existential threat, their power is not absolute and 
does not guarantee that an audience “will accept a claim for necessary security action” 
(Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998, 31). To successfully securitize a problem as an 
existential threat, a securitizing actor’s utterances must be based on events or factors that 
an audience can relate to. Therefore, a securitizing actor will not simply succeed because 
they have the power to securitize a threat but because their words are able to tap into the 
psyche of an audience and invoke feelings that a security problem is an existential threat.  
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Once the audience identifies a problem as an existential threat, it ceases to be part of normal 
politics and paves the way for the use of extraordinary measures to address the threat 
(Balzacq 2011a; Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998).    
The use of extraordinary measures is synonymous with security measures that 
denote a clear shift in security policy (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998, 33). To 
distinguish between normal politics and securitization Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998) 
noted that any decision related to public policy falls within a spectrum of three categories. 
The first category, known as non-politicized, consists of issues that have not elicited any 
public debate. The second category is made up of politicized issues that are part of normal 
politics or public policy and are subject to government decisions as well as the allocation 
of public funds. The third category, referred to as securitized, includes issues that are 
described as existential threats which require extraordinary measures for them to be 
addressed.  
Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998) also argued that successful securitization is an 
anomaly because it results from the failure of normal politics – a process through which 
issues are openly debated upon before a final decision is made. This differs from 
securitization where issues are regarded as being so critical that they “should not be 
exposed to the normal haggling of politics” (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998, 29).  
Therefore, rather than accept securitization as an end result, Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 
(1998) argued against the successful securitization of threats in favour of their 
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desecuritization/ non-securitization,13 described as a process through which security threats 
are reconstituted and addressed within the realm of normal politics.   
Even though the founders of securitization theory contributed to a better 
understanding of threat construction in security studies, there is one critical aspect of the 
securitization process that the theory does not clearly explain. While the illocutionary and 
intersubjective nature of the securitization process gives eminence to the roles played by 
the securitization actors (the securitizing actor, the audience and the functional actor) the 
theory does not provide a clear conceptualization of some of these actors. The lack of 
clarity about the features of the securitization actors makes it difficult for researchers to 
operationalize these concepts in empirical studies (Balzacq 2011a, 2016; Stritzel 2007; 
Salter 2011; McDonald 2008). Indeed, in an article that expounds on securitization theory, 
Wæver (2003) admits to this shortcoming and gives two suggestions on how researchers 
can clarify the roles of one of the actors, that is, the audience in securitization processes.  
First, he noted that the audience should have “a better definition and probably 
differentiation” (Wæver 2003, 26) in the securitization process. This is because a political 
system and nature of a security problem can result in multiple and varied audiences taking 
part in securitization. Consequently, the audience does not have to comprise of the 
population in a democratic state but may also include other constituencies within the state 
such as bureaucratic institutions whose tasks and responsibilities are relevant to the 
problem under securitization. Second, Wæver (2003) recommended that researchers 
should divide the audience into different categories so as to have a better understanding of 
 
13 Roe (2004), refers to desecuritization as non-securitization, whereby, threats are not framed as security 
issues. Rather than desecuritizing threats Roe (2004) suggests that security problems should be either 
managed or transformed within the framework of security discourse.    
~ 36 ~ 
 
their impact on the securitization process. He, however, did not give any details on what 
these categories may be, how they can be developed or how they would relate to each other 
in the securitization process.   
Building on the works of Wæver, a few scholars have divided the audience into 
different categories in efforts to clarify the concept and unpack the “politics of consent” 
(Salter 2008, 324). Vuori (2008) suggested that distinct audiences can be identified based 
on the impact that they will have on the securitizing actor’s capacity to enact extraordinary 
security measures. He, therefore, divided the audience into two broad categories. The first 
category is made up of audiences that provide formal support to the securitizing actor while 
the second includes audiences that morally support the use of extraordinary security 
measures. Even though the two categories of audiences have the power to legitimize the 
use of extraordinary measures, it is the formal audience that ultimately gives the 
securitizing actor the mandate to enact extraordinary security measures. In this context, the 
formal audience determines the success or failure of the securitization process.  
Like Vuori (2008), Roe (2008) provided a distinction between formal and moral 
audiences. He categorized the general public as moral supporters of the securitization 
process and policymakers as formal supporters of the process. Whereas, formal support is 
critical to the successful securitization of a threat, Roe (2008) noted that an increase in the 
level of congruence between formal and moral support increases the likelihood of 
successful securitization. Adding to this, Biba (2016) noted that the political elite, defined 
as a small group of individuals who hold significant economic and political power, have a 
higher chance of successfully securitizing an issue when compared with non-state actors. 
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This is because they are more likely to get the government support that is needed to 
implement extraordinary security measures.    
Other factors that should be considered when identifying the audience, categorizing 
them into groups and assessing their influence on the securitization process are the amount 
of power that they wield and, to a lesser extent, their level of expertise in relation to the 
security problem. Since the construction of a security problem is discursive power relations 
as well as knowledge have a profound impact on how the security problem develops into a 
threat and the choice of measures that are used to address the threat (Balzacq 2011a). 
Furthermore, factoring in power relations and knowledge into the analysis of the 
securitization process can enable a researcher to identify and explain cases of failed 
securitization or unsecuritization.  
Using power relations and knowledge as determining factors, Salter (2008, 2011) 
developed a model with four levels of analysis namely: elite, technocratic, scientific and 
popular audiences. 14  He stated that the model enables researchers to interrogate the 
“different logics of persuasion, different epistemologies and [different] power networks” 
(Salter 2011, 122) under which each category operates. In so doing, the researcher is able 
to determine specific intricacies of the securitization process such as the dominant or prime 
audience in relation to the success and failure of securitization as well as the effects of the 
interaction between the categories on the securitization process. Balzacq, Léonard and 
Ruzicka (2016) also pointed out that identifying diverse audiences involved in 
 
14 Salter does not describe or define these audience categories.    
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securitization and analysing the impact that each audience has on the process will enable a 
researcher to avoid false generalizations.   
In addition to disaggregating the audience into different categories, proponents of 
securitization theory indicate that political and historical context have an impact on the 
securitization process. While acknowledging the importance of speech acts in the 
securitization process several theorists, including Stritzel (2007), Salter (2008, 2011), 
Balzacq (2011a), Vuori (2011) and Balzacq, Léonard and Ruzicka (2015), suggested that 
analysing securitization acts that take place alongside15 and antecedent16 to the speech acts 
may provide insights on the reasons why securitization succeeds or fails. Similarily, Ciută 
(2009), argued that a contextual approach allows a researcher to strengthen “the empirical 
focus of security analysis without losing its conceptual and theoretical sophistication” 
Ciută 2009, 324).   
According to Balzacq (2005, 184) “securitization is a complex repertoire of 
causes.” It does not occur in a vacuum. Therefore, an investigation that is solely based on 
the discursive component of the securitization process may not identify why a 
securitization move succeeded or failed. In addition to this, Vuori (2011) argued that 
examining the process of securitization in as many contexts as possible may reveal how 
different securitization actors perform in different contexts. This would enable a researcher 
to uncover how context empowers and disempowers securitizing actors and the effects of 
this on the securitization process.  
 
15 Within the context of this study, the researcher will examine the impact that Kenya’s incursion against Al 
Shabaab in Somalia, in 2011, had on its decision to enact its first counterterrorism law in 2012. 
16 The study also examines the effects of historical events on counterterrorism policymaking in Kenya.  
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Adding to this, Roe (2008) and Balzacq (2011b) suggested that observing “the 
degree of congruence between different circumstances that constrain and drive a 
securitization process” (Balzacq 2011b, 49) can reveal why an audience rejects or accepts 
a securitizing move. This means that the audience does not simply accept, at face value, a 
securitizing actor’s claim that a security problem is an existential threat. On the contrary, 
such a claim is evaluated against the context in which it is made.  
Successful securitization is also dependent on the securitizing actor’s ability to tap 
into “the audience’s feelings, needs and interests” (Balzacq 2005, 184). Vuori (2008) refers 
to this ability as the perlocutionary effect, whereby, the securitizing actor relates the threat 
to the audience’s experiences. Expounding on this, Salter (2011, 2008) argued that 
securitization is more likely to succeed if the securitizing actor makes securitization speech 
acts when there is a receptive environment for securitization. In his assessment, the most 
conducive environment for successful securitization is when there is a “climate of fear.”17 
Another important analytical component of securitization theory is the failure of 
securitization or what Salter (2011) referred to as unsecuritization. He identified two 
scenarios that would result in unsecuritization. First, there could be faults in the speech act 
that is used to frame the security threat. In this case, the audience would not be convinced 
that the security problem is an existential threat. Second, even though the securitizing actor 
 
17 For an in-depth account of Salter’s arguments see Salter, Mark. 2011. “When Securitization Fails: The 
Hard Case of Counterterrorism Programs.” In Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and 
Dissolved, edited by Thierry Balzacq, 116-132.  London: Routledge; Salter, Mark. 2008. “Securitization and 
Desecuritization: A Dramaturgical Analysis of the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority.” Journal of 
International Relations and Development 11, no. 4: 321-349.      
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may successfully frame a security problem as an existential threat, the process of 
securitization may fail if a section of the audience rejects the extraordinary security 
measures that are proposed to address the threat. In this instance, the audience would 
respond with an alternative speech act that counters the proposed measures.  
While the audience’s rejection of a speech act or extraordinary security measure 
may denote the end of a securitization process, there may be instances where speech acts, 
between the securitizing actor and the audience, are reignited until securitization occurs. In 
such cases, securitization would succeed if the audience concedes that a security problem 
is an existential threat that must be addressed using extraordinary security measures. This 
aspect of securitization, how and why a securitization process shifts from unsecuritization 
to securitization, depicts the puzzle of counterterrorism policymaking in Kenya and is the 
focus of this thesis.  
The last analytical component of securitization theory is desecuritization/non-
securitization. As explained earlier, Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998) viewed 
securitization as an anomaly and advocated for its deconstruction through the process of 
desecuritization. While acknowledging the importance of desecuritization in the study of 
security issues, this study is limited to understanding the unsecuritization and securitization 
of terrorism in Kenya.  
Hypothesis 
 
The literature review identified five themes that explain the development of 
counterterrorism measures in Kenya. While these themes provide insights on the issues 
that have permeated counterterrorism debates in the country, they do not fully or 
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satisfactorily answer the research questions. To reiterate, why did the Kenyan government 
fail to enact counterterrorism measures between 2001 and 2011 when it had good domestic 
and external reasons for doing so? Second, why did the Kenyan government shift its 
position in 2012 and enact counterterrorism measures? To answer these questions, the 
study puts forward and tests one main hypothesis that is founded on securitization theory.  
Proponents of securitization theory agree that the outcome of a securitization 
process, namely the unsecuritization or securitization of a threat, largely depends on how 
the securitizing actors and the audience perceive a security problem. In the case of 
counterterrorism policymaking in Kenya, the securitizing actors were individuals who had 
the authority to declare that terrorism was an existential threat to Kenya and that the country 
had to enact counterterrorism measures to survive. They included the president, the prime 
minister and cabinet ministers who were members of the executive arm of Kenya’s 
government. The audience were individuals who had the power to reject or accept the claim 
that terrorism was an existential threat and block attempts to enact counterterrorism 
measures. They comprised of Kenya’s lawmakers also known as members of parliament.  
One of the defining features of counterterrorism policymaking in Kenya in 2003 
(when the Suppression of Terrorism Bill was rejected) and 2006 (when the Anti-Terrorism 
Bill was rejected) was the discordant perceptions that the president, cabinet ministers and 
members of Kenya’s parliament had about the terrorist threat in Kenya and the measures 
that were proposed to address the threat. This contrasted with counterterrorism 
policymaking in 2012 when most securitization actors, including those who had opposed 
the 2003 and 2006 anti-terrorism bills, spoke with one voice in support of enacting 
counterterrorism measures. 
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Based on the arguments above the hypothesis tested in this study is: Kenya’s 
enactment of counterterrorism measures depended on consensus building among the 
country’s executive (securitizing actors) and legislative (audience) arms of government. It 
then follows that the challenge for the securitizing actors (president, prime minister and 
cabinet ministers) was to arrive at “a fundamental and stable national consensus” (George 
1980, 234)18 with the audience (members of Kenya’s parliament). However, achieving 
national consensus on counterterrorism policy is not simply a matter of cajoling those who 
oppose security measures into accepting that a security problem is an existential threat. As 
several securitization theorists have stated, the contextual factors in which the 
securitization process takes place, that is - all significant events that occur prior to and 
during the securitization process, have an impact on the outcome of the securitization 
process (Balzacq 2005; McDonald 2008; Balzacq Léonard and Ruzicka 2016; Salter 2008, 
2011; Vuori 2011).  
Security is usually constructed over time through a range of incremental processes. 
Hence, narrowly focusing on the moment that an audience accepts that a security problem 
is an existential threat will not account for the factors that contributed to the securitization 
of the threat or the enactment of extraordinary security measures (McDonald 2008). It is, 
therefore, important for researchers to include contextual factors in the analysis of 
securitization processes. This thesis proposes three contextual factors that contributed to a 
lack of consensus that terrorism was an existential threat in 2003 and 2006 
 
18 George’s (1980) argument is based on his analysis of domestic constraints on US foreign policy.  
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(unsecuritization) and three factors that led to consensus that terrorism was an existential 
threat in 2012 (securitization).  
 Contextual Factors in the Unsecuritization of Terrorism in Kenya 
Three contextual factors contributed to a lack of consensus that terrorism was an existential 
threat to Kenya. They were; 1) the perception that foreigners, who were carrying out attacks 
against American and Israeli installations in Kenya, were the main perpetrators of terrorist 
attacks in the country; 2) the inability of Kenya’s security agencies and institutions to 
securitize terrorism as an existential threat; and 3) the preoccupation of Kenya’s 
securitizing actors (the president and cabinet ministers)19 with the machinations of power 
sharing in Kenya.      
Foreign Attackers Targeting American and Israeli Installations 
The US Embassy bombing in Kenya in 1998 and the bombing of an Israeli hotel in 
Mombasa in 2002 became the focal points of discussions about enacting counterterrorism 
measures in Kenya after 9/11. The fact that the perpetrators and planners of the attacks 
were predominantly foreign nationals who attacked foreign installations in Kenya 
contributed to the narrative that the threats were not directed at the Kenyan state. This thesis 
argues that Kenya’s government could not arrive at a consensus that terrorism was an 
existential threat to Kenya because several members of parliament and cabinet ministers 
were unconvinced that the terrorists’ intention was to destroy the Kenyan state.  In their 
view, it was the United States’ and Israel’s survival that was under threat from transnational 
 
19 The position of the prime minister did not exist during this time. It was created in 2008. 
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terrorist groups that had declared jihad against the two states. The validity of this contextual 
factor is examined in chapter three.   
Kenya’s Security Agencies and Institutions  
Security agencies and institutions are supposed to provide the president and his Cabinet 
with information that is used to inform national security policy. In Kenya’s case, however, 
security agencies and institutions had a culture of subservience to the office of the president 
that had been entrenched over a period of 40 years of the Kenya African National Union’s 
(KANU’s) rule. As a result, the main role of Kenya’s security agencies and institutions, 
when KANU was in power, was to clamp down on political dissidents that were portrayed 
as threats to the Kenyan state. This limited their view of security to buttressing the president 
and those who were close to him from individuals and groups that dared to challenge the 
status quo.  
On this basis, this thesis argues that the election of a new democratic government in Kenya 
in 2002 did not automatically transform the country’s security agencies and institutions 
into professional and functional entities.  On the contrary, the new government inherited 
security agencies that needed to be reformed before they could become functional. Hence, 
in the aftermath of 9/11 Kenya’s security agencies and institutions lacked the professional 
aptitude that would have enabled them to identify significant threats to Kenya’s national 
security. They, therefore, did not identify terrorism as an existential threat to Kenya even 
though other actors, such as the US, cautioned Kenya about the presence of terrorist cells 
in the country.  The validity of this contextual factor is examined in chapter four.   
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Preoccupation with Power Sharing 
The interests of the president and cabinet ministers in Kenya played a significant role in 
the securitization process. As was discussed earlier in this chapter, the president and cabinet 
ministers were the securitizing actors in Kenya’s counterterrorism policymaking processes 
in 2003 and 2006. Since securitizing actors set the tone for the seriousness of existential 
threats, their demeanour towards a threat will affect the outcome of a securitization process.  
This thesis argues that the governing elite in Kenya, who came to power just over 
a year after 9/11, were preoccupied with the machinations of power sharing in the 
government which impeded their ability to consolidate support for the enactment of 
counterterrorism measures. Consequently, Kenya’s government could not reach a 
consensus that terrorism was an existential threat, nor could it garner the political will that 
was needed to enact counterterrorism measures.  The validity of this contextual factor is 
examined in chapter four.      
Contextual Factors in the Securitization of Terrorism in Kenya  
Successful securitization in Kenya can be attributed to three contextual factors that made 
Kenya’s executive and legislative arms of government agree that terrorism was an 
existential threat. These factors were: 1) the rise in domestic radicalization; 2) the 
enactment of a new constitution in 2010; and 3) the emergence of new economic interests.  
These three factors provided compelling reasons that were used to justify the enactment of 
extraordinary security measures. As a result, there was congruence between the claim that 
terrorism was an existential threat to Kenya and events that were unfolding during the time 
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leading up to the enactment of counterterrorism measures. In addition to validating the 
securitizing actor’s claim that terrorism was an existential threat in Kenya the contextual 
factors provided a unifying rationale that enacting counterterrorism measures was critical 
to Kenya’s survival.  
Domestic Radicalization in Kenya  
This thesis argues that an increase in domestic radicalization in Kenya was one of the 
contextual factors that contributed to the securitization of terrorism. Domestic 
radicalization is a risk factor for terrorism.20 It is an indication that more individuals are 
willing to engage in/or support terrorism activities, which, in turn, increases the likelihood 
of terrorism attacks. There are two main reasons why domestic or homegrown terrorists 
pose a significantly higher security threat to states when compared to foreign terrorists. 
  First, terrorist groups are increasingly using domestic terrorism as their preferred 
mondus operandi because it is part of their strategy to decentralize and expand their 
terrorist operations worldwide (Schuurman and Horgan 2016). As Ayman al Zawahiri, the 
leader of Al Qaeda, once stated “all Mujahid brothers must consider targeting the interests 
of the Western-Zionist Crusader alliance in any part of the world as their foremost duty. 
They must exert efforts to the best of their ability for this purpose” (al Zawahiri n.d).  Based 
on this statement, fighters who have received training in terrorist camps abroad as well as 
terrorist sympathizers, who may not be able to travel for training but have access to online 
 
20 While acknowledging that radicalization is not synonymous with terrorism, this argument is premised on 
several studies which draw a clear pathway between radicalization and terrorism (Smith 2018; McCauley 
and Moskalenko 2008; Neumann 2013). The link between radicalization and terrorism is discussed in greater 
detail in chapter three.    
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training material, are encouraged to turn their countries into frontline battlegrounds for 
terrorist organizations.  
Second, this thesis argues that domestic terrorists, and their networks, are more 
likely to carry out successful terrorist attacks in their home countries. The knowledge that 
domestic terrorists have about their targets and their ability to blend in with the local 
population, without causing suspicion, gives them the upper hand that foreign terrorists do 
not have. Furthermore, the increased scrutiny of foreign travellers and the tightening of 
border security, especially after 9/11, made it more difficult for terrorists to travel and carry 
out attacks outside countries of their citizenship or permanent residency21  (Baldaccini 
2008; Boer 2015). States, therefore, face a bigger threat from domestic terrorists when 
compared to foreign terrorists.   
Perceptions about radicalization also play a role when considering the threat posed 
by domestic terrorists. Even though radicalization does not always lead to the support of/or 
involvement in terrorist activities, research shows that radicalization is often a preclude to 
the use of violence (Neumann 2013a, 2015, 2016, 2017; Klausen et al. 2015; McCauley 
and Moskalenko 2008, 2017; Horgan 2009; Kruglanski et al. 2014; Moghaddam 2005). 
According to Neumann (2013), many individuals who resorted to terrorism, across 
different historical periods, among different groups and in different geographical regions, 
were powered by radical beliefs and ideologies. Like Neumann, McCauley and 
Moskalenko (2008, 2017), as well Kruglanski et al. (2014), contended that those who are 
 
21 For instance, Baldaccini (2008) noted that in the aftermath of 9/11, border security agencies around the 
world increased their usage of biometrics to identify terrorist suspects and criminals.  
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willing to commit acts of terror are radicalized individuals who exhibit an unwavering 
commitment to a particular cause.   
    The change in Kenya’s counterterrorism policy, from unsecuritization to 
securitization, occurred because there was evidence of increased radicalization in the 
country. The increase of young Kenyans who were willing to carry out terrorist attacks in 
Kenya was linked to Al Shabaab, a terrorist group in Somalia. Indeed, studies on 
radicalization in Kenya show that there was a steady increase in the number of young 
Kenyans who joined Al Shabaab in the period leading up to the enactment of 
counterterrorism measures in 2012 (Finn et al. 2016; Williams 2014; Botha 2014; 
Anderson and Mcknight 2014). On this basis, this thesis argues that the realization that 
terrorism was a home-grown threat rather than a foreign threat changed the national 
security discourse leading to the securitization of terrorism which culminated in the 
enactment of counterterrorism measures in 2012. In other words, Kenya shifted its position 
and enacted counterterrorism measures because terrorism was no longer perceived as an 
American or Israeli problem carried out by foreign terrorists. Instead, Kenya’s executive 
and legislative arms of government concurred that Kenya was under siege from within and 
that counterterrorism measures were essential to its survival.  The validity of this contextual 
factor is examined in chapter three. 
 Kenya’s 2010 Constitution  
The promulgation of a new constitution in Kenya in 2010 is another contextual factor that 
had a profound impact on the securitization of terrorism in Kenya. The 2010 constitution 
addressed many of the pitfalls that undermined democracy in Kenya. In this regard, the 
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constitution reduced the powers of the president and limited the office bearer’s capacity to 
interfere with other branches of government. Consequently, security agencies and 
institutions whose responsibilities involved or affected counterterrorism activities in Kenya 
were no longer solely answerable to the president. They were also answerable to the 
legislature and oversight bodies which were created to scrutinize their activities.  
These changes empowered security agencies that were responsible for matters of 
national security by giving them the leeway that they needed to perform their duties without 
undue influence from the office of the president.  As Hellmuth (2016) pointed out, “as 
government structures change, restraints [also] change shaping not only the nature of 
decision-making processes and interagency dynamics but also affecting the choice of 
security policies” (Hellmuth 2016, 282). In Kenya’s case, the empowerment of security 
agencies and institutions led to the strengthening of the country’s stance against terrorism.  
As explained earlier, within the context of securitization theory, Kenya’s security 
agencies and institutions played the role of functional actors. Essentially, functional actors 
can shape the outcome of a securitization process by influencing the perceptions that other 
securitization actors have about a security problem. This argument is based on two 
interconnected logical explanations. First, through their involvement, security agencies 
have the capacity to legitimize policymaking processes thus facilitating the enactment of 
laws that are needed to implement policy (Villalobos 2012; Meier and O’Toole, 2006). 
Villalobos (2012), argued that the involvement of state agencies in policy development 
infuses “bureaucratic objectivity, expertise and transparency” (Villalobos 2012, 838) into 
the policymaking process which can be used to convince legislators to support a policy. 
The input of state agencies creates the impression that the proposed policy is not simply a 
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representation of partisan political goals but rather, a concerted effort to come up with a 
solution that serves the public good (Romero and Villalobos 2015). This increases the 
chances of policy acceptance and approval among the audience.  
Second, state agencies and institutions in democratic societies often have a 
profound impact on policy outcomes (Morin and Paquin 2018; Shobe 2017; Verschuere 
2009; Halperin and Clapp 2006; Allison and Zelikow 1999).  Morin and Paquin (2018), 
contended that “the bureaucracy’s principle resource is no doubt its expertise. It selects the 
information presented to the leaders and arranges it intelligibly. By presenting the problems 
or possible actions in a certain way, it structures the leaders’ decision-making” (Morin and 
Paquin 2018, 102). In a study on the role of state agencies in policymaking, Shobe (2017) 
arrived at similar findings noting that state agencies have a big impact on the decisions that 
political leaders make. He observed that state agencies are not only involved in drafting the 
material that is used to make policies, in some instances, they also play a pivotal role in 
reviewing and editing policy documents. It then follows that the interests of state security 
agencies would be reflected in the policies that they help to draft, review and edit. 
Ultimately, Kenya’s president, prime minister, cabinet ministers and members of 
parliament enacted extraordinary security measures because security agencies and 
institutions in Kenya stated that terrorism was an existential threat to the country.   
To further consolidate democracy in Kenya, the 2010 constitution included a Bill 
of Rights. Article 19(2) of the Bill of Rights states that “the purpose of recognizing and 
protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms is to preserve the dignity of individuals 
and communities and to promote social justice and the realisation of the potential of all 
human beings” (The Constitution of Kenya 2010, Article 19[2]). The consideration of 
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human rights and fundamental freedoms was an important factor in the securitization of 
terrorism in Kenya. Like many other democratic states around the world, Kenya’s 
government had to weigh out the restrictions that counterterrorism measures could have on 
individual rights and liberties.  
Counterterrorism measures are enacted on grounds that they are targeted at 
terrorists rather than the general population. However, in order to identify and weed out 
terrorists, who are usually clandestine and difficult to detect, governments use 
counterterrorism measures that may limit the rights and liberties of the entire population 
(Donohue 2008). This creates a dilemma for the securitization actors. On one hand, there 
may be a backlash against the enactment of counterterrorism measures as citizens feel that 
the state is eroding their rights and liberties. On the other hand, citizens may perceive 
failure to act on terrorism as irresponsible and lackluster (Liow 2017). This may not only 
lead to criticism of a government’s counterterrorism policy but also high political costs as 
the electorate punishes those who hold elective positions for failing to protect the state and 
its citizens from terrorist attacks. The securitization of terrorism and enactment of 
counterterrorism measures, therefore, are strategic decisions that must be made at an 
opportune time (Salter 2011; Altheide 2002, 2017; Robin 2004; Massumi 2005). Ideally, 
the best time to enact counterterrorism measures is when a government can justify the use 
of extraordinary security measures and reassure the public that such measures will not be 
abused.   
Based on the discussions above, this thesis argues that the inclusion of the Bill of 
Rights in Kenya’s 2010 constitution was one of the contextual factors that Kenya’s 
president, prime minister, cabinet ministers and members of parliament coalesced around 
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to justify the enactment of counterterrorism measures. Coupled with other changes in the 
2010 constitution, securitization actors in Kenya presented the Bill of Rights as a guarantor 
of individual rights and liberties as they sought to expand the state’s powers to counter 
terrorism. There was, therefore, consensus that the 2010 constitution had safeguards that 
would stop the president and those close to him from maliciously using counterterrorism 
measures to infringe on the rights and liberties of Kenyan citizens. The validity of this 
contextual factor is examined in chapter four.  
 
Kenya’s New Economic Interests 
 
The last contextual factor that led to the enactment of counterterrorism measures in Kenya 
was the emergence of new economic interests in the country. This contextual factor is based 
on the argument that securitization does not simply depend on the successful construction 
of a security problem as an existential threat. It also depends on the securitizing actor’s 
ability to convince the audience that the extraordinary measures that will be used to address 
the security threat are worth their economic costs.  
The significance of economic costs on policymaking in democracies can be found 
in the seminal writings of Downs (1957), Niskanen (1975), and Bueno de Mesquita et al. 
(2005). All these scholars argued that during policymaking processes, leaders who hold 
elective positions, such as members of parliament and the head of state, must anticipate 
how their constituents will react to their policy choices. As a result, individuals who hold 
or are vying for elective positions are unlikely to support policies whose costs cannot be 
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justified to the electorate because such policies may result in the loss of popularity and 
failure to get re-elected.  
Although it is difficult to pinpoint the exact economic cost of counterterrorism, 
there is consensus that states must dedicate a considerable amount of government 
expenditure to defence and security activities such as counterterrorism (Mueller and 
Stewart 2014; Gold 2004; Dunne and Tian 2013; Dunne and Nikolaidou 2012; Zycher 
2003).  Since government expenditure is pegged on government revenues, securitizing 
actors must bargain for counterterrorism funding from three main sources namely: 1) 
taxation revenue, 2) the reallocation of government resources; and 3) revenue obtained 
from new sources of government income. Funding for counterterrorism activities using 
taxation revenue is difficult to justify because an increase in government taxes often raises 
living expenses for the average household (Zycher 2003; Stewart, Ellingwood and Mueller 
2011).  
Moreover, funding for counterterrorism activities must be competitively sourced 
because resources for security-related expenses often have opportunity costs. This means 
that more spending, in the areas of security, may result in the reallocation of resources from 
other areas of government expenditure, such as healthcare, education and infrastructure 
(Gold 2004; Hou and Chen 2013; Zhang et al. 2017). As Baldwin (1997) stated, security 
costs are “the sacrifice of other goals that could have been pursued with the resources 
devoted to security” (Baldwin 1997, 16). The successful securitization of terrorism is, 
therefore, dependent on the securitizing actor’s ability to convince the audience that the 
increased economic costs of counterterrorism measures are a necessary trade-off for the 
sake of security. Failure to do so may lead to the rejection of the proposed measures.  
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While funding counterterrorism activities using taxation revenues and the 
reallocation of resources is difficult to justify, the discovery of new sources of government 
income often bolsters security spending. A study that investigated the relationship between 
economic growth and the expansion of defence capabilities in five countries22 revealed that 
states are likely to expand their defence capabilities if they face a significant security threat 
and experience an increase in national revenue (Castillo et al. 2001). In this context, the 
securitization of terrorism and subsequent implementation of counterterrorism measures is 
likely to succeed because there is a positive correlation between an increase in national 
income and the expansion of a country’s security apparatus. 
The construction of the Lamu Port - South Sudan - Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) 
corridor and the discovery of oil and gas in Kenya contributed to the securitization of 
terrorism in Kenya. The projected socio-economic benefits of the LAPSETT project and 
the potential for Kenya to become an oil exporter provided the impetus for increased 
spending. Hence, 2012 marked the year when Kenya’s president, prime minister, cabinet 
ministers and parliamentarians arrived at a consensus that enacting an anti-terrorism law 
was a public good whose benefits outweighed its economic costs. The validity of this 




This thesis is based on a single case study of Kenya. The advantages of using case studies 
are widely documented. They include: 1) identifying “new or omitted variables or 
 
22 These countries were the US, the UK, France, Germany and Russia. 
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hypotheses” (Bennet 2002, 27); 2) using causal mechanisms to explain the historical causes 
of a phenomenon; and 3) identifying complex relationships, such as path dependency 
(Bennet 2002). In addition to this, Bennet (2002) and Kacowicz (2002) pointed out that 
single case studies can contribute to the development or clarification of theories by 
uncovering empirical data that support or challenge existing theories about the 
phenomenon being studied. This is especially relevant in studies that focus on a deviant 
case which previous studies have not fully understood or explained.  
Kenya was selected as a case study for this research after a comprehensive literature 
review that examined how states have reacted to the threat of terrorism since 9/11. The 
literature review revealed that, unlike other countries, Kenya did not enact counterterrorism 
measures until 2012 even when it had good domestic and external reasons to do so in the 
aftermath of 9/11.  
Bennet (2002) also stated that cases whose outcomes are not predicted or explained 
well using existing theories can be particularly useful in identifying new or left-out 
variables. Based on the literature review and the hypothesis for this study, new variables 
that were either not considered or comprehensively explained in previous studies were 
tested. These variables are: 1) the perception that foreign fighters who were carrying out 
attacks against American and Israeli installations in Kenya, were the main perpetrators of 
terrorist attacks in the country; 2) the inability of Kenya’s security agencies and institutions 
to securitize terrorism as an existential threat; 3) the preoccupation of Kenya’s 
securitization actors with the machinations of power sharing; 4) the rise in domestic 
radicalization; 5) the enactment of a new constitution in 2010; and 6) the emergence of 
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new economic interests. Lastly, the novelty of the Kenyan case justifies the use of a single 
case study and outweighs its disadvantages.23  
 
Data Collection Methods 
The study was conducted through two data collection phases. In the first phase, archival 
data from the Kenya National Assembly Hansard, policy documents, public statements and 
court records were reviewed. The information gathered through the review of archival data 
informed the semi-structured interviews that were conducted during the second phase of 
the data collection process. Semi-structured interviews were done in the second phase 
rather than the first phase of the study so that the researcher could detect misleading, 
inconsistent or false information that was obtained during the interviews. This is a common 
problem in security research where securitization actors may intentionally or 
unintentionally manipulate, obscure or conceal information about securitization processes 
(Jorgensen 1989, 14).  The interviews were used to corroborate and expound on the 
information collected from official public documents and statements.  
Interviewees were selected using purposive and snowball sampling. While 
purposive sampling is a technique that is used to identify key informants, who have vast 
knowledge about the study under investigation, snowball sampling is a technique through 
which key informants introduce potential interviewees to the researcher. The two 
techniques were used interchangeably. Purposive sampling was used to identify key 
 
23 Bennet (2002) noted that the key disadvantage of case study methods is that it is unlikely for findings to 
be generalized to the wider population.  
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respondents who had been involved in the securitization of terrorism in Kenya. These 
informants mostly comprised of functional actors who held senior positions in Kenya’s 
security agencies and institutions. Interviews were conducted using a semi-structured 
format. This is a flexible interview method where the researcher asks pre-determined 
questions that lead up to further discussions on the topic (see Appendix 7). 
The biggest challenge when collecting primary data about Kenya’s 
counterterrorism policy was that Kenya’s security agencies and institutions do not share a 
lot of information about the country’s security with the public more so, when it relates to 
terrorism activities. Therefore, the key informants who agreed to speak with the researcher 
were reluctant to share sensitive details about the terrorism threat in Kenya that would have 
illuminated some of the questions that were asked. This was probably because of provisions 
in Kenya’s Official Secrets Act, 1970 (Revised 2016) that obligates all public servants not 
to share information that may jeopardize Kenya’s national security. There is also a culture 
of secrecy among former and current employees of Kenya’s security agencies and 
institutions. To add to this, current and former employees of Kenya’s security agencies and 
institutions do not write about their experiences. Despite these shortcomings, inferences 
about Kenya’s counterterrorism policy were drawn from the public statements of key 
security actors in Kenya. In addition to this, a leaked National Intelligence Service (Kenya) 
report that Al Jazeera obtained provided information that was factored into the analysis of 
this research.         
 
 




Balzacq (2011b) identified discourse analysis, ethnographic research, content analysis and 
process tracing as the most appropriate methods for analysing data in studies about 
securitization processes. While ethnographic research and content analysis have been 
successfully used in other studies (for example Wilkinson 2011; Salter 2011; Vuori 2011) 
they are not appropriate for this study. Ethnographic research is unsuitable because it is 
based on participant observation – a technique that requires prolonged access to key 
policymakers and practitioners in Kenya’s security apparatus. It is highly unlikely that the 
researcher would have been granted unlimited access to this group. In addition, 
ethnography was unsuitable because it could not be used to explain the causal relationship 
between variables. Content analysis was also unsuitable for this study because it is a purely 
descriptive method that focuses on ‘what’ rather than ‘why’ questions. It concentrates on 
“the analysis of text as an independent entity” and does not factor in “the reaction that the 
text provokes in a given audience” (Balzacq 2011b, 51). Content analysis focuses on the 
outcome rather than the process of securitization. As a result, it may not have revealed the 
underlying reasons why Kenya did not enact counterterrorism measures when it appeared 
to have good reasons to do so. In the same vein, it would not have explained why Kenya 
enacted counterterrorism measures in 2012.    
Two methods, discourse analysis and process tracing were used to establish the 
relationships between the variables in this study. The main advantage of combining the two 
methods was to expose aspects of the relationships that a single method would not have 
revealed. As Checkel (2008) argued, “better answers to the questions we ask [can be 
achieved through] epistemological and methodological boundary crossing [which is both] 
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essential and possible” (Checkel 2008, 126).  In this regard, discourse analysis was used to 
give rich descriptions of the construction and evolution of the terrorist threat in Kenya. 
Balzacq (2011b) stated that rich descriptions are obtained when a researcher: 
 
examine[s] various genres of texts, at different points in 
time, in distinct social contexts [because] discourses are 
always connected to other discourses which were produced 
earlier, as well as those which are synchronically and 
subsequently enacted (Balzacq 2011b, 43).   
 
The rich descriptions, for this study, were initially derived from written texts 
including the Kenya National Assembly Hansard, policy documents, court documents and 
secondary sources of information. The data was then triangulated with descriptions 
obtained from spoken texts including interviews, archival press conferences, media 
interviews and other audio and video recordings. The recurring linguistic patterns obtained 
from these descriptions formed the narratives that explained how terrorism was framed and 
the impact that this had on the enactment of counterterrorism measures.  
Process tracing supplemented discourse analysis. According to George and Bennet 
(2005), process tracing is a method that is used to identify and explain the intervening 
process between a cause and an outcome. Within the context of examining securitization 
processes, Balzacq (2011b) contended that process tracing enables a researcher to pinpoint 
the conditions under which securitization occurs, that is, the causal chains that link 
independent variables to the dependent variable(s). He further argued: 
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If the investigator inquires “why securitization was 
successful?” answering “because an audience accepted” 
would be a platitude, if not a tautology. Process tracing is 
particularly useful for uncovering the scope conditions under 
which securitization is likely to succeed (Balzacq 2011b, 
43).  
 
Process tracing, therefore, complements discourse analysis by preventing 
confirmation bias. Unlike discourse analysis which focuses on whether securitization has 
occurred and how it has happened, process tracing seeks to explain why and when 
securitization has occurred as well as the conditions for unsecuritization (Balzacq 2011b).  
All the data that was collected during this research was coded according to the 
contextual factors that caused the unsecuritization and securitization of terrorism in Kenya 
before it was analysed. In order for the findings to meet quality standards, validity and 
reliability checks, such as confirming and disconfirming evidence as well as research 
reflexivity, were incorporated into all stages of the research process. Lastly, the ethical 
considerations for this study are guided by the Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) 
at Murdoch University. Human ethics approval was obtained before commencing the 
research (Appendix 5).  
 
 




The aim of this chapter was to discuss the theoretical framework, hypothesis and methods 
that were used to investigate Kenya’s puzzling counterterrorism behaviour. Securitization 
theory was selected as the most appropriate theory for this study because it provides the 
framework for explaining why and how a security problem becomes an existential threat 
leading to the enactment of extraordinary security measures. The hypothesis for this 
research was founded on the core assumptions of securitization theory and identified 
Kenya’s securitization actors as the executive and legislative branches of government. The 
hypothesis also identified and elaborated on the contextual factors that contributed to the 
unsecuritization and securitization of terrorism in Kenya.  
 Both primary and secondary data were used to investigate the securitization of 
terrorism in Kenya and the enactment of counterterrorism measures. The sources of data 
included archival material from the Kenya National Assembly Hansard, court records, 
policy documents and public statements. Information was also gathered through semi-
structured interviews that were done after a review of archival material. Although, the 
initial plan of the research was to conduct interviews between August and October 2017, 
this could not be done because of political violence in Kenya after the 2017 General 
Elections. The interviews, therefore, did not take place until November 2017. While several 
participants who had been contacted earlier during the planning stage of field work were 
willing to meet with the researcher in November, others were unable to do so either because 
they had been transferred to other locations in Kenya or had voluntarily withdrawn from 
the research. Despite this challenge, useful information about Kenya’s counterterrorism 
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policy was obtained from leaked intelligence reports as well as the participants who were 
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Chapter Three 
Political Violence in Kenya: Oscillating between Ethnopolitical 
Violence and Terrorism 
 
Introduction 
This chapter delves into the history of political violence in Kenya with the objective of 
explaining how some of the key contextual factors24 that shaped Kenya’s counterterrorism 
policy emerged. It begins in 1980 when Kenya experienced its first major post-
independence terrorist attack. Other terrorist attacks that are discussed in the chapter are 
the 1998 US Embassy bombing in Nairobi and the 2002 bombing at a hotel in Kikambala, 
Mombasa. While these attacks killed hundreds of Kenyans and injured over 4000 others, 
they were not the only incidences of political violence that occurred in Kenya. 
Ethnopolitical violence also became a malignant feature of Kenyan politics when the 
country became a de jure multiparty state in 1992.  
 Analysing Kenya’s oscillation between ethnopolitical violence and terrorism 
uncovers some of the important factors that had an impact on the country’s 
counterterrorism policymaking process. These include the dominance of foreign 
perpetrators in carrying out terrorism attacks in Kenya in 1980, 1998 and 2002 and the 
 
24 The key contextual factors were identified in chapter one. They are: 1) the perception that foreigners, who 
were carrying out attacks against American and Israeli installations in Kenya, were the main perpetrators of 
terrorist attacks in the country ; 2) the inability of Kenya’s security agencies and institutions to securitize 
terrorism as an existential threat; 3) the preoccupation of Kenya’s securitizing actors (the president, cabinet 
ministers and prime minister) with the machinations of power sharing in Kenya; 4) the rise in domestic 
radicalization in Kenya; 5) the enactment of a new constitution in 2010 and; 6) the emergence of new 
economic interests in Kenya.   
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belief among Kenya’s opposition parties that ethnopolitical violence was the biggest threat 
to Kenya’s security. This chapter argues that members of Kenya’s opposition parties 
blamed ethnopolitical violence on KANU which had been in power for close to 40 years. 
KANU’s ouster from power in 2002 marked a new beginning for Kenya and had significant 
implications on the country’s counterterrorism policy. Moreover, many of the underlying 
factors that have been used to instigate political violence in Kenya for decades are founded 
in the policies and practices of KANU’s 40-year autocratic rule. This chapter, therefore, 
sets the stage for some of the arguments that are made in chapters three, four and five.     
The 1980 Norfolk Hotel Bombing  
On December 31, 1980 a sophisticated time bomb went off at the Norfolk hotel in Kenya’s 
capital city, Nairobi, as guests were celebrating a New Year’s Eve dinner party. The bomb 
which had been strategically placed in a room that was directly above the dining area killed 
20 people and left over 80 injured. A lot of the details about the hotel bombing are unclear. 
Nevertheless, there is some information about the perpetrators who carried out the attack, 
the method that was used to carry out the attack and the motive of the attack. Nine days 
before the attack a Moroccan citizen, Qaddura Mohammed Abdel al-Hamid, booked the 
room that was directly above the dining area and proceeded to construct the bomb. 
Investigations revealed that a woman with a German accent was a frequent visitor to his 
room and it is suspected that she supplied al-Hamid with some of the components that he 
needed to construct the bomb. It is also believed that she bought the plane ticket that al- 
Hamid used to flee the country a few hours before the bomb went off (UPI 1981; Special 
1981; Bar 2016).  
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In the aftermath of the attack, the Kenyan government as well as several Western 
diplomats blamed the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a Palestinian 
guerrilla organization that had links with the Revolutionary Cells (RZ) terrorist group that 
was based in West Germany. They suspected that the Norfolk hotel was deliberately 
targeted in retaliation for Kenya’s role in the rescue of Jewish hostages in Uganda in 1976.  
In July that year, Kenya had provided critical logistical, medical and intelligence support 
to Israel during Operation Yonatan,25 a rescue mission of hostages after the hijacking of an 
Air France plane that was forced to land in Entebbe, Uganda. The hijackers, who were 
members of the PFLP and the RZ, wanted to trade-off the hostages for 53 prisoners who 
were being held for their roles in terrorist related activities in various parts of the world.26 
Among these prisoners were five people accused of attempting to shoot down an El Al 
Israeli jet at an airport in Nairobi in January 197627 (UPI 1980; Special 1981; Bishku 2017; 
Hornsby 2012, 319).  
Rather than give into the terrorists demands, the Israeli government, with the 
cooperation of Kenya, raided the Entebbe airport and freed the hostages. Kenya’s role 
included turning a lounge at the Jomo Kenyatta International Airport (JKIA) in Nairobi 
into a makeshift field hospital that had anaesthetic equipment, oxygen cannisters and an 
operating table. A paramilitary wing of Kenya’s police service known as the General 
 
25 The rescue mission which was initially referred to as Operation Entebbe was renamed Operation Yonatan 
to honour the mission’s commander, Jonathan Netanyahu, who was killed during the operation.  
26 The prisoners were being held in Israel, Kenya, France and Germany. 
27In January 1976, three Palestinians had entered Kenya and set up Russian hand-launched anti-aircraft 
missiles at the perimeter of the Jomo Kenyatta International Airport in Nairobi, before the expected arrival 
of a jet belonging to Israeli airline El Al. However, Israeli intelligence alerted Kenya’s law enforcement 
agencies who captured the men before they could launch the missiles. Further investigations revealed that 
their vehicle contained machine guns, grenades and pistols that appeared to have come from Uganda. Two 
more suspects were arrested later that week (Bishku 2017, 87).  
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Service Unit (GSU) as well as Kenyan troops were also stationed at the airport to provide 
extra security during the mission (Muendo 2016).  In the end, Kenya’s collaboration with 
the Israeli government contributed to the success of the mission despite the death of four 
hostages28 and the mission’s commander, Jonathan Netanyahu.  
When news broke out that Nairobi had supported the Israeli operation, several 
African, Arab and Asian states condemned Kenya’s government for its actions.29 At the 
forefront was Idi Amin, the president of Uganda, who wrote to the OAU and the United 
Nations Security Council to protest against Kenya’s willingness to collaborate with Israel. 
Part of the letter addressed to the President of the Security Council on July 5, 1976, stated:  
 
I should like to bring to your attention some aspects of the 
Israeli invasion showing that it had been well planned and 
rehearsed with the full collaboration of some other countries. 
According to the information available to us, which has been 
repeatedly confirmed by the international press, the Zionist 
Israeli plan to invade Entebbe was decided on Thursday, 1 
July. This decision was communicated to the Kenyan 
authorities whose consent and assistance in the operation 
was immediately obtained … Uganda reserves her right to 
 
28The hostages who died were Jean-Jacques Mimouni, Pasco Cohen, Ida Boruchovich and Dora Bloch. 
29 Such condemnation included an OAU Resolution on Israel Aggression against Uganda which, among 
other things, stated that an aggression against one-member state was an aggression against all member states 
of the OAU. It urged all member states to “intensify their efforts in order to isolate Israel and compel her to 
change her aggressive policy” (OAU 1976).  
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retaliate in whatever way she can to redress the aggression 
against her (Idi Amin Dada to the United Nations 1976, 2).  
Several top Kenyan officials tried to counter the accusations of collaboration and 
change the narrative of Kenya’s role in Operation Yonatan. On July 7, 1976, Kenya offered 
a rebuttal to Uganda’s letter stating:  
There is no evidence whatsoever to indicate [Kenya’s] 
collaboration with Israel in the Entebbe episode as alleged in 
the Ugandan statement. Kenya has not and will not be used 
as a base for aggression against a neighbouring or indeed any 
other country in the world, least of all Uganda, which Kenya 
has consistently assisted with supplies since Uganda’s coup 
d’état in 1971 … [The] Israeli aggressor must have 
overflown a number of countries, both Arab and African, on 
their way to Entebbe Uganda [on this basis] Kenya, too, was 
the victim of aggression and, therefore, condemns most 
unreservedly this blatant aggression and violation of our air 
space ... the landing of the Israeli aircraft … after the Israeli 
raid was only allowed for [the use of] medical facilities with 
respect to the injured persons … on humanitarian grounds 
and in accordance with international law (Kasina to the 
United Nations Secretary General 1976, 1).  
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Moi, Kenya’s Vice President at the time, also denied Kenya’s involvement in the 
rescue operation. In his address to an OAU Heads of State Summit meeting in 1976, Moi 
referred to Israel as an aggressor and criticized it for violating Kenya’s airspace during the 
hostage rescue operation. Hornsby (2012, 319) suggested that Moi was probably not aware 
of the intrinsic details of Operation Yonatan and his comments were made out of ignorance 
rather than a deliberate attempt to mislead the Summit about the extent of Kenya’s 
involvement in the operation. In addition to this, it is likely that Kenya’s top officials had 
underestimated the backlash that the country would receive when other countries found out 
that Kenya had assisted Israel to carry out a military operation. In fact, Idi Amin was 
outraged that “Kenya, a neighbouring sister State which is a member of both the OAU and 
the United Nations, assisted Israel to invade Uganda” (Idi Amin Dada to the United Nations 
1976, 3). Kenya, therefore, downplayed its involvement in the operation not only to 
appease Uganda but also to deflect the growing notion that it was an Israeli supporter in 
the protracted Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.  
Kenya reiterated its assertion that it was not an Israeli ally in the aftermath of the 
1980 Norfolk hotel bombing. Responding to a question about Kenya’s diplomatic relations 
with Israel a few months after the attack, the Minister for Foreign Affairs Robert Ouko 
informed Kenya’s National Assembly that:  
 
The Government of Kenya suspended diplomatic relations 
with Israel in 1973 as a result of the Organization of African 
Unity’s resolution. Kenya is committed to the principles of 
the Organization of African Unity and has no intention of 
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action in contravention of its decision ... [The] Kenyan 
Government has permitted the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) to open an office in Nairobi and to enjoy 
the usual diplomatic privileges. (Republic of Kenya. 
Parliament. March 10-May 7, 1981, 608)    
 
These assertions were made even as Kenya continued to work closely with Israel 
on security matters. For instance, the military and training assistance that Kenya had started 
receiving from Israel in 1963 did not stop despite Kenya being party to the OAU’s 
resolution that severed relations between African states and Israel as a result of the Yom 
Kippur War in 1973.  Kenya also maintained the extensive intelligence-gathering 
partnership that it had established with Israel in 1963 when Nairobi was designated as 
Mossad’s centre of operations in East Africa. In fact, the successful interception of a PFLP 
terror plot to shoot down an El Al flight using a SAM - 7 rocket, in 1976, was because of 
the close security partnership between Kenya and Israel (Bishku 2017; Mogire 2008). 
Further demonstrating just how close Kenya and Israel were during the time that diplomatic 
relations were officially severed between the two countries, Arye Oded, an Israeli diplomat 
who was based at the British High Commission in Kenya, stated that he “served as an 
interest officer in Nairobi between 1978 to 1981, operating as an ambassador in every 
regard apart from external, formal aspects” (Oded 2000, 214).   
The disconnect between what Kenya stated about its relationship with Israel vis-à-
vis what appeared to be de facto diplomatic ties between the two countries as well as 
Kenya’s support of the PLO was driven by pragmatic considerations. Kenya’s behaviour 
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also revealed how cabinet ministers in Kenya’s government perceived terrorism at the time. 
Pragmatically, Kenya’s leaders were aware that they needed to partner with states that were 
interested in economic and security projects in the country. Israel, among other Western 
states, had shown great interest in providing economic, security and technical assistance to 
Kenya. By 1996, for instance, Kenya was among only ten African countries that were 
receiving direct military assistance from Israel. This included the training of Kenya’s 
fighter pilots in Israel and the provision of military equipment. Over the years, Kenya also 
received technical aid in agriculture and other civilian fields (Bishku 2017, 89). 
The generous support that Kenya received from Israel contrasted with the marginal 
interest that other states, in the Middle East, had shown during the same period. 
Furthermore, it appeared as if Arab states in that region were supporting irredentist 
demands in East Africa.  When Somalia joined the Arab League in 1974, it received support 
for its territorial claims vis-à-vis Kenya and Ethiopia from Arab states (Oded 2000). Kenya 
regarded this move as an affront to its sovereignty.  
Arab states also channelled developmental aid and financial assistance for religious 
activities to various organizations based in Kenya’s Coastal and Northeastern regions 
(Oded 2000; Mogire 2008). While there was no evidence to suggest that the financial 
assistance was used to fund irredentist activities, Kenya’s government was wary that ethno-
nationalistic groups might receive funding for their cause disguised as developmental aid. 
It is because of these suspicions that Kenya’s government closely watched over all political 
activities in the Coastal and Northeastern regions and clamped down on groups or 
individuals that it perceived as a threat to Kenya’s territorial integrity and stability. In 
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certain instances, efforts to control political activities in these regions led to the excessive 
use of force as was witnessed during the Wagalla massacre30 in 1984 (Anderson 2014; 
Oywa 2011). Over the years, the relationship between Kenya’s government and 
communities in the Coastal and Northeastern regions deteriorated resulting in the 
widespread belief that these two regions have been politically marginalized since Kenya 
gained its independence in 1963. It is, therefore, not surprising that Kenya’s government 
valued its close relations with Israel and Western states.  
Notwithstanding the close ties that Kenya had with Israel and other Western states, 
the country’s leaders knew that they could not ignore the plight of the Palestinians because 
of Kenya’s membership in the OAU and its association with the Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM).31 Additionally, some of Kenya’s leaders did not want to criticize the PLO because 
they could relate to the group’s quest to establish an independent state in the Middle East. 
Between 1973 and 1980, for instance, several members of Kenya’s parliament passionately 
spoke about their roles as freedom fighters and the need to support groups that were 
fighting for independence around the world. These sentiments not only reflected the key 
proclamations of NAM but were also expressed because Kenya’s founding leaders had 
once been condemned for using political violence to fight for independence. For instance, 
Jomo Kenyatta, Kenya’s first president, had been accused of taking part in terrorism 
because of his affiliation with the Mau Mau (Edgerton 1989). In this instance, even though 
 
30 The Wagalla massacre happened over a period of four days in February 1984 when attempts to disarm the 
Degodia clan who are part of Kenyan Somalis led to human rights abuses and killings of Somalis in Wajir 
(Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission 2013; Oywa 2011; Anderson 2014). 
31 The NAM was created during the first conference of Heads of State or Government non-aligned countries 
that was hosted in Belgrade in September 1961 to denounce colonialism, apartheid, racism and Zionism 
(Tassin 2006). 
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the British had designated the Mau Mau as an ethno-nationalistic terrorist group, it enjoyed 
the support of Kikuyus who perceived its members as freedom fighters.   
The preceding discussions provide the context for one of the key factors that 
affected perceptions about terrorism in Kenya. Even though the Norfolk hotel bombing had 
been carried out in Kenya, it was perceived as an attack on Israeli interests rather than an 
attack on the Kenyan state or its people. The fact that the perpetrators of the attack were 
foreigners who belonged to groups that were fighting against Israel reinforced the belief 
that Kenya was not the target of the attack. Consequently, Kenyan victims of the attack 
were perceived as innocent bystanders who were caught in the crossfire of the conflict 
between the Israelis and the Palestinians. The emphasis on foreign fighters carrying out 
attacks against foreign entities in Kenya became a recurrent theme in the unsecuritization 
of terrorism.  Furthermore, cabinet ministers in Kenya’s government, though critical of the 
attack, were sympathetic to the plight of the Palestinians on whose behalf the attackers 
claimed to have acted. As a result, no one in Kenya’s government, at the time, declared 
that Kenya was under threat from terrorists or that the country had to enact counterterrorism 
measures to address terrorism threats.  
Ethnopolitical Violence in Kenya 
After the Norfolk hotel bombing, Kenya did not experience any terrorist attacks until the 
US Embassy bombing in 1998. However, the country was far from peaceful. Ethnopolitical 
violence became a malignant feature of Kenya’s electoral process. The genesis of the 
violence can be traced to 1991, the year that the Cold War officially ended. The changing 
relationship between Russia and the US affected how Western states related to developing 
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states. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Western states had new impetus to focus on 
the entrenchment of democracy in developing states. In Kenya’s case, local groups and 
individuals, alongside Western states and international organizations, put pressure on 
Moi’s government to allow multiparty politics in Kenya.32 In December 1991, Moi yielded 
to pressure and led Kenya’s parliament in repealing Section 2A of the constitution which 
made Kenya a de jure multiparty state (Makinda 1996; Brown 2001; Adar and Munyae 
2001).    
Even though Moi agreed to open democratic space in Kenya, his government 
zeroed in on the instigation of ethnopolitical violence as a way of maintaining its hold on 
political power. Ethnopolitical violence refers to ethnic or religiously motivated conflict 
that occurs between two or more ethnic groups. It usually takes place when ethnic identities 
are manipulated to pit two or more groups against each other. As Oloo (2010) stated, the 
rallying cry of ethnopolitical violence is that “it [will] advance the interests of particular 
groups in society, the members of which often share and unite around common experiences 
of actual or perceived social and economic injustice, relative to the wider society of which 
they form part of and exist” (Oloo 2010, 33).   
Kenya’s colonial legacy and some of the practices of its postcolonial governments 
provided fertile ground for the growth of many social and economic grievances that were 
used to instigate ethnopolitical violence as well as terrorist attacks in the 1990s and beyond. 
When Kenya became independent in 1963, Kenyatta’s government embarked on a scheme 
 
32 Kenya had been a one-party state from 1982 when Kenya’s parliament passed the Constitution of Kenya 
Amendment Act No. 7 of 1982. The Act introduced Section 2A that changed Kenya from a de facto to a de 
jure one-party state.  
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whose key objective was to reacquire land from the European settlers. From the onset, 
Kenyatta made it clear that the process of getting land back would not include evicting any 
of the occupants of the land. Indeed, part of Kenyatta’s Independence Day speech stated, 
“I would not like to feel that my shamba (farm) or house belongs to the government. Titles 
must be respected and the right of the individual safeguarded” (Branch 2011, 9). In 
Kenyatta’s view, Africans who wanted to own land in the White Highlands, or anywhere 
else in Kenya, would have to purchase the land from European settlers who were willing 
to sell their land. To the chagrin of African nationalists such as Oginga Odinga and Bildad 
Kaggia, Kenyatta “explicitly ruled out the nationalization of foreign-owned assets, 
including land, or the compulsory purchase of European-owned land” (Branch 2011, 9).  
On paper, Kenyatta’s policy appeared plausible and transparent. However, its 
implementation was plagued with controversies and the inconsistent allocation of land. The 
key beneficiaries of the post-colonial land reacquisition scheme were African elites. 
According to the Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission (2013) within 12 years of 
Kenya’s independence, “one sixth of the settler land had been sold, intact, to Kenyatta, his 
wife, children and close associates” (Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission 2013, 
19). In addition to buying land in the former White Highlands, Kenyatta and his close 
associates were also privileged in land transactions at the Kenyan Coast. Their land 
purchases at the Coast included areas that indigenous Mijikenda groups33 occupied, thus, 
 
33 The Mijikenda consists of nine closely related but distinct ethnic groups that are also known as the nine 
houses. They are: Kauma, Chonyi, Giriama, Jibana, Ribe, Rabai, Digo, Kamabe and Duruma.   
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rendering members of these groups landless and exacerbating the squatter problem in 
Kenya (Kanyinga 1988).  
Apart from selling large tracts of land to Kenyatta and his close associates, 
Kenyatta’s government bought land from some of the European settlers that was then 
reallocated to former occupants of Native Reserves and workers in former settler farms. In 
other instances, individuals formed ethnic-based cooperatives that were used to purchase 
land that was then shared among members of the cooperative. Some of the areas where 
such settlement schemes were established included Uasin Gishu, Molo, Nakuru, Trans 
Nzoia, Nandi, Narok, Kwale and Mpeketoni (Kanyinga 2009). Decades later, these regions 
would become hotspots of political violence in Kenya.     
The initial plan for the resettlement schemes was to allocate land to individuals 
whose forebearers had lived in or around the designated areas. However, the principle of 
willing buyer willing seller made it impossible to prevent individuals from other ethnic 
groups to settle in the designated areas. For instance, Kikuyus and Kalenjins acquired 
pieces of land in Burnt Forest,34 an area in the Rift Valley that is considered to belong to 
members of the Kalenjin community. While many occupants of the new settlement 
schemes lived harmoniously, there were incidences of violence between members of 
different ethnic groups because of the belief that outsiders (those with no direct-historical 
connection to the region) were unfairly allocated land in the settlement areas. One of the 
 
34 This area would later become an epicentre of ethnopolitical violence. Because of the negative connotation 
of the name Burnt Forest, residents have called for the area to revert to its original name, Tarakwa.  
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violent incidences included the 1967 land clashes in Narok between members of the 
Kikuyu and Kalenjin ethnic groups (Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission 2013).   
The notion that members of some ethnic groups had occupied land that they did not 
deserve became a toxic undercurrent that opportunistic politicians and terrorist groups used 
to enflame political violence in Kenya. Instigators of political violence not only pointed 
out that those with ancestral links to the land had lost their land to outsiders but also 
criticized the socio-economic activities of the outsiders. There were claims that outsiders 
dominated lucrative economic activities and were taking away economic opportunities 
from the rightful inhabitants of the land. Closely linked to allegations of economic 
domination were accusations of a political takeover (Boon 2012; Kanyinga 2009; Truth 
Justice and Reconciliation Commission 2013). Outsiders were accused of distorting the 
voting preferences of various regions depending on the ethnic affiliation of presidential 
candidates. For instance, during Moi’s presidency, it was widely presumed that Kikuyus 
living in the Rift Valley would never vote for Moi if a Kikuyu was running for president. 
Armed with propaganda about the impact that outsiders could have on the socio-
economic interests of those who had ancestral claims to land, political candidates called 
for the expulsion of outsiders. At face value, narratives about the expulsion of outsiders 
were framed as a campaign to protect the socio-economic interests of local communities.  
In reality, several political candidates used violence to preserve their political, social and 
economic power through ethnic cleansing (Odhiambo 2004; Ruteere 2011; Klopp 2002; 
Anderson and Lochery 2008; Kanyinga 2009; Ajulu 2002). In this context, ethnic identity 
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was associated with political affiliation, thus, providing the justification to violently expel 
members of ethnic groups that were linked to opposing political parties.  
Witnesses who testified during the Kiliku Commission’s inquiry into the 1992 post-
election violence stated that politicians incited violence. In one account, a witness 
described how a politician repeatedly told attendees at political meetings that all foreigners, 
that is, anyone who was not a Maasai, “would have to leave Maasai land and return to their 
ancestral home” (Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission 2013, 519). Further 
testimony at the inquiry implicated the government in orchestrating attacks against 
civilians. During one testimony, a resident from Chebilat, in the Rift Valley, stated that the 
Chief in his area informed members of his community (Kikuyus) that “the attacks by young 
Kalenjins was a government project” (Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission 2013, 
522). The Chief advised anyone who feared for their life to “leave Rift Valley province 
and go back to Murang’a35 [because] they would not be offered security by any policeman” 
(Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission 2013, 522).  
Similar scenarios played out in other parts of the Rift Valley. Perpetrators of the 
violence identified with the ruling KANU political party and sought to expel members of 
ethnic groups that were suspected of supporting any other political party (Adar and Munyae 
2001; Klopp 2002). In one case that happened in 1993, a prominent politician36  was 
enraged that KANU had not received as many votes as anticipated in parts of the Rift 
Valley. The politician asked his supporters “to lynch and forcibly expel Luo people from 
 
35 Murang’a is a county in Kenya that is predominantly inhabited by the Kikuyu.  
36 Although the identities of inciters of violence is not a secret in Kenya, the official government reports on 
election violence do not mention any of the politicians by name. They are referred to in code.   
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Bomet and Kericho [which were districts in the Rift Valley at the time]” for allegedly 
supporting an opposition party (Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission 2013, 521).  
In yet another case that happened after the results of the 1992 elections had been 
announced on November 28, 1993, a prominent politician delivered a speech at Makutano 
stadium in Kapenguria “where he ordered Kikuyus to leave West Pokot district in 48 hours 
and warned that the Kalenjin and Pokot communities would take the law into their own 
hands if they did not comply with his orders” (Truth Justice and Reconciliation 
Commission 2013, 521). These cases, and many others that happened around the country, 
show that the threat of ethnopolitical violence in Kenya did not dissipate once political 
candidates had been elected. The threat continued to simmer during the period between 
elections and re-erupted during subsequent election periods.      
Violence broke out again during the 1997 election period. This time, ethnic 
cleansing and violence not only took place in the Rift Valley but also at the Kenyan Coast 
where approximately 100 people identified as ‘watu wa bara’ (upcountry people/outsiders) 
lost their lives and another 100,000 were internally displaced (Steeves 2006). The most 
affected areas at the Coast were Msambweni in Kwale and Likoni in Mombasa. On August 
19, 1997 a group of young men mainly from the Digo37 community, who called themselves 
vijana wa Kaya Bombo (the Kaya Bombo youth), stormed into the Likoni police station 
and stole 40 firearms and 3000 rounds of ammunition. They then proceeded to attack 
 
37 The Digo are one of nine ethnic groups that make up the Mijikenda. They hail from the Kenyan Coast.  
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residents from upcountry with guns and machetes (Nation Reporter 2004; Truth Justice 
and Reconciliation Commission, 2013).  
Even though the violence sent shockwaves across the Coastal region, it did not 
come as a surprise. Months before the attack, the Kaya Bombo youth had distributed 
leaflets warning outsiders to move out of the Coastal region. The leaflets had a clear 
deadline and once it passed, the Kaya Bombo youth went on the rampage. It was also an 
open secret that groups of young men were being recruited into the group before taking 
oaths and undergoing training at designated spots in the Kaya Bombo forest. The young 
men were lured into the group on claims that they would be fighting against members of 
ethnic groups that had not only exploited their land and resources but also marginalized the 
original inhabitants of Kenya’s Coastal region for a long time (Truth Justice and 
Reconciliation Commission 2013, 525-526; Nation Reporter 2004).            
There were also pockets of violence in the Western Highlands and Kenya’s capital 
city Nairobi.  As was the case in 1992, KANU leaders were identified as the main instigator 
of violence during the 1997 elections, although, there were also cases of retaliatory attacks 
against members of ethnic groups that were affiliated with KANU. In some parts of the 
Rift Valley, it was alleged that a prominent politician bought weapons and provided funds 
for Kikuyu youth to carry out attacks against members of the Kalenjin, Luhya and Luo 
communities on allegations that members of these communities were KANU loyalists 
(Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission 2013, 519-520). In total, ethno-political 
violence in Kenya from 1992-1997 resulted in over 1900 deaths, the displacement of over 
350,000 people, financial losses in the tourism industry as visitor numbers dwindled, loss 
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of property worth billions of Kenya shillings and disruptions to farming activities in the 
affected areas (Human Rights Watch 1993, 2002).  
The 1998 US Embassy Bombing in Kenya 
As Kenyans in several affected regions rebuilt their lives after another spate of 
ethnopolitical violence in 1997, the country experienced its second major terrorist attack. 
On August 7, 1998, two trucks loaded with bombs exploded at the entrance of the US 
Embassy that was situated in Kenya’s capital city Nairobi. The explosion not only damaged 
the American Embassy building but also destroyed several surrounding buildings killing 
approximately 213 and injuring over 4000 people, the majority being Kenyans. It later 
emerged that Al Qaeda operatives who had lived in Kenya for a period of five years, were 
responsible for the attack. Among them was Ali Mohamed, an American citizen and a 
former sergeant in the US army, who said that he had conducted surveillance of American, 
British, French and Israeli targets in Nairobi in 1993 (Moghadam 2008). Other key planners 
of the attack, Mohammed Saddig Oden, a Palestinian who was born in Saudi Arabia and 
Fazul Abdullah Mohammed (alias Abdulkarim), a citizen of the Comoro Islands, had 
moved to Kenya from Afghanistan in 1994 and 1996 respectively. They both settled in 
Mombasa, a coastal town in Kenya, and mingled with locals as they planned the Embassy 
bombing. While Oden set up a fishing business in Mombasa, Fazul Mohammed ran a gem 
business there. Both men used these businesses as a cover for their clandestine operations. 
They were not only able to meet regularly with other Al Qaeda members in Kenya but also 
managed to travel in and out of the country freely as they planned the bombing of the US 
Embassy in Nairobi (Mickolus and Simmons 2014).  
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In addition to encouraging its operatives to assimilate with locals in Kenya, the Al 
Qaeda network was flexible and decentralized. When Wadi el-Hage, a Lebanese-born 
American citizen credited with establishing the group’s Kenyan cell in 199438 came under 
the radar of the United States’ Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), Al Qaeda replaced 
him with an Egyptian citizen, Ali Saleh, who continued with preparations for the attack. 
El-Hage was quickly replaced because the FBI, in collaboration with Kenyan authorities, 
had visited his house in August 1997 where they confiscated papers and personal 
computers. Since el-Hage had travelled out of the country when authorities visited his 
home, the FBI warned his wife and mother-in-law about staying in Kenya and advised 
them to go back to the US. Immediately el-Hage returned to Kenya, he and his family, who 
were all American citizens, sold everything they owned and went back to the US where he 
took up a job at a tire store in Texas (Zill 2001).  
El-Hage’s quick departure from Kenya gave authorities the false impression that 
Al Qaeda’s Kenyan cell was no longer operational because its leader, el-Hage, had fled to 
the US.  Al Qaeda’s plans to attack the US Embassy in Nairobi were, therefore, not 
disrupted because US and Kenyan authorities believed that the group had ceased its 
operations in Kenya not knowing that Saleh had been appointed as the new head of Al 
Qaeda in Kenya. The decentralized nature of the group also made it difficult for the FBI as 
well as law enforcement agencies in Kenya to identify members of Al Qaeda’s network in 
the country. Despite arresting several suspects including eight Yemeni and thirteen Somali 
 
38 El Hage’s was also Osama bin Laden’s secretary and his Al Qaeda cell operated under the disguise of a 
Muslim charity organization called Help Africa People. The organization claimed that it was involved in 
malaria control projects in Kenya (Zill 2001).   
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citizens some of the key planners of the 1998 bombing remained at large (United States 
Institute of Peace 2004; Jacquard 2002).  
As the deadliest attack since Al Qaeda’s creation in 1988, the 1998 bombing 
demonstrated the group’s capabilities as a dangerous transnational terrorist organization 
and drew the world’s attention to the motives of its leader Osama bin Laden. On February 
23, 1998, just a few months before the attack, bin Laden issued a fatwa 39  urging all 
Muslims to fight against Americans whom he accused of occupying Muslim lands, 
exploiting its riches and killing its people with impunity. Although the fatwa did not make 
specific references to Kenya as an Al Qaeda target, bin Laden explicitly instructed his 
followers “to kill the Americans and their allies, civilians and military … in any country in 
which it is possible to do it” (bin Laden 1998). Bin Laden’s fatwa did not distinguish 
between the US and any country that was perceived to support it.  
Bin Laden also had grievances against Israel and anyone who supported the Jewish 
state. A brief biography that he gave to Nida’ul Islam, an Australian based magazine that 
interviewed him in 1996, points to 1973 as the year of his political awakening (Nida’ul 
Islam 1996).40 While the 1996 interview did not reveal why the year 1973 was significant 
for bin Laden, a letter dated December 29, 1994, to the then Chief Mufti of Saudi Arabia, 
Abdul Aziz bin Abdullah bin Baz, did. It gave a scathing attack of Israel’s policy in the 
Middle East. Part of the letter stated that the “Jewish enemy is not an enemy settled in his 
own original country fighting in its defence until he gains a peace agreement, but an 
 
39 A fatwa is “an Islamic legal pronouncement issued by an expert in religious law” (The Islamic Supreme 
Council of America 2017).   
40 This was the year that Israel defeated Egypt and Syria in the Yom Kippur war, after getting weapons and 
supplies from the United States. For details see Boyne (2002). 
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attacking enemy and a corrupter of religion and the world, for whom the words of the 
Sheikh of Islam Ibn Taymiyya apply” (Lawrence and Howarth 2005, 23).41 In this instance, 
bin Laden was referring to Ibn Taymiyya’s fatwa which stated that threats to Islamic 
identity, such as the Mongol threat that inhabitants of Syria faced in the thirteenth century, 
must be repulsed through jihad (holy war). Bin Laden equated the Mongol’s threat against 
Syria to what he described as the Western civilization’s threat against the Muslim world. 
Just as Ibn Taymiyya had called upon Muslims to fight against the Mongols, bin Laden 
expected all Muslims to fight against Western states and their allies (Doran 2002). 
The letter also berated anyone who either supported or was willing to negotiate with 
Israel, and bin Laden later reiterated these sentiments during an Al Jazeera interview in 
December 1998. When asked whether he was involved in terrorist activities, including the 
attack in Kenya, bin Laden said that he and his followers were fighting against “the global 
crusader alliance with the Zionist Jews, led by America, Britain and Israel [who attack] my 
land” (quoted in Lawrence and Howarth 2005, 73). Even though he did not identify Kenya 
as an enemy, he declared that it was within their right to avenge mistreatment despite the 
loss of innocent life as had happened in Kenya.  
Although bin Laden repeatedly denied that he had ordered the attack on the US 
Embassy in Kenya, there are indications that Kenya was selected as a battlefield for Al 
Qaeda’s fight with the West because of its close relations with the US, Britain and Israel. 
Since it gained independence in 1963, Kenya had maintained cordial relations with all three 
countries except for a period of low-key relations with Israel after the Yom Kippur war. 
 
41 For an English translation of the entire letter see Lawrence and Howarth (2005, 23-33).   
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Security cooperation has been an important component of Kenya’s relations with these 
countries. For instance, the US started providing military assistance to Kenya in 1976, the 
year that Kenya played a pivotal role in the rescue of Jewish hostages in Entebbe, Uganda. 
After the rescue mission, the US Secretary of State at the time, Henry Kissinger, authorized 
the positioning of an aircraft carrier group near Mombasa as a warning to Idi Amin who 
had threatened to retaliate against Kenya for its assistance in the Entebbe raid (Hornsby 
2012, 318-319).  
In addition to this, the two countries signed a military agreement that allowed the 
US to access Kenya’s ports and airfields in pursuit of US security objectives in the Indian 
Ocean region. It is because of this agreement that the US military was able to use facilities 
in Kenya to support the UN’s 1992 multinational relief effort in Somalia dubbed, Operation 
Provide Relief (Poole 2005). The fact that the US was playing a pivotal role in Somalia’s 
affairs irked bin Laden. In a letter to the Chief Mufti of Saudi Arabia, dated December 29, 
1994, bin Laden protested against the proliferation of Western influence in the Horn of 
Africa, among other regions, and claimed that the UN was being used as a cover to control 
Muslims in countries such as Somalia (Lawrence and Howarth 2005, 23-33).  
One of bin Laden’s former bodyguard’s, Nasir Ahmad Abdallah Al-Bahri (alias 
Abu-Jandal), reaffirmed bin Laden’s views about the US and its allies in an interview with 
Al-Quads Al-Arabi – a pan-Arab newspaper published in London. During the interview, 
Al-Bahri revealed that bin Laden was vehemently opposed to US intervention in Somalia 
viewing it as a sinister plot to spread US hegemony in the region, stifle Islamic movements 
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and set up a US base that would be close to the Arabian Gulf (Al-Quads Al-Arabi 2004; 
Vadlamudi 2007, 121).     
 Like the US, the UK signed several bilateral defence agreements with Kenya 
beginning in 1963 when Kenya became an independent state. Among them was an 
agreement that established the British Training Unit Kenya (BATUK). This agreement 
allowed the British government to train its troops in parts of Kenya in preparation for 
deployment in regions, “with a similar terrain and climate such as parts of Afghanistan and 
Iraq” (Tossini 2017, para. 3).   
Kenya also had close security ties with Israel for many years. The relationship 
began in 1962 during a meeting between Mossad agents and Jomo Kenyatta, who went on 
to become Kenya’s first president in 1964.  After the meeting, Israel designated Kenya as 
one of its centres of intelligence activity and security cooperation in Africa, the others being 
Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) and Nigeria (Vargo 2015). The close ties 
between the two countries led to several joint security missions, including the interception 
of plans to attack an Israeli plane in Nairobi in January 1976 and the rescue of hostages 
later that year in Entebbe, Uganda.   
The cordial relationship between Kenya and Israel was reaffirmed in the aftermath 
of the 1998 US Embassy bombings when the Israel Defence Forces became the first rescue 
team to arrive from abroad (Otiso 2009). It is these events, among others,42 that give 
credence to Bishku’s (2017) assertion that Kenya is Israel’s closest and most reliable 
partner in Africa. Based on its relations with its Western allies, it is evident that Kenya was 
 
42 For further details about Kenya-Israel relations see Bishku (2017), Mogire (2008) and Oded (2000). 
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instrumental in supporting American, British and Israeli security interests. It is, therefore, 
likely that bin Laden and his supporters targeted Kenya because of its long-standing and 
close relations with countries that he had identified as his arch nemeses.   
The 1998 US Embassy Attack and Implications on Kenya’s Counterterrorism Policy 
The 1998 US Embassy bombing underscored the presence of Al Qaeda operatives in East 
Africa and the dangers that they posed in the region. Prior to the bombing, law enforcement 
agencies in Kenya and the US knew that Abu Ubayda al-Banshiri, an Al Qaeda military 
commander who was born in Egypt, was part of an Al Qaeda cell, in Nairobi, that facilitated 
the travel of Al Qaeda operatives going to Somalia. However, they did not consider this to 
be a significant threat to Kenyan or American interests in the region mainly because of 
conflicting intelligence on the intentions of Al Qaeda cells in East Africa. The 
Accountability Review Board report on the 1998 US Embassy bombing noted that while 
intelligence reports about threats to US and other targets were taken seriously, they were 
later “discounted because of imprecise, changing and non-specific dates about the attacks” 
(Accountability Review Board Report n.d, 2). 
Law enforcement agencies also thought that their actions against organizations and 
persons associated with Al Qaeda in Nairobi had foiled the possibility of attacks in East 
Africa (Accountability Review Board, n.d). For instance, Wadi el-Hage, the founder of Al 
Qaeda’s cell in Kenya, appeared to heed warnings from the FBI and Kenyan authorities 
when he quickly left the country after authorities visited his home in August 1997 (Zill 
2001).  
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The FBI and Kenya’s law enforcement authorities had also confronted a suspected 
terrorist group, the Al-Haramayn Foundation (Kenya), in Nairobi in 1997. The Al-
Haramayn Foundation in Kenya was one of several branches of the Saudi Arabia based Al-
Haramain Islamic Foundation.43 Even though the Al-Haramain foundation claimed to be a 
charitable and educational NGO that operated in several countries around the world, 
investigations linked the foundation’s activities to Al Qaeda. Through its worldwide 
network of so-called charitable foundations, Al-Haramain provided material, financial and 
logistical support to Al Qaeda operatives. Indeed, el-Hage, one of the masterminds of the 
1998 US Embassy bombings, had visited the offices of Al-Haramayn (Kenya) and kept in 
touch with a senior official from the organization before the bombings in Kenya and 
Tanzania (United Nations Security Council 2015).  Additionally, the foundation’s Kenyan 
branch Al Haramayn (Kenya) was linked to Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya (AIAI), an Islamist 
group in Somalia. Kenyan authorities believed that they had dissipated all the alleged 
threats because they arrested and later deported foreigners who worked for Al-Haramayn 
(Kenya) (United Nations Security Council 2009). 
Even as Kenya’s law enforcement agencies worked with the FBI to flash out and 
rid Kenya of foreign terrorists, Moi’s government never considered terrorism to be a 
serious threat in Kenya. Consequently, terrorism was not part of national security discourse 
during Moi’s presidency. Moi’s reaction after the US Embassy attack provides insight on 
his government’s perceptions about terrorism during that time. Despite being a president 
 
43  The Al Haramain Foundation in Saudi Arabia had branches in several starts including Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Somalia, Indonesia, Ethiopia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, the Netherlands, Tanzania, Afghanistan, 
Albania, Tanzania and the Union of the Comoros (United Nations Security Council 2015).   
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who never shied away from condemning anyone who he perceived as a threat to his 
government, Moi did not have much to say about the bombing of the US Embassy in Kenya 
and only made two brief comments shortly after the attacks. A few hours after the bombing, 
Moi addressed the media at the attack site stating “kuleta vita kwetu sisi watu wa amani 
hatujui ni kwanini. Watu wa Kenya hawana vita na mtu yeyote” (We do not know why war 
has been brought to our peace-loving nation. The people of Kenya are not at war with 
anyone) (KTN News 2018a, 1:01). A few days later, Moi and Benjamin Mkapa, Tanzania’s 
president at the time, held a joint press briefing where Moi confirmed that Kenya and 
Tanzania were cooperating with the US to investigate the US Embassy bombings in 
Nairobi and Dar es Salaam (Associate Press Archive 2015).  
Based on his choice of words and the tone of his voice, Moi expressed shock about 
the attack and empathy towards the victims of the attack. However, he did not express 
outrage towards the attackers even as details about the attack were revealed to the public. 
This was unusual given the magnitude of the attack and the fact that the main victims of 
the attack were Kenyans. Moreover, it was out of character for Moi, an authoritarian 
president who had ruled Kenya for almost 20 years,44 not to talk about how Kenya was 
going to protect itself and prevent another terrorist attack. Moi had always presented 
himself as Kenya’s protector and would walk into public ceremonies and gatherings to 
chants of “baba wa taifa” (father of the nation) (KTN News 2014). He prided himself as a 
powerful leader who knew everything that was going on in Kenya and believed that he was 
in control of the country’s destiny.   
 
44 Moi ruled for a total of 24 years. From 1978-2002.  
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On this basis, Moi’s nonchalant attitude towards Al Qaeda’s attack on Kenyan soil 
was an indication that he did not perceive the attack as a security problem for Kenya. It is 
likely that Moi’s government perceived the US Embassy bombing as an attack on the US 
even though it happened on Kenyan soil. The reason behind Moi’s government’s attitude 
towards the attack is discussed further in chapter three of this thesis.  
In contrast to Kenya, policymakers and political leaders in the US repeatedly stated 
that there was need for a policy shift in efforts to counter transnational terrorism. Reacting 
to the attacks, the US president at the time, Bill Clinton, declared that “law enforcement 
and diplomatic tools are simply not enough” and “we must take extraordinary steps to 
protect the safety of our citizens” (Clinton 1998, para. 7). Clinton categorically criticized 
the perpetrators of the attack and promised them that the US would retaliate against the 
attacks stating:  
These acts of terrorist violence are abhorrent, they are 
inhuman. We will use all the means at our disposal to bring 
those responsible to justice no matter what or how long it 
takes (Associate Press Archive 2015b, 0:01). 
Clinton predicted that what lay ahead was “a long, ongoing struggle between freedom and 
fanaticism, between the rule of law and terrorism” and was emphatic that “we must be 
prepared to do all that we can for as long as we must” (Clinton 1998, para. 14).  
Other key policymakers in the Clinton administration including Secretary of State 
Madeline Albright, Defence Secretary William Cohen and National Security Advisor 
Sandy Berger made similar remarks. The dominant theme in their public statements was 
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that the United States’ counterterrorism policy, henceforth, would be based on proactive 
and extraordinary security measures (Perl 1998).  This view was reinforced after the 
terrorist attacks on 9/11 leading to the enactment of the Uniting and Strengthening America 
by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 
(USA PATRIOT Act) and the adoption of the United Nations Security Council’s 
Resolution 1373.   
The 2002 Kikambala Bombing   
Shortly after 9/11, Kenya’s vulnerability to transnational terrorist attacks was, once again, 
brought to the fore. On November 28, 2002, Al Qaeda militants attacked the Israeli-owned 
Paradise Hotel in Kikambala, Mombasa. They also attempted to shoot down an Israeli 
charter plane that had just taken off from the Moi International airport in Mombasa with 
261 passengers on board. Although the fired surface-to-air missiles failed to hit the plane, 
a suicide bomber drove a car packed with explosives into the Paradise hotel killing 15 
people and injuring 40 others (Fighel 2011; Muiruri 2003; Gunaratna 2002).  
One of the masterminds of the attacks, Fazul Abdallah Mohammed, a Comoran, 
had fled from Kenya after the 1998 US Embassy bombing before sneaking back into the 
country from Afghanistan between 2001 and 2002. He settled in Lamu, an island off the 
Kenyan coast, married a Kenyan woman from the area and entrenched himself into the 
community as a Muslim cleric and mentor for the youth. He was even able to establish 
three football teams - Al Qaeda, Kandahar and Kabul - for boys and young men in Lamu 
without raising any suspicions about his intentions (Fighel 2011; Muiruri 2003; Gunaratna 
2002). After the 2002 attacks in Mombasa, he slipped into Somalia through the Lamu 
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border where he became Al Qaeda’s East African leader and a top commander in Al 
Shabaab until his death in 2011.  
Security Discussions in the Aftermath of the 2002 Kikambala Bombing 
The second major terrorist attack in Kenya happened a month before the 2002 elections 
were held in the country. This time, Moi’s name was not on the ballot paper. However, he 
had handpicked Uhuru Kenyatta, the son of Kenya’s first president Jomo Kenyatta, as his 
preferred candidate on a KANU ticket. To counter Uhuru Kenyatta’s bid for presidency, 
several prominent opposition members had come together under the umbrella of the 
National Rainbow Coalition (NARC). The main objective of the coalition, which was made 
up of 15 opposition parties,45 was to make sure that KANU’s 40-year rule came to an end 
(Awori 2017).  
Many opposition members viewed KANU as a destructive force in Kenya 
considering its leaders involvement in ethnopolitical violence in the country among other 
vices. Indeed, some members of the opposition had referred to ethnopolitical violence in 
Kenya as a form of state terrorism. On April 17, 1997, Kiraitu Murungi, who was in the 
opposition at the time and would later serve in the NARC Cabinet when it won the elections 
in 2002, stated:  
One of the courses which I studied at graduate level was a 
course called Political Violence and Terrorism. This 
 
45 NARC was made up of 15 opposition parties and the most prominent of these were: Raila Odinga’s Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP), Kijana Wamalwa’s Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (Ford-Kenya), Charity 
Ngilu’s Social Democratic Party (SDP) and Mwai Kibaki’s Democratic Party (DP). 
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[ethnopolitical violence] is one of the strategies of state 
terrorism in this country. There are people in this country 
who think that they can win, maintain power and preserve 
their economic privileges … by using terrorism … We want 
president Moi to be told that we, in the opposition, would 
like him to retire peacefully and play with his grandchildren 
(Kenya Hansard 1997, 298). 
Murungi’s speech was not just a candid expression of how Kenya’s opposition felt about 
Moi and KANU, but also one of the main reasons why members of the opposition came 
together to form a coalition party. For NARC, KANU was the malignant threat that had to 
be stopped and not what they believed were a few foreign terrorists who were targeting 
foreign installations in Kenya. Transnational terrorism was, therefore, not a priority for 
policymakers in Kenya in the immediate aftermath of 9/11.      
When NARC ousted KANU and won the elections in 2002, Kenya started a new 
chapter in its history. For the first time in almost a decade, Kenya had relatively peaceful 
elections with no major incidences of ethnopolitical violence. Plus, NARC had pledged to 
uproot the despotic system that KANU had developed over a period of almost 40 years. 
NARC’s strategy to lead Kenya on a new path of prosperity focused on two key things. 
First, entrenching democracy in Kenya through institutional and constitutional changes and 
second, pursuing innovative economic policies that would revamp Kenya’s economy 
(Ndegwa 2003).  The changes that NARC instituted and the processes that accompanied 
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the changes set in motion a series of events that had a profound impact on counterterrorism 
policymaking in Kenya. These changes are discussed in chapters three, four and five. 
Conclusion 
 This chapter focused on major incidences of political violence in Kenya with an objective 
of identifying some of the contextual factors that affected the unsecuritization and 
securitization of terrorism in Kenya.  Kenya experienced several incidences of 
ethnopolitical violence as well as three major terrorist attacks in 1980, 1998 and 2002. 
Kenya’s government and members of the opposition condemned the terrorist attacks. 
Nevertheless, the prominence of foreign nationals in orchestrating the attacks was 
perceived as a sign that terrorism was a foreign threat. This view was reinforced by the fact 
that the targets of the attacks, which included the Israeli owned Norfolk hotel in Nairobi, 
the US Embassy in Nairobi and the Israeli owned Kikambala hotel in Mombasa, were 
foreign installations in Kenya.  
     Additionally, securitization actors in Kenya, that is, the president, cabinet ministers 
and members of parliament, were preoccupied with the politics of ethnopolitical violence 
in Kenya. Unlike terrorist incidences in the country which occurred infrequently and were 
targeted at foreign installations, ethnopolitical violence in Kenya was a cyclical 
phenomenon that worsened during the subsequent election year. Moreover, even though 
violence subsided once the election results had been announced, Kenya was never really at 
peace. Once ethnic animosity was ignited in 1992, it became impossible to extinguish 
mainly because it was coupled with narratives of historical injustices. Hence, at the time, 
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the problem of transnational terrorism was far less menacing when compared to 
ethnopolitical violence in Kenya.  
 The terrorist attacks in the US on 9/11 happened just over a year before NARC was 
elected in Kenya. NARC’s election victory in December 2002 was a new starting point for 
Kenya. After almost 40 years of despotic rule under KANU, Kenya had a chance to become 
a democracy and embark on activities that would revamp its economy. The changes that 
Kenya went through under the NARC government combined with geopolitical 
developments in the Horn of Africa had a big impact on counterterrorism policymaking in 
Kenya. These changes and their impact on the unsecuritization and securitization of 
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Chapter Four 




Chapter three elaborated on political violence in Kenya including three of the country’s 
major terrorist attacks. The three terrorist attacks had two factors in common. First, foreign 
nationals were predominantly involved in planning and executing the attacks. Second, 
despite the high number of Kenyan casualties, the terrorist attacks were directed at 
American and Israeli installations in Kenya.  
From 2009, there was a shift in the nature of terrorism incidences in Kenya. The 
frequency of terrorist attacks increased and many of the attacks were directed at Kenyan 
targets such as local restaurants, police stations and the country’s public transport system. 
In addition to this, Kenyan citizens were identified as the perpetrators of many of the 
attacks which were attributed to an Islamist terrorist group known as Al Shabaab. While 
Al Shabaab’s original goal was to create an Islamic state in Somalia, governed by a 
punctilious application of religious texts and teachings, it gradually spread its influence on 
other parts of East Africa including Kenya (Botha 2013, 2014, 2017). It is the spread of Al 
Shabaab’s influence in Kenya that led to concerns that a growing population of young 
radicalized Kenyans made terrorism an existential threat to the country.  
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The key objectives of this chapter are to elaborate on how and why terrorism 
incidences in Kenya changed and to explain the effect of the changes on Kenya’s 
counterterrorism policy. This chapter begins with discussions about why radicalization is 
a significant part of the recruitment process of many terrorist groups including Al Shabaab. 
As discussions in this chapter will reveal, ongoing radicalization is part of Al Shabaab’s 
recruitment and retention strategy. The group’s media branch, Al Kataib, has produced 
hundreds of video and audio recordings, statements and several copies of a digital 
magazine that contain comprehensive lessons about Al Shabaab’s ideology. The lessons 
are not only targeted at potential recruits. Several of the video recordings feature 
individuals who eloquently give lectures to groups of Al Shabaab fighters about the merits 
of jihad and other Al Shabaab objectives. Some of the video and audio recordings are quite 
lengthy and participants can be heard asking questions just as students would in a 
classroom setting. For instance, in 2012 Al Kataib media released a video entitled A 
Lecture: But if they Seek Your Help in Religion, It is your Duty to Help Them by Mujahid 
Brother Ahmad Iman Ali (Al Kataib Media 2012). Given the emphasis that Al Shabaab 
places on the radicalization of its members, it is important to explain what radicalization is 
and how it is linked to terrorism.  
Next, this chapter elaborates on the emergence of Al Shabaab before analysing the 
role of key individuals who acted as conduits of radicalization in Kenya. Radicalization 
conduits propagate ideas that not only attract young people to terrorist groups but also 
galvanize individuals to carry out lone-wolf attacks. Several studies note that the presence 
of radicalization conduits, irrespective of whether they are members of a terrorist group, 
contributes to an increase in the number of individuals who join terrorist groups (Barbieri 
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and Klausen 2012; Neumann 2017). Examining the roles of radicalization conduits in 
Kenya provides insights about the levels of radicalization in the country.  
The last part of this chapter establishes whether an increase in the levels of 
radicalization in Kenya led to an increase in terrorist incidences as well as an increase in 
the number of Kenyans involved in terrorist activities. The discussions in this section of 
the chapter are juxtaposed with narratives about the terrorism threat in Kenya and debates 
about counterterrorism measures. 
The Link between Terrorism and Radicalization  
Attracting and recruiting individuals who are willing to support and carry out terrorist acts 
is critical to the success and survival of terrorist groups. It is through recruitment that 
terrorist groups obtain the human resources that they need to carry out attacks and other 
operational activities. Terrorist recruitment strategies are varied and complex involving 
different methods such as personal contact, the use of social media and the distribution of 
written and recorded propaganda material.   
Central to the recruitment methods is the process of radicalization which is defined 
as the progressive adoption of “beliefs, feelings and behaviours in directions that 
increasingly justify intergroup violence and demand sacrifice in defence of the ingroup” 
(McCauley and Moskalenko 2008, 416). While radicalization does not always lead to the 
use, facilitation or support of violence (Schmid 2013; Borum 2011) it can be a precondition 
for terrorism. Neumann (2013, 2016), argued that politically motivated violence, including 
terrorism, has always been the product of ideas, feelings and beliefs that venerate the use 
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of violence to achieve a political goal. He noted that terrorist groups that espoused different 
political beliefs, across different regions around the world and in different historical periods 
used radical ideas to create a sense of purpose and belonging among their members.  
Similarly, Rapoport (2012) found that since the late 1870s radical ideas and beliefs 
have been the cause of four waves of modern terrorism namely; the anarchist, the anti-
colonial,46 the new left and the current religious wave. Anarchists were motivated by the 
idea of overthrowing political systems. Anti-colonialists envisioned colonial territories that 
were free from European rule. New leftists wanted to overthrow the capitalist state and 
replace it with a society that was founded on Marxist ideas. Lastly, religious terrorists, 
which will be the focus of this chapter, strive to create puritanical religious societies that 
are devoid of what they perceive as infidels or non-believers. (Rapoport 2012; Rasler and 
Thompson 2009; Jones, 2008; Rink and Sharma 2018).  
Several case studies that have examined why fighters joined terrorist groups lend 
credence to the integral role of radicalization in terrorist groups’ recruitment and retention 
processes. In a study that examined why 58 defectors joined the Islamic State (IS) the 
International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence found that three 
key radicalization narratives were used to lure recruits to Syria. These were: 1) that Sunni 
Muslims in Syria were facing genocide from Bashar al Assad’s government and needed 
help from devote Muslims; 2) that the IS was the perfect Islamic state and every Muslim 
was obligated to join and support it; and 3) that all mujahideen47 would be rewarded with 
 
46 It is important to note that many anti-colonial groups had the support of the communities on whose 
behalf they carried out political violence.   
47 The term Mujahedeen refers to Jihadi fighters.  
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luxury goods and become coveted members of the IS brotherhood of heroes (Neumann 
2015).   
Other studies which carried out interviews to find out the root causes of terrorism 
among members of the Lord Resistance Army (LRA),48 the Allied Democratic Forces 
(ADF)49 and Al Shabaab revealed that many members joined these groups because of what 
the groups’ advocated for. LRA fighters joined the group because they had been told that 
Uganda’s president, Yoweri Museveni, wanted to wipe out the Acholi people in Northern 
Uganda and take away their land. Hence, the LRA was largely made up of Acholis who 
believed that they were defending their people and land (Dubal 2018; Botha 2015).  In the 
cases of the ADF and Al Shabaab, the majority of those interviewed joined the groups 
because they believed that Muslims faced widespread discrimination in East Africa and 
that this injustice would be resolved through the violent creation of an Islamic caliphate in 
the region (Botha, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2017; Titeca and Vlassenroot 2012).   
The Collapse of Somalia and the Rise of Al Shabaab, Its Goals and Recruitment 
Strategies 
 
Several studies have concluded that Al Shabaab gained prominence after the Ethiopian 
invasion of Somalia in December 2006 (Hansen 2013; Marchal 2009; Solomon 2014; Wise 
2011). However, the group’s formation and its ambition to create an Islamic state in 
Somalia and possibly the entire East African region predates the Ethiopian invasion.  Prior 
 
48 The Lord Resistance Army (LRA) is a heterodox Christian insurgency group that employs terrorist tactics 
to fight against Yoweri Museveni’s government in Uganda. It is important to note that even members of the 
LRA who had been abducted and forcefully recruited as young children were indoctrinated and many of them 
gradually believed in the group’s cause (Dubal 2018).    
49 The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) is an insurgency group that operates in Western Uganda and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (Titeca and Vlassenroot 2012).  
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to the invasion, Al Shabaab formed an important part of the UIC militant wing. Under the 
leadership of Hassan Dahir Aweys and Adan Hashi Farah Ayro, militants, then known as 
Mu’askar Mahkamad (troops of the Islamic Courts) and later as Al Shabaab, successfully 
facilitated the UIC’s takeover of Mogadishu in June 2006 (Menkhaus 2014; Marchal 2009). 
Aweys was a former leader of AIAI, an Al Qaeda affiliated organization that fought to 
overthrow Somalia’s former president Mohammed Siad Barre with a view to installing a 
Somali government founded on Wahhabism and spreading its influence on other parts of 
East Africa (United Nations Security Council 2011a; Unites Nations Security Council 
2011b).  
AIAI’s ambitions were outlined in a document entitled “The Manifesto of an 
Islamic Party,” which clearly stated that the group’s main goal was to bring all Somalis 
together under an Islamic state devoid of any foreign influence or associations 
(Loewenstein 2010; UNSC 2011b). When AIAI decentralized and dispersed after the 9/11 
attacks to evade the United States’ counterterrorism operations (UNSC 2011a) its key 
leaders, such as Aweys, joined the UIC and became influential members of its leadership 
council. From his position within the UIC Council, Aweys appointed Ayro as the 
commander of UIC’s military wing sometime in 2005 (Marchal 2009; Rabasa 2009; Maruf 
and Joseph, 2018). It is likely that Ayro was selected for this position because of his 
willingness to commit acts of political violence. He had received training in Afghanistan 
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before 9/11 and did not shy away from expressing his desire to carry out jihad against 
infidels or anyone else who stood in his way (Marchal 2009; Rabasa 2009).50  
Other prominent personalities of the UIC, who had received training in Afghanistan 
and went on to become leaders in Al Shabaab included Ahmed Aw Abdi Godane (aka 
Mukhtar Abu Zubair), Mukhtar Robow (aka Abu Mansur) and Ibrahim al-Afghani (aka 
Ibrahim Haji Jama Mead). Together with Ayro, the three embarked on an aggressive 
recruitment strategy modelled on the lessons that they had undertaken in Afghanistan 
(Marchal 2009; Rabasa 2009).  
Marchal (2009) noted that those who were initially recruited into Al Shabaab “were 
not average young Somalis” (Marchal 2009, 389) with the majority being teenage boys 
who were either orphans or did not have strong family ties. The boys were housed and 
trained at a camp that was established after UIC militants destroyed a colonial Italian 
cemetery in the Huriwa district in the northern part of Mogadishu. The camp was named 
Salahuddin Muaskar and Godane was appointed as its leader. It had all the necessary 
equipment and infrastructure that the recruits needed for their training including a mosque, 
a training campus, a weapons store, a weapons repair section, an emergency clinic and a 
women’s section where food was prepared for the trainees (Maruf and Joseph 2018; BBC 
2005). There was, therefore, no need for the boys to have any contact with the outside 
world and the radicalization process took place uninterrupted.  
 
50 It is, however, important to note that the training of Somalis in Afghanistan was not the norm. Their 
appearance is different from that of Afghanis and this would have made them stand out in Afghanistan and 
drawn unwanted attention to their groups.    
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The Salahuddin Mu’askar camp became a blueprint for future camps where mostly 
young men, including children below the age of 18, were isolated and radicalized. The 
2006 UN Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia found that, by October 2006, the 
UIC’s military wing had set up approximately 16 camps in Central and Southern Somalia 
with a total of approximately 400 young fighters. The report further stated that in addition 
to Somali trainers who focused on conventional military techniques, the camps hosted 
foreign trainers from Pakistan, Afghanistan, the Arabian Peninsula and Chechnya who 
gave lessons on kidnapping techniques, bomb making, the use of bombs against 
transportation and building targets as well as assassination methods such as sniping and 
ambush.  
The fact that the UIC’s military wing training regime included techniques 
associated with terrorist and insurgency groups suggests that their long-term goal was not 
limited to establishing and maintaining order within Somalia. Instead, the group’s militant 
wing was preparing its recruits to carry out acts of terrorism as part of its commitment to 
global jihad. Although this goal was not explicit at the time, the prominent role of 
Afghanistan-trained members in the UIC’s military wing and their connections to jihadist 
networks in other parts of the world meant that the group’s identity as part of the global 
jihad network was always on the horizon. Perhaps the most influential leader in this regard 
was Godane. In addition to travelling to Afghanistan, Godane had studied in Sudan and 
Pakistan after receiving funding from Saudi donors. It is in Pakistan where Godane was 
radicalized before he travelled to Afghanistan to train and fight alongside the Taliban and 
later on to Kashmir (Raghavan 2013).    
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Hence, even though several studies (Hansen 2013; Marchal 2009; Solomon 2014; 
Wise 2011) described the UIC as a mixture of moderate and radical Islamic leaders whose 
objective was to restore and maintain order in Somalia, it is unlikely that the group’s radical 
members, such as Ayro, Godane, Robow and al-Afghani, who also happened to be in 
charge of its military wing, would have been content with operating within the confines or 
behind the shadows of a moderate UIC. This may explain why rifts within the UIC, such 
as Ayro’s public criticism of moderate UIC members including Abukar Umar Adaan and 
Ahmed Nuur Ali Jim’ale, began to appear months before the group disintegrated in 
December 2006 (Marchal 2011; Barnes and Hassan 2007). It also explains why the UIC’s 
military wing, which came to be known as Al Shabaab, did not make any attempts to 
reintegrate with moderate members of the UIC after it recaptured and extended its political 
power in Somalia from 2007.  
Another indication that the UIC’s military wing was not enthusiastic about being 
part of a moderate UIC was its repeated attempts to dominate the agenda of the UIC and 
its uncompromising stance towards the views of other UIC members. According to Barnes 
and Hassan (2007) “there was serious ideological friction between the moderate wing led 
by the Chairman of the Islamic Courts’ Executive Council Sheikh Sharif and the radical 
wing led by the Chairman of the Courts’ Shura (Consultative or Legislative Council) 
Sheikh Aweys” (Barnes and Hassan 2007, 155).  For instance, as soon as the UIC had 
defeated warlords in Mogadishu in June 2006, its military wing demanded that order in 
Mogadishu should be based on a strict Wahhabi interpretation of Sharia law. The militants 
were staunchly opposed to the long-standing Sufi traditions that were an important part of 
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religious practices among several Somali clans (Marchal 2011; Uexkull and Pettersson 
2018).  
Furthermore, in line with the UICs military wing’s strict laws, Somalis were 
subjected to public floggings as well as the banning of music and TV programs because 
they were deemed un-Islamic (Kebede 2007; Sjah 2014). The military wing also demanded 
that the UIC should be open to membership from foreign fighters (Marchal 2011), a request 
that contradicted the objectives of moderates within the group who wanted it to be made 
up of Somalis interested in rebuilding their country. It is, therefore, not surprising that the 
UIC’s military wing faced “growing opposition from different quarters within the UIC 
leadership” (Marchal 2011, 17) who disagreed with the rules that the militants were 
imposing on the Somali people. Given the tumultuous relationship within the UIC, it was 
only a matter of time before its military wing broke away from moderate elements in the 
group. Consequently, the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia, in December 2006, acted as a 
catalyst rather than the main cause of the rise of Al Shabaab in Somalia.  
When Ethiopian forces invaded Somalia in December 2006, the UIC collapsed and 
several members of its leadership council sought refuge outside Somalia. Members of its 
military wing retreated to the Southern part of Somalia where they regrouped and launched 
a guerrilla campaign against Ethiopian forces. Throughout most of 2007 and 2008 former 
UIC militants, who now went by the name Al Shabaab, used Improvised Explosive Devices 
(IEDs), bombs and assassinations to push back against Ethiopian advancement into 
Southern Somalia. Al Shabaab’s attacks against Ethiopian forces were largely successful 
because the group had the backing of local populations which resented the presence of 
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Ethiopia in Somalia51 and welcomed the services and security that Al Shabaab provided in 
ungoverned regions where crime had been rampant for several years. Wise (2011), noted 
that Al Shabaab brought a sense of normalcy in regions that it controlled through the 
provision of goods and services such as “policing, judicial decision making and welfare” 
(Wise 2011, 6). This made the group popular, especially in 2007, leading to an increase in 
the number of young, mostly uneducated, Somalis who wanted to be part of what appeared 
to be a nationalistic organization that was fighting to restore order and kick out foreign 
invaders from Somalia (Wise 2011).  
Moreover, the fact that the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), Somalia’s 
government at the time, was holed up in Baidoa due to security concerns and had no control 
over other parts of Somalia made it easy for Al Shabaab to attract and train recruits. The 
group disseminated its propaganda through broadcast stations and print media in regions 
under its control without fear of reprisal from the government. New recruits were openly 
trained in specialized camps including a hand-to-hand and small-arms training camp in Ras 
Kamboni as well as a kidnapping training camp in Eel Aarfid (Wise 2011).  By the end of 
2007, Al Shabaab had grown into one of the most powerful militant groups in Africa with 
thousands of fighters and millions of dollars’ worth of funds obtained from revenues in the 
areas under its control as well as donations from its supporters both within and outside 
Somalia (Wise 2011; Mwangi 2012).  
 
51 Somalia and Ethiopia have a long history of acrimonious relations dating back to the period when part of 
Ethiopia was known as Abyssinia (Ahmed 1999; Abbink 2003).   
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From mid-2008, Al Shabaab’s outlook took on a more transnational focus. Two 
key factors led to this change. First, some of the communities under its control started 
rebelling against Al Shabaab’s style of governance. They were particularly upset because 
Al Shabaab, which adhered to Wahhabism, had banned several religious practices 
associated with Sufism. The resentment that this elicited among the Somali people was 
captured in Abdurahman Abdullahi’s observation where he noted that: 
[Wahhabis] are engaged in an uncompromising conflictual 
campaign against Sufis. In that way [Wahhabism], as 
projected in Somalia, is not a reform movement but a 
revolutionary approach that aims to obliterate and 
completely change traditional Islam as practiced in Somalia 
for centuries. This stream of thought is followed by Al-
Itihaad and its more extreme versions such as Al Shabaab 
and Hizb Al-Islam which engage in the destruction and 
desecration of the tombs of prominent Sufi scholars 
(Abdullahi 2011, 51-52).  
Al Shabaab’s waning popularity coincided with the emergence of groups that 
challenged its authority. One such group, the Ahlu Sunna wal Jamaa (ASWJ), battled it out 
with Al Shabaab in areas where it had imposed strict Wahhabi rules (Sjah 2014). Despite 
being a formidable opponent, the ASWJ did not dislodge Al Shabaab from Somalia. 
Nevertheless, ASWJ’s commitment to defending Sufism demonstrated that Al Shabaab 
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was unlikely to exert full control over the Somali people because of their rich history of 
Sufi traditions.  
Faced with the prospect of attracting fewer recruits within Somalia, Al Shabaab 
repositioned itself as a global jihadist organization. On April 5, 2008 the group released a 
statement entitled “Shabaab al-Mujahideen Announces New Campaign of Terrorism in 
Somalia,” where it reaffirmed not just its commitment to rid Somalia of foreign influence 
but also its pride in being part of a global jihad network that was working towards the 
creation of an Islamic caliphate. Part of the statement stated that Al Shabaab was “going 
through a crucial stage in which the oppressors have crossed the line” (Shabaab al-
Mujahideen 2008, para. 1).  It appealed to all Muslims and other Islamist fighters around 
the world to “round up and join forces under one leadership and uniform flag in order to 
frustrate the enemies of Allah [and] make our jihad stronger and more harmful to our 
enemies” (Shabaab al-Mujahideen 2008, para. 1).  
 The second factor that contributed to Al Shabaab’s transnational focus was the 
change of leadership from Ayro to Godane. On May 1, 2008, Ayro was killed in a US 
airstrike shortly after the US Department of State had designated Al Shabaab as a terrorist 
group. Unlike Ayro who emphasized the importance of pursuing both nationalistic and 
transnational objectives, his successor, Godane, was more enthusiastic about projecting Al 
Shabaab as a transnational terrorist group. Soon after being declared the Emir (supreme 
leader) of Al Shabaab, Godane announced that the struggle in Somalia was “an integral 
part of global jihad” (Sjah 2014, 39). Godane reiterated Al Shabaab’s commitment to 
global jihad in 2009 when he stated “we will establish Islamic rule from Alaska to Chile 
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and South Africa, Japan, Russia to Solomon Island and all the way to Iceland. Be warned! 
We are coming” (Al Jazeera 2013, 2:36; Appendix 3) 
In line with Godane’s transnational outlook, Al Shabaab started releasing 
propaganda videos that encouraged foreign fighters, including Kenyan Somalis and 
Muslims, to travel to Somalia and become Al Shabaab Mujahedeen. One of the videos 
released in November 2010 featured Ali Rage, Al Shabaab’s spokesperson at the time, 
inviting fighters from East Africa to Somalia saying “to our family in East Africa we say 
welcome to Somalia, hakuna matata (there are no worries) (Al Shabaab 2010c, 22:10). 
These activities constituted part of Al Shabaab’s recruitment strategies in Kenya.    
Al Shabaab’s Kenyan Recruits  
There are myriads of factors that explain why radicalization takes place. They range 
from perceived and real social, economic and political grievances (Gurr 1970; Makinda 
2003; Botha 2014; George 2016; Okafor and Piesse 2017) to situations where individuals 
are experiencing social identity crisis (Sambanis and Shayo 2013; Kfir 2017). However, 
not everyone who feels aggrieved or is in a social crisis will resort to the use of political 
violence in pursuit of justice or a sense of belonging. So, what would make an aggrieved 
individual decide to support or become a member of a terrorist group?  
Increasingly, evidence has linked radicalization to individuals (referred to as 
radicalization conduits in this thesis) who propagate ideas that not only compel young 
people to join terrorist groups but also galvanize some of them to carry out lone-wolf 
terrorist attacks. For instance, a study on Al Qaeda related networks in London between 
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1999 and 2010 showed that over 80% of the 350 Britons convicted of terrorist offenses 
during that time got their inspiration from four radical preachers (Klausen 2010; Klausen, 
Libretti, Hung and Jayasumana 2018; Barbieri and Klausen 2012). Similarly, an MI5 report 
entitled International Terrorism (2008) stated that most Al Qaeda recruits in London had 
diverse demographic characteristics and the only common denominator among them was 
that they were linked to two radical preachers from an area called Luton (Rayment 2008; 
Neumann 2017). Another study on the IS’s foreign fighters in Syria found that most of the 
300 fighters surveyed in the study chose to travel to Syria because of the messages that 
they had received from radicalization conduits. Neumann (2017) referred to these conduits 
as cheerleaders of radical Islamic groups because of their capacity to mobilize young 
people on behalf of terrorist groups. 
Like the cases of London and Syria, radicalization hotspots and trends in Kenya 
can be linked to conduits of radicalization who tell young people that terrorism is the only 
option through which they can seek redress for perceived and real grievances. Among the 
conduits was a fiery preacher known as Aboud Rogo Mohammed who regarded himself as 
a leading Wahhabi voice in Kenya and East Africa as a whole (Rogo n.d, 2010).  In 2002, 
Rogo was arrested on suspicions of aiding the perpetrators of the 1998 US Embassy 
bombing in Nairobi and the Kikambala terrorist attacks in Mombasa. It was alleged that he 
hosted one of the masterminds of the attacks, Fazul Mohammed, and introduced him to a 
Kenyan woman who later became his wife. However, the charges against Rogo were 
dropped in 2005 due to insufficient evidence linking him to any of the attacks (United 
Nations Security Council 2011). Kenya’s acting Foreign Affairs Minister at the time, 
Moses Wetangula, expressed disappointment with the court’s ruling attributing it to the 
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lack of anti-terrorism legislation. The acting Foreign Affairs Minister said that even though 
the government had no doubt of Rogo’s involvement in the 1998 US Embassy bombings 
and the Kikambala hotel attacks, nothing could be done because of legal loopholes in 
Kenya’s laws (Government of Kenya 2005).  
Although Rogo denied all charges and insisted that he did not support terrorism, his 
utterances between 2009 until his death in 2012 painted a different picture. Rogo usually 
issued weekly summons at the Masjid Musa Mosque in Mombasa which called for the 
separation of Kenyan Muslims from the rest of the population in the country. Some of his 
sermons were also widely distributed on CDs and uploaded on YouTube (United Nations 
Security Council 2012). Rogo’s sermons meshed local grievances with rhetoric that was 
similar to that of other terrorist groups, such as Al Qaeda, in efforts to rally young Kenyans 
against what he called “the unholy evil of Kenya’s secular state” (quoted in Amble and 
Meleagrou-Hitchens 2014, 526). In this context, Rogo provided what several analysts refer 
to as a cognitive opening which is a period when a child, teenager or young adult is 
receptive to conversations about engaging in terrorist acts (Neumann 2017; Vidino, 
Pantucci and Kohlmann 2010; Bergen 2016; Wiktorowicz 2005).  
In one sermon, for example, Rogo claimed that life for Muslims at the Kenyan 
Coast was equivalent to life in hell. He told his audience that they were victims of poverty, 
discrimination and unemployment because they had neglected Allah and that the living 
conditions of his audience was a clear sign that while “you (Muslims) love non-believers 
they do not love you” (Rogo 2010, 10:15).  He claimed that non-believers all over the world 
were out to destroy Muslims and that they unfairly labelled heroic defenders of the Muslim 
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faith, such as bin Laden, Muammar Gaddafi52 and Omar al-Bashir,53 as terrorists. He was 
emphatic that ‘real’ Kenyan Muslims should go for jihad stating: “ukitaka kufa shahid ndio 
utaaishi maisha mazuri, ukitaka kufa baki mjini, ukitaka kuishi nenda jihad,” (if you want 
to live a good life you should die as a martyr, if you want to die as a nonbeliever stay in 
the city, if you want to continue living go for jihad) (Rogo 2010, 17:11).   
In addition to giving sermons in support of jihad, radicalization conduits may act as 
gatekeepers for terrorist groups. Usually, gatekeepers have direct contact with key leaders 
in terrorist groups and identify new recruits who are provided with the skills, resources and 
support that they need to join terrorist groups. According to the United Nations Security 
Council: 
Kenya-based extremist Aboud Rogo Mohammed has 
threatened the peace, security, or stability of Somalia, by 
providing financial, material, logistical, or technical support 
to Al Shabaab, an entity listed by the UNSC Committee 
established pursuant to Resolution 751 (1992) concerning 
Somalia and resolution 1907 (2009) concerning Eritrea for 
engaging in acts that directly or indirectly threaten the peace, 
security, or stability of Somalia. Aboud Rogo Mohammed is 
an extremist Islamic cleric based in Kenya.  He continues to 
 
52 Muammar Gaddafi, the president of Libya from 1962 to 2011 was implicated in the Lockerbie bombing of 
Pan Am flight 103 on December 21, 1988.    
53 Omar al-Bashir was the president of Sudan from 1989 to 2019. He has been linked to Al Qaeda because 
Sudan hosted Osama bin Laden from 1991 to 1996. He has also been accused of genocide and crimes against 
humanity in Darfur (Astil 2001; Associated Press in the Hague 2010).  
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exert influence over extremist groups in East Africa as part 
of his campaign to promote violence throughout East 
Africa.  Aboud Rogo’s activities include fundraising for Al 
Shabaab (United Nations Security Council 2012, para.3). 
 
Rogo’s main sources for recruits were the Masjid Musa and the Masjid Sakina 
mosques54 in Kenya’s Coastal city of Mombasa. These two locations were ideal venues for 
recruitment because they had an abundance of young people from disadvantaged 
backgrounds who were susceptible to Rogo’s sermons. Mosques play important roles 
especially in Muslim communities where there are high levels of poverty. They are often 
the only source of welfare, education and employment for poor youth (Interview with 
religious leader F November 20, 2017). Hence, young people who were members of the 
two mosques and were exposed to Rogo’s sermons, which were inundated with allegations 
about the Kenyan state’s mistreatment of Muslims, had no other authoritative source of 
information. Accordingly, the mosques were identified as key recruitment and 
radicalization centres for young Kenyans who were sent off to Somalia as Al Shabaab 
fighters (United Nations Security Council 2011).     
Like instigators of ethnopolitical violence in Kenya, Rogo and other radicalization 
conduits exploited grievances that Kenyan Muslims had with the Kenyan state to incite 
violence. Among the grievances was the issue of land ownership at the Kenyan Coast that 
 
54 The Masjid Sakina was a mosque in Mombasa, Kenya where Rogo would give his lectures. After Rogo’s 
death on August 27, 2012 a group of youth forcefully took over the mosque and renamed it Masjid 
Mujaheeden (fighters) (Nation Reporter 2014).    
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was also the cause of ethnopolitical violence at the Coast and many other parts of Kenya. 
For instance, absentee landlords own hundreds of thousands of acres in the 10-mile Coast 
strip, Kilifi and Malindi even though hundreds of thousands of indigenous residents remain 
landless (Kanyinga 2000; Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission 2013).55 While the 
land injustices committed against indigenous people at the Kenyan Coast, comprising of 
Muslims, Christians and others, should be redressed, those who use land as a call to arms 
omit the historical intricacies surrounding the distribution of land in the region.  
Indeed, the annexation of land from indigenous populations at the Kenyan Coast 
goes as far back as the 12th century when Arabs arrived in the Coastal region and gradually 
dispossessed the Mijikenda of their ancestral land. In 1908, the Land Ordinance Act sealed 
the fate of the landless indigenous populations by awarding title deeds to mostly rich Arab 
and Swahili individuals. As Kanyinga (2000) wrote:  
The Ordinance did not seek to establish Mijikenda claims, 
even those which had been recognized by the Sultan [of 
Zanzibar] because their rights amounted to a tribal and not 
an individual title … those whose claims succeeded were the 
Arabs, the Swahili and the Indians (Kanyinga 2000, 59).   
Furthermore, some of the land that was awarded through the Land Ordinance Act has 
changed ownership through several economic interactions. Consequently, the issue of land 
 
55 Land owners include the descendants of the Liwalis who inherited land that was given to their families by 
the Sultanate of Zanzibar along the 10-mile Coast strip. Many of the land owners live in Oman and are 
referred to as absentee landlords (Kanyinga 2000; Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission 2013).   
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injustices is quite complex and cannot be surmised based on Kenya’s post-colonial 
governments’ relations with indigenous communities at the Kenyan Coast.  
Notwithstanding some of the complexities of land ownership, Kenyan Muslims 
have grievances that can be attributed to the actions of Kenya’s post-colonial governments. 
As Hassan Khalid, the Director of Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI), pointed out: 
There has been very clear discrimination and 
marginalization of the Muslim-dominated regions … if you 
look at education, for example, our region [the Coastal 
region] remains to be the one with the least number of 
schools per population if you compare the ratio. We have 
poor infrastructure and there is no other region that has more 
resources than Coast but unfortunately it receives the least 
from the central government (PBS Newshour 2013, 2:31). 
 Khalid’s claims, about marginalization, are backed up with data from Kenya’s 
Commission on Revenue Allocation.  Five out of the six counties in Kenya’s Coastal region 
are ranked among the most marginalized and underdeveloped counties in the country. They 
include Kwale, Tana River, Kilifi, Taita Taveta and Lamu which lag behind other counties 
in education and infrastructural development. Counties in other Muslim-dominated regions 
namely Mandera, Wajir, Marsabit, Garissa and Isiolo are also identified as marginalized 
areas. Other marginalized counties that do not have a substantive Muslim population are 
Turkana, Samburu, West Pokot and Narok. Hence, 10 out of the 14 most marginalized 
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counties in Kenya are areas where most Kenyan Muslims reside (Commission on Revenue 
Allocation 2018, 15-16).      
In addition to marginalization Khalid noted that:  
Every other week we hear of a raid, police raiding a home 
[inhabited by Muslims] probably harassing people and then 
a few hours later they will come back and tell you we didn’t 
find anything … when a community feels aggrieved and 
harassed there is no way someone will come to their aid. 
There is no way the law will be used to address their issues. 
Then, you feel completely helpless (PBS Newshour 2013, 
3:28). 
The helplessness that Khalid spoke about is what drove young Muslims into the hands of 
radicalization conduits who purported to offer a solution to their predicament. By 
repeatedly talking about the grievances that Muslims had against the Kenyan state 
radicalization conduits, such as Rogo, spurred Muslim youth to join Al Shabaab so that 
they could fight against the Kenyan state.    
Additionally, Rogo’s support for Al Shabaab appears to have been geared towards 
an ambitious, long-term plan to destroy all forms of secularism in predominantly Muslim 
regions in Kenya, such as the Coast region, and impose Wahhabi practices in those regions. 
Many of his edicts were similar to those of groups that professed Wahhabi teachings such 
as Boko Haram and the IS. They included warnings against secular education saying that 
it was morally corrupting and drew Muslim children away from the Islamic way of life. 
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His most damning sermon was issued a few months before the national elections that were 
scheduled to take place in 2012. 56  He encouraged Muslims to boycott the elections 
claiming that they interfered with their ability to establish a global caliphate. Rather than 
participate in the elections, Rogo (2012) asked his followers to assassinate key government 
officials including the country’s president at the time, Mwai Kibaki, and the prime minister, 
Raila Odinga.  
Another radicalization conduit, Abubaker Shariff Ahmed (aka Makaburi) was 
instrumental in facilitating the travel of Al Shabaab recruits to Somalia. The United Nations 
Security Council identified him as a close associate of Rogo and a frequent traveller to Al 
Shabaab strongholds where he had very close relations with senior members of the terrorist 
group (United Nations Security Council 2012b). Like Rogo, Makaburi did not believe in 
moderation in Islam. During an interview with a BBC reporter, Makaburi bluntly stated 
that “there is no such thing as a moderate Muslim. The Prophet did not teach us moderation 
in Islam. Islam is Islam!” (Taylor 2013, para. 6). While he denied that he was closely 
associated with Al Shabaab, he defended the group’s right to use force in defence of Islam. 
Indeed, Makaburi provided logistical support for new Al Shabaab recruits irrespective of 
their national origin. He would tell them about different islands off the Kenyan Coast where 
they could get accommodation before being transported by boat to Somalia. Some of the 
islands that were used as transit points for the recruits included Pate, Faza, Manda, Lamu 
and Kipungani (Taylor 2013; Beja 2014; Al Jazeera 2015).  
 
56 The elections were postponed and held in March 2013. 
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Rogo’s and Makaburi’s fiery sermons and defiant attitude inspired other 
radicalization conduits who, like them, publicly advocated for the use of political violence 
in Kenya. Among them was Rogo’s former student, Ahmed Iman Ali (aka Abu Zinira), 
who set up a radicalization base at the Pumwani Riyadha mosque in Majengo, Nairobi 
between 2007 and 2009 (Amble and Meleagrou-Hitchens 2014). According to the United 
Nations Security Council (2011), Ali deliberately targeted the mosque because he wanted 
to use revenue from a second-hand clothes market that it owned to finance terror-related 
activities in Kenya and Somalia. Part of the money was used to entice unemployed youth, 
mainly from the slums in Majengo, to join Al Shabaab. In order to have full control of the 
mosque’s revenue, Ali instigated a youth rebellion against older members of the mosque’s 
committee alleging that they had been bribed to give away part of the mosque’s land to a 
powerful clique of Kenyan politicians (United Nations Security Council 2012).  His 
allegations gained traction with the youth at the mosque and they quickly ousted the 
mosque’s elders probably because they believed that they were colluding with leaders of a 
political system that was designed to marginalize them.  
After gaining control of the mosque, Ali established the Muslim Youth Centre 
(MYC)57 in 2008. Although the MYC was fronted as a counselling centre for wayward 
youth in Majengo as well as a platform through which disenfranchised youth could express 
their grievances, it soon emerged that Ali and other radicalization conduits were using it as 
an Al Shabaab recruitment agency (United Nations Security Council 2012). During several 
interviews in 2011 and 2012, the Somalia/Eritrea Monitoring Group confirmed that 
 
57 The centre was also known as the Pumwani Muslim Youth. 
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hundreds of young Kenyans had joined Al Shabaab through the MYC between 2009 and 
2011 (United Nations Security Council 2012, 183-185). Indeed, Kenyan citizens formed 
the bulk of Al Shabaab’s foreign fighters with estimates placing them at about 25% of 
between 5000 and 7000 Al Shabaab fighters (Anderson and McKnight 2015; Cannon and 
Pkalya 2019; United Nations Security Council 2012).     
 The Somalia/Eritrea Monitoring Group also discovered that although the MYC 
was based in Nairobi, it had an extensive network of supporters and members across Kenya 
in areas such as Eldoret, Garissa and Mombasa. Reports on the profiles of foreign fighters 
in Al Shabaab corroborates this information showing that while the majority of Al Shabaab 
members were initially drawn from ethnic Kenyan Somalis, the group expanded its 
outreach to other parts of Kenya in 2009 making Kenyans the largest group of foreign 
fighters in Al Shabaab (Botha 2014, 2017; Anderson and Mcknight 2014; Finn et al. 2016; 
Williams 2014; Hansen 2013).  
The MYC was not only a recruitment agency for Al Shabaab. It also conducted 
paramilitary training sessions for some of its potential recruits. One such session, that took 
place on October 20, 2009 at the Masjid Nuur mosque in Kawangware, Nairobi, focused 
on young children (International Crisis Group 2012; United Nations Security Council 
2012). A source privy to radicalization patterns in Kenya’s Coastal region said that it was 
not surprising that children were being trained by the terrorist group noting that several 
local Sheikhs from Mombasa had revealed that children, as young as 12, were being 
recruited into Al Shabaab (Interview with university academic A, October 20, 2017).  Other 
radicalization activities that Ali facilitated as the leader of the MYC included the 
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distribution of extremist material written by Anwar al-Awlaki, a senior Al Qaeda recruiter 
who was ultimately killed in a US drone strike in 2011. The material appeared in a weekly 
newsletter, Al Misbah, which was available in Kiswahili and other local Kenyan languages 
so that it could appeal to a wider audience (International Crisis Group 2012; United Nations 
Security Council 2012).  
Ali also gave inflammatory sermons that were similar to bin Laden’s writings and 
speeches on alleged Western and Jewish aggression against Islam. He told his audience, at 
the Riyadha mosque, that their religion was under siege and that they had to violently 
defend it (Amble and Meleagrou-Hitchens 2014). In his view, Somalia was one of the key 
battlegrounds for the creation of an Islamic caliphate and he encouraged his followers to 
join Al Shabaab. Indeed, Ali demonstrated his loyalty to Al Shabaab in 2009 when he 
abruptly left the Riyadha mosque and took up a position in charge of the terrorist group’s 
propaganda and media division. He was also designated as one of the group’s commanders 
in charge of foreign fighters from East Africa (United Nations Security Council 2012).  
Even though he had moved from Kenya, Ali did not relent in his efforts to recruit 
and radicalize young Kenyans. From his base in Somalia, he posted several online videos 
and audio recordings urging Kenyans to join him in Somalia. Many of the messages in the 
recordings also advocated for terrorist attacks in Kenya. For instance, in an online 
recording that was uploaded on December 30, 2010, Ali is heard urging young people not 
to take part in Kenyan politics, instead, suggesting that it would be more productive if they 
“chonga” (peel), “fyeka” (slash) and “chinja” (cut the throats of) Kenyan infidels (Ali 
2010a, 40:00). He also asked his followers to carry out bombings in Kenya similar to the 
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one that Al Shabaab had carried out in Kampala on July 11, 2010. 58  Another audio 
recording that was posted online on December 30, 2010, explicitly ordered members of the 
MYC to carry out terrorist attacks on institutions in Kenya. Towards the end of the 
recording, a man’s voice can be heard assenting to the order saying, “strap the bombs on 
me and let me blow myself up in the parliament building of Kenya” (Ali December 2010b, 
58:03). 59   
In a move that appeared to heed to Ali’s call to engage in terrorist activities in 
Kenya, several MYC members who were based in Somalia started going back to Kenya 
from December 2010 (United Nations Security Council 2012). Their return coincided with 
an increase in attacks using an assortment of explosive devises and automatic weapons in 
some of Kenya’s major cities and towns. Between 2010 and 2011, Al Shabaab was 
responsible for at least 40 attacks on Kenyan night clubs, Christian churches, police stations 
and bus stops (Global Terrorism Database 2018).  
Figure 1 shows that the number of casualties (deaths and injuries) and frequency of 
attacks gradually increased from 2008 when Al Shabaab carried out its first attack in 
Kenya.  The number of casualties increased over the years adding up to a total of 99 deaths 
and 433 injuries by the time Kenya passed an anti-terrorism law in October 2012. Details 
about the dates of the attacks, the number of deaths and injuries as well as the targets and 
types of the attacks can be found in appendix 1.  
 
58 For a detailed account of the Kampala bombing see Rice, Xan. 2010. “Uganda Bomb Blast Kills at least 
74,” The Guardian, 13 July 2010. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jul/12/uganda-kampala-bombs-
explosions-attacks 
59  Other archived and more recent material of Ali’s videos and recordings can be accessed on 
http://jihadology.net/category/individuals/ideologues/a%E1%B8%A5mad-iman-ali/  




While data about the nationality of the perpetrators is not included in the GTD the ease 
with which the perpetrators of the attacks were able to mingle with individuals in the 
vicinity of the attacks implies that they were Kenyan citizens who did not draw attention 
to themselves and knew their way around the targeted venues. As the Director of the Boni 
Enclave Campaign,60 Joseph Kanyiri, once observed: 
Kuna yule adui ambaye anatoka Somalia. Kuna adui 
mwingine ambaye ni wetu hapa nyumbani … Manake, kwa 
visa vile vimetokea ukiwa pale watu wamevamiwa hapa 
 
60 The Boni Enclave Campaign is a military campaign designed to rid Boni forest, in Kenya, of Al Shabaab 
militants. More details about the presence of Al Shabaab in Boni forest are discussed later in this chapter.    
 
Figure 1: Frequency of Al Shabaab Attacks in Kenya: May 31, 2008 - November 5, 
2012 
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lakini, haumuoni. Ameyeyuka amepotea. Na visa hivi 
vimekuwa ni watu watata, wanne wakizidi pengine ni 
waishirini. (There is an enemy from Somalia. There is also a 
home-grown enemy … Because, there are attacks that take 
place in your presence yet, you cannot identify the 
perpetrator. He or she has melted and vanished. Such cases 
involve three people, four people or at most 20 people) 
(NTV Kenya 2017, 0:55). 
    In efforts to apprehend the perpetrators of the attacks, Kenya’s law enforcement 
agencies carried out raids in areas that were identified as hotspots for the MYC and Al 
Shabaab members including neighbourhoods that were located near the Riyadha mosque. 
It is, therefore, not surprising that after conducting interviews in the area in 2012, the 
International Crisis Group concluded that the MYC had gone underground because of the 
raids, possibly to madrasas and people’s homes (International Crisis Group 2012). While 
this is one possibility, it is also likely that the MYC decided to expand its outreach and 
change its recruiting strategy by taking advantage of Kenya’s fast-growing ICT 
infrastructure.61 In essence, the MYC went online.   
The MYC became more aggressive in its efforts to attract new recruits using online 
tools. It started producing an online magazine entitled Gaidi Mtaani (Terrorism Street) 
which targeted disaffected Kenyan youth. The magazine featured articles on Al Shabaab’s 
 
61 Internet access in Kenya grew rapidly from 2010 with the proliferation of internet cafes as well as the 
availability of personal internet plans through cell phone providers and fibre optic cable options (Internet 
Live Stats 2017). 
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strategies and gave detailed descriptions of the group’s terrorist attacks in Kenya. The 
magazine also contained several articles that linked Al Shabaab’s goals and activities with 
those of other terrorist groups around the world. The propaganda in the magazine was 
carefully framed within the context of perceived and real youth marginalization at the 
hands of the Kenyan state as well as selected passages from the Koran that were used to 
justify and promote the use of political violence.  
The magazine’s first edition, for instance, had a subtitle “Operation Linda Uislamu” 
(Operation Defend Islam) and featured a cover of a man holding two grenades behind his 
back. The magazine cover also had a quotation from the ninth chapter of the Koran which 
states “na piganeni na washirikina wote kama wao wanavyo pigana nanyi nyote. Na jueni 
kuwa Mwenyezi Mungu yu pamajo na wachamngu (sic)” (And fight against the 
disbelievers collectively as they fight against you collectively. And know that Allah is with 
the righteous who fear Him) (At-Taubah:36 as quoted in Gaidi Mtaani 2012a, cover page). 
Al Shabaab published another special issue of the magazine that was partly 
dedicated to the plight of Kenyan Muslims in Mombasa. The fifth issue entitled “Waislamu 
wa Bangui na Mombasa: Kisa cha Msiba” (Muslims in Bangui and Mombasa: The 
Tragedy) (Gaidi Mtaani 2012b) contained alleged images of police operations in mosques 
in Mombasa as well as graphic pictures of dead children, among others, that the magazine 
claimed were Muslim faithfuls. Excerpts from the magazine stated: 
Leo tutazungumzia [kuhusu] msalaba dhidi ya Waislamu 
katika bara Afrika na kichwa cha vita hivi ni mauaji ya 
kimbari yanayowakumba Waislamu ya Jamhuri ya Afrika ya 
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Kati, pamoja na vita vya msalaba dhidi ya Waislamu wa 
Kenya (Today, we shall talk about the plight of Muslims on 
the African continent and the theme of this war is the 
genocide of Muslims in the Central African Republic and the 
cross’s [Christian’s] war against Kenyan Muslims) (Gaidi 
Mtaani 2012b, 2).  
 The magazine went on to state: 
Naawambia Waislamu wa Kenya: Unganeni muwe kitu 
kimoja dhidi ya hivi vita vya msalaba, na simameni imara 
kwa pamoja kama msimamo wa mtu mmoja (I tell you 
Kenyan Muslims: Unite and be united in this war against the 
cross [Christians] and stand firm together like the position of 
one person) (Gaidi Mtaani 2012b, 6).  
 The careful selection of images that showed the suffering of Muslims from all walks 
of life, including what appeared to be dead children, was meant to discredit any measures 
that Kenya’s law enforcement agencies undertook to investigate terrorism incidences in 
Kenya. The information in Gaidi Mtaani alleged that the Kenyan state, which was 
predominantly governed by Christians, singled out Muslims for no reason other than their 
Islamic faith. The contents in the magazine also suggested that Kenya’s government had 
sanctioned the use of indiscriminate violence against all Muslims including innocent 
children.    
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Even though the evidence in the magazine could not be substantiated, some of the 
practices of Kenya’s law enforcement agencies appeared to confirm Al Shabaab’s claims. 
For instance, on January 13, 2007, the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights 
(KNHCR) and Kenya Human Rights Network (KHRN) released a joint statement that 
condemned Kenya’s police force’s “arbitrary arrests, interrogation and incarceration of 
[mostly] Kenyan and non-Kenyan Muslims” (Jaji 2013, 365). They were especially critical 
of the detention of Hafsah Swaleh Ali, a four-year old Somali refugee, who stayed in jail 
for 25 days with her pregnant mother. In this case, Hafsah’s mother was detained because 
the police were unable to locate her husband who was a terrorist suspect. In their statement, 
the KNHRC and KHRN noted that “relatives and friends of alleged suspects were detained 
because they had been declared guilty by association” (Jaji 2013, 365). Such cases, among 
others, 62  reinforced the perception that Kenya’s government was unfairly targeting 
Muslims.  
The MYC also used Twitter63 to comment on terrorist attacks and post messages 
that praised the attackers suggesting to its audience that the rewards of being a mujahid 
(Muslim fighter) were like no other they would ever receive during their lives on earth. 
Other online tools for radicalization were its blogs64 which were used to provide updates 
about Al Shabaab’s activities in Kenya. On January 10, 2012, a few months before Kenya 
 
62 For a comprehensive account of allegations against the Kenya police see Open Society Foundations. 2013. 
We’re Tired of Taking You to the Court: Human Rights Abuses by Kenya’s Anti-terrorism Police Unit 
 https://www.justiceinitiative.org/publications/were-tired-taking-you-court-human-rights-abuses-kenyas-
anti-terrorism-police-unit  
63 Its account was @MYC_Press 
64 Two of its blogs, themovingcaravan.wordpress.org and mycnjiawaukweli.blogspot.org have been blocked 
for violating the terms and conditions of the websites. Nevertheless, some of the material from these blogs is 
available on jihadology.net.    
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passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2012, the MYC posted a message on one of its 
blogs pledging allegiance to Ali and revealing the extent of the group’s support for Al 
Shabaab in addition to its intentions in Kenya. Part of the message stated:  
Some years back our beloved brothers in Al Shabaab called 
upon our Amir to take up his duty and help the mujahedeen 
in Somalia. Without hesitation or excuses like many of the 
other Sheikhs in Kenya our Amir left Majengo and MYC to 
begin fighting in Allah’s cause. As a result, many of us in 
MYC and others in Kenya followed our dear Amir to the 
land of Somalia. We in MYC have no doubt that our Amir 
Sheikh Ahmad Iman Ali will continue the unfinished work 
of our brother Fazul 65  in Kenya and the region of East 
Africa. Kenya is legally a war zone and Ali leads us into 
jihad in Kenya without hesitation or fear (quoted in Roggio 
2012 para. 5).  
The MYC’s decision to have a greater online presence was strategic and logical. In 
some instances, posting material online was an effective way of engaging with potential 
recruits turning them from consumers of terrorism propaganda to active participants in 
discussions about radicalization. Recruits were given a chance to explain how the 
propaganda material related to their personal circumstances. Some of the online platforms 
where material was posted, such as YouTube, allow viewers to interact with each other and 
 
65 Fazul Mohammed was one of the core planners of the 1998 and 2002 bombings in Kenya.  
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contact the authors of the videos. For example, the uploaded YouTube videos of Rogo’s 
sermons that form part of the analysis for this thesis had thousands of views as well as 
hundreds of comments that supported the contents of the videos. Neumann (2013) referred 
to this phenomenon as the emergence of virtual fighting communities where political 
violence is encouraged, normalized and celebrated. He went on to say that virtual fighting 
communities: 
Become like echo chambers in which all moderating 
influences are removed, and violent voices are amplified. As 
a result, people acquire a skewed sense of reality so that 
extremist attitudes and violence are no longer taboos (sic) 
but rather are seen as positive and desirable (Neumann 
2013b, 436).           
While some individuals who are radicalized online may decide to carry out lone-
wolf attacks, others seek out ways in which they can become members of terrorist groups. 
Based on accounts from Kenyans who joined Al Shabaab (see Botha 2013, 2014, 2015 
2017; Al Jazeera 2015, 2018), as well as Kenyans who managed to escape from the terrorist 
group (see Taylor 2013; Beja 2014) and Kenyans who are serving prison time for being 
members of Al Shabaab (see Speckhard and Shajkovci 2019), it appears that Al Shabaab’s 
preferred method of recruitment was to have personal contact with potential recruits so that 
they could go through an induction period before they were formally admitted into the 
group. 
~ 128 ~ 
 
 Being part of a virtual fighting community was, in several cases, the first step 
towards joining Al Shabaab. This recruitment method differs from that of the IS, whereby, 
anyone who is a Muslim automatically becomes a member of the Caliphate (Weaver 2015). 
In the case of Al Shabaab, local Kenyan networks indoctrinated new recruits before they 
were sent to Somalia for further training. Once the recruits were fully trained, they were 
posted to various locations in East Africa where they were told to wait for instructions 
about their missions. Many of the trained Al Shabaab returnees then started carrying out 
terrorist attacks in Kenya in 2009 with attacks escalating exponentially from 2011 
(Interview with Kenya Defence Forces personnel D November 15, 2017; Interview with 
Kenya Defence Forces personnel E November 20, 2017). Indeed, data from the GTD 
collaborates this information showing that there was a significant increase in Al Shabaab 
attacks in Kenya from 2011 (Appendix 1).  
Most of the attacks in Kenya were small-scale. Attackers (I refer to those who 
carried out small-scale attacks as hit-and-run terrorists) would carry out small-scale attacks 
before escaping. The small-scale attacks included throwing grenades into: 1) matatus 
(small mini vans used for public transport) and churches; 2) waylaying long-distance buses 
so that they could kill non-Muslim passengers; and 3) raiding police stations so the 
attackers could steal firearms and ammunition before escaping (Appendix 1).  
There were also major terrorist attacks that were carefully planned for a long time 
before being executed. Those who were selected to carry out major attacks in Kenya and 
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elsewhere, such as the Westgate attack 66  and the Garissa University attack, 67  were 
members of the most allegiant group in Al Shabaab known as the suicide (martyrdom) 
brigade. The suicide brigade is one of two elite units in Al Shabaab. The other is the 
Amniyat which is also known as Al Shabaab’s secret or intelligence service. The Amniyat 
coordinates suicide missions, provides logistical and operational support to the group and, 
tracks down and assassinates anyone who betrays the terrorist group (Roggio 2016; Botha 
2014). Even though Al Shabaab cannot function without Amniyat’s logistical and 
operational support, it is the suicide missions that are venerated as the group’s most 
important activity. (Channel 4 News 2013). 
The importance that Al Shabaab places on suicide missions may explain why 
radicalization is critical to the group’s recruitment and training strategies. The key goal of 
Al Shabaab fighters who are selected to carry out the group’s major attacks is not to escape 
after carrying out an attack but, to die in the process. As Ali Dhere Al Shabaab’s 
spokesperson pointed out during a ceremony for Al Shabaab’s graduating class of 2013:  
To free ourselves, we have to follow our religion and that 
means preparing for jihad … look at what is happening in 
Kenya. Boys who were like you, had the same training as 
you. They sacrificed their lives for Allah and brought huge 
victory for Muslims. When we die and are martyred, we 
hope to be with Allah in paradise. We are hoping for 
 
66 On September 21, 2013 Al Shabaab gunmen attacked the Westgate mall in Kenya killing 71 people and 
wounding approximately 200 others (Williams 2014).  
67 On April 2, 2014 Al Shabaab gunmen took over 700 students form Garissa University hostage killing 147 
and injuring over 70 others (Cannon and Pkalya 2019).   
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beautiful women.68 What are infidels hoping for? Nothing!   
(Channel 4 2013, 1:14).  
Hence, radicalization is an effective way of reinforcing the claim that dying as a 
mujahid is a great honour. It is important for Al Shabaab’s members to internalize this 
belief because the group places suicide attacks above all other forms of violence. Al 
Shabaab’s members must be committed to this form of violence more so, if they are 
required to go back to their countries of origin and wait for an indefinite period of time69 
before they receive instructions on how, where and when to carry out suicide missions. 
Indeed, Ali Dhere stated that only the best recruits were chosen to join Al Shabaab’s suicide 
brigade (Channel 4, 2013).  It is, therefore, probable that such recruits were not simply 
selected based on their physical abilities but also because they were psychologically 
prepared70 to carry out their suicide missions to the end. Kenyan suicide attackers were part 
of all the major Al Shabaab terrorist attacks in Kenya including the Westgate Mall attack, 
the Garissa University attack and the Dusit hotel attack. Many of those who assisted in the 
planning of these attacks were also Kenyan citizens (Lacey-Bordeaux 2013; BBC 2019; 
Kiley 2019)  
 
68 The debates about martyrs and the rewards that they will receive in paradise is controversial and beyond 
the scope of this study. However, there is evidence of references to beautiful women in paradise for martyrs 
and other Muslims in Islamic historical texts including the Koran and Hadith.    
69 Suicide attacks such as the 1998 US Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, the 2002 Kikambala 
hotel bombing in Mombasa, the 2013 Westgate mall bombing in Nairobi, the Garissa University attacks in 
2014 and the Dusit hotel attack in Nairobi in 2019 often take years of planning. 
70  Several scholars have identified numerous psychological factors that may explain why seemingly 
unexceptional human beings are willing to carry out suicide attacks. They include alienation and the quest 
for emotional support among disenfranchised youth (Sageman 2004), the desire to liberate Muslim lands 
from foreign occupation (Pape 2005), the belief that Muslim martyrs will be rewarded in paradise (Hassan 
2006) as well as feminism and the desire to prove that women can also be combatants (Bloom 2005). 
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 Even though radicalization is a core component of Al Shabaab’s recruitment 
strategy, the group often lured young Kenyans to Somalia with promises of regular income 
for their families (Interview with KDF personnel D November 15, 2017; Botha 2014). The 
high unemployment rate of young people in Kenya71 provided an ample source of willing 
recruits for Al Shabaab. Indeed, a few current and former Al Shabaab fighters stated that 
it was the promises of money rather than Al Shabaab’s ideology that first lured them to the 
group. For instance, each of the former Al Shabaab fighters interviewed during an Al 
Jazeera documentary on radicalized youth in Kenya claimed that they would not have 
joined Al Shabaab if they had not been promised money for them and their families (Al 
Jazeera 2018).  
It is, however, important to note that the participants for the Al Jazeera interview 
were drawn from the poorest suburbs in Nairobi and were not representative of Al 
Shabaab’s Kenyan recruits who include young people from middle-income families. 
Furthermore, the huge sums of money that Al Shabaab recruits were promised never 
materialized. Instead, new recruits were subjected to radicalization and indoctrination 
where their devotion to Al Shabaab’s ideology was repeatedly tested. This explains why it 
is not unusual for recruits to risk their lives in attempts to escape especially if they do not 
believe in Al Shabaab’s interpretation of Islam (Al Jazeera 2018; Kiley 2019).72        
 
71 The International Labour Organization (ILO) estimates that youth unemployment in Kenya was between 
18.26%- 19.61% between 2008 and 2018 (Statista 2019).   
72 A former Al Shabaab fighter revealed that the terrorist group asked new recruits to carry out dehumanizing 
acts, such as the decapitation of Al Shabaab’s infidel prisoners, to prove their loyalty to the terrorist group’s 
ideology (Kiley 2019).  
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Unlike Al Jazeera’s documentary, Botha’s (2014) extensive filed work provides a 
more nuanced analysis of the reasons why young Kenyans joined Al Shabaab. Participants 
in Botha’s study included 95 Kenyans associated with Al Shabaab and 46 relatives of 
Kenyans who were associated with Al Shabaab73 (Botha 2014). Most of those interviewed 
were born into Muslim families and only 9% of the respondents had converted to Islam. 
The findings of Botha’s study showed that 73% of respondents “hated other religions” 
(Botha 2014, 8) and considered followers of other religions to be infidels who deserved to 
be killed. Furthermore, 87% of respondents stated that they joined Al Shabaab because of 
their Islamic beliefs (Botha 2014, 9). 1% joined Al Shabaab because of their sense of 
adventure, 4% for economic reasons and 2% for personal reasons. The remaining 6% 
joined Al Shabaab because of a combination of economic and religious reasons (Botha 
2014, 9-14).  
Overall, Botha’s (2014) study showed that most of the Al Shabaab recruits from 
Kenya believed in and were attracted to the group’s interpretation of Islam. It is also 
possible that Al Shabaab actively recruited Kenyan citizens because it would be easier for 
Kenyans to regain entry into Kenya and carry out Al Shabaab’s bidding, either as members 
of the Amniyat, the suicide brigade or hit-and-run terrorists. Hence, Al Shabaab’s Kenyan 
recruits were essentially trained to carry out terrorism activities against their own country. 
Considering this, the question that remains to be answered about Al Shabaab’s recruitment 
 
73 The 46 relatives were interviewed in cases where Al Shabaab members could not be located or were 
incarcerated (Botha 2014).  
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strategy in Kenya is why the group selected Kenya as one of its preferred targets in East 
Africa.  
 Why Al Shabaab Views Kenya as a Legitimate Target 
 
 When a reporter asked Ali Dhere74 why Kenya was an Al Shabaab target, his 
response was similar to that of bin Laden’s75 when he was asked why Al Qaeda carried out 
the 1998 US Embassy bombing in Kenya. According to Ali Dhere, Al Shabaab was at odds 
with Kenya because its government supported the Western-backed transitional government 
in Somalia (Channel 4 News 2013). In other words, Al Shabaab identified Kenya as an 
enemy long before the country’s incursion into Somalia in 2011.76 This partly explains why 
Al Shabaab’s attacks in Kenya began in 2008, shortly after the group was formed.  
Kenya became a key player in Somalia’s political affairs soon after Somalia 
descended into civil war.  Somalia’s civil war started in 1991 when a group of clan leaders 
who were excluded from the military government of Siad Barre ousted him from power. 
What followed was years of failed attempts to restore peace in the country. During the 
initial stages of the war, the United Nations Security Council passed a Resolution that 
mandated a US-led military force to use “all necessary means to establish as soon as 
possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia” (United 
Nations Security Council 1992, para. 27). Although, the interventions, which lasted from 
 
74 Ali Dhere was Al Shabaab’s spokesperson at the time.  
75 As explained in chapter two, bin Laden stated that US allies such as Kenya were legitimate terrorist targets.  
76 Many scholars argue that Kenya became a target of Al Shabaab terrorist attacks because its military 
invaded Somalia in 2011 (Anderson and McKnight 2014; Mwangi 2012; Lind, Mutahi and Oosterom 2017). 
While Al Shabaab has used the incursion to justify its post-2011 attacks in Kenya, the fact that there were 
attacks in Kenya prior to 2011 is an indication that there are other reasons that motivate Al Shabaab’s attacks 
in Kenya.   
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1993 to 1995, made substantial humanitarian contributions in Somalia, they failed to 
restore peace in the country (Crocker 1995; Osman and Souaré 2007). When the UN forces 
pulled out in 1995, most parts of Somalia were politically unstable and insecure and 
competing warlords and clan conflicts prevented the establishment of a single government.  
Even though the UN was no longer at the forefront of peace initiatives in Somalia, 
efforts to end conflict in the country continued.77 The Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD),78 took up the mantle of brokering peace in Somalia. In 2002, IGAD 
formed a Technical Committee whose key role was to convene a new peace process for 
Somalia. Kenya was designated as the Chair of this Committee and proceeded to host the 
Eldoret Peace Conference whose ultimate objective was to arrive at a broad-based 
agreement on power-sharing and the creation of a functional government in Somalia (Elmi 
and Barise 2006). As the Chair of IGAD’s Technical Committee on Somalia, Kenya 
successfully oversaw the establishment of Somalia’s TFG when, in 2004, Somali delegates 
first selected 275 representatives as parliamentary members of the TFG and then elected 
Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed as the president of Somalia (Mulugeta 2009). Through its role in 
the Somalia peace process, Kenya inevitably became a key player in Somalia’s political 
affairs. After the election of president Ahmed, Kenya hosted the new TFG in Nairobi for 
almost a year when it was unable to move to Mogadishu due to insecurity (Mwangi 2010; 
Barnes and Hassan 2007).  
 
77 Between 1991 and 2004 Somalia had 14 peace conferences. Out of these, five conferences resulted in peace 
agreements and the creation of new governments (Elimi and Barise 2006).    
78 IGAD is a regional organization that was established in 1986 to address environmental degradation in the 
Horn of Africa. The organization’s mandate was broadened in 1996 to resolve conflicts in the region. Its 
member states are: Kenya, Uganda, Djibouti, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia (UNECA 
2018).    
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One of the biggest security challenges, at the time, was a group of Islamist 
organizations that came together to form the UIC.79  The UIC’s initial objective was to 
uphold law and order in Mogadishu through neighbourhood sharia courts. However, as the 
neighbourhood sharia courts spread in Mogadishu, the UIC’s political influence increased 
and it began to harbor political ambitions that threatened the authority of the TFG. Indeed, 
between 2005 and 2006, a turf-war ensued between the UIC and president Ahmed’s TFG. 
By then, the TFG had moved from Nairobi to Baidoa, a town located in Somalia’s 
Southwestern Bay region which is about 223 kilometres from Mogadishu. As the TFG 
settled in Baidoa there was a spate of assassinations and disappearances targeted at 
members of the UIC in Mogadishu. In retaliation, the UIC’s military wing, made up of 
young militants who later came to be referred to as Al Shabaab, fought back killing security 
officers associated with the TFG as well as warlords who challenged the UIC’s jurisdiction 
in Mogadishu (Barnes and Hassan 2007).80  
The UIC’s actions were explained in a press release on June 6, 2006, in which its 
chairman, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, accused the TFG and other Somali warlords of 
being behind the killings of UIC members in Mogadishu with the full support of the US 
government (Ahmed 2006). By that time, the UIC had succeeded in its purge and had 
gained full control of Mogadishu as well as parts of south-central Somalia (Barnes and 
Hassan 2007; IRIN 2006). In efforts to push back against the UIC’s growing influence in 
Somalia, protect the TFG from UIC’s militants (Al Shabaab) and forestall what it perceived 
 
79 Although the UIC gained prominence in the mid-2000s, its origins date back to 1994 when Islamic clerics 
from the Abgal sub-clan of the Hawiye clan founded the first sharia court after the breakout of war in Somalia 
in 1991 (Barnes and Hassan 2007).    
80 In March 2006, a group of Somali warlords and businessmen formed the Alliance for Restoration of Peace 
and Counterterrorism as a buffer against the growing influence of the UIC (Menkhaus 2007).  
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as a threat to its territorial integrity, Ethiopia started sending small military contingents to 
Somalia in August 2006. This was followed by a full military onslaught, in December 2006, 
which dislodged the UIC from power. As this was happening, the US launched special 
counterterrorism operations against the UIC from its contingency operation location in 
Manda Bay, Lamu81 (Bachmann and Hönke 2010).  
Although Kenya did not participate in any of the military campaigns against the 
UIC, the collapse of the courts had two major implications on Kenya’s security. First, as 
the UIC crumbled some of its members, including its chairman Sheikh Ahmed, sought 
refuge in Kenya. Kenya’s government responded by setting up more patrols along the 
Kenya-Somalia border resulting in the arrest of about 100 alleged members of the UIC 
because Kenya perceived the UIC as an organization that supported and engaged in 
terrorism activities (Ombati 2007; Mogire 2011). The arrested UIC members were then 
handed over to Ethiopian and US officials for interrogation (Clarke 2007).  
Second, the UIC’s collapse did not result in the annihilation of the organization. On 
the contrary, the UIC’s military wing, which now called itself Al Shabaab, regrouped and 
embarked on an aggressive recruitment campaign in Somalia and beyond (Wise 2011). To 
attract recruits, Al Shabaab presented itself as an organization that was fighting for the 
rights of Somali people and Muslims irrespective of where they resided in East Africa. In 
2008, at around the time that the US listed Al Shabaab as a terrorist organization, the group 
stated that its key objective was to overthrow the TFG and establish an Islamic Emirate of 
Somalia that would include Somalia, the Northeastern part of Kenya, Somaliland, Puntland 
 
81 Lamu is a tourist coastal town in Kenya.  
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and the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and Djibouti (Australia Government 2018; US 
Department of State 2018). To facilitate recruitment in other East African states, including 
Kenya, Al Shabaab either established or affiliated itself with groups that were sympathetic 
to its cause such as the MYC. 
As Al Shabaab continued to gain territory in Somalia, Kenya did not relent in its 
support for the TFG. Not only did Kenya host the TFG in Nairobi for prolonged periods of 
time, it also supported military activities whose objectives were to weaken and dislodge Al 
Shabaab.  In 2010, for instance, Kenya allowed Ethiopian troops to pass through Kenyan 
territory on their way to carry out a military incursion against Al Shabaab in Somalia. 
Kenya also attempted to work with several Somalia-based allies and militant groups that 
were fighting against Al Shabaab including groups from the Gedo region, the Ras Kamboni 
Movement, the Azania regional administration and the ASWJ (Gisesa 2012a; Interview 
with Kenyan official C, November 16, 2017; Menkhaus 2012).  
In addition to this, between 2009 and 2011, Kenya Defence Forces trained about 
4000 troops, made up of mainly young Kenyan Somalis and a few Somali refugees, to fight 
against Al Shabaab (Abdi 2015). The trained troops were part of a contingent under the 
command of Mohammed Abdi Mohammed (aka Gandhi). Gandhi was a former Defence 
Minister in the TFG who went on to become the first president of Jubaland which was then 
renamed Azania (Lindley 2011). Coincidentally, the troops were trained at a time when a 
few prominent politicians in Kenya were advocating for the creation of a buffer zone 
between Kenya and Somalia.   On July 13, 2010, Farah Maalim, the Deputy Speaker of 
Kenya’s National Assembly, at the time, wondered why the troops that the Kenyan 
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government had trained to fight against Al Shabaab were not deployed to secure and create 
a buffer zone between Kenya and Somalia. The Deputy Speaker of Kenya’s National 
Assembly was adamant that Kenya should create a buffer zone in Jubaland (renamed 
Azania) even if other states, including the US, were opposed to this move (Republic of 
Kenya, Parliament. July 13, 2010, 33).  
It is likely that Kenya became a proactive player in Somalia’s political affairs in 
attempts to weaken the UIC and later Al Shabaab while simultaneously containing the 
group’s activities in Somalia. However, Kenya’s containment policy was not effective in 
preventing the spread of Al Shabaab’s influence in Kenya. Al Shabaab perceived Kenya’s 
involvement in Somalia’s political affairs as an obstacle to its quest to establish an Islamic 
caliphate in Somalia as well as expand its control to other parts of East Africa. In retaliation, 
Al Shabaab aggressively recruited and radicalized Kenyan citizens who were willing to 
engage in terrorism activities in Kenya.  
From Foreign Attackers to Domestic Terrorists 
 
As Kenya struggled to contain Al Shabaab in Somalia, the group stepped up its recruitment 
and radicalization efforts in Kenya through the MYC as well as several radicalization 
conduits.82 Nevertheless, Al Shabaab refrained from carrying out attacks in Kenya as it 
focused on fighting Ethiopian forces and AMISOM troops in Somalia. Furthermore, the 
 
82 The radicalization conduits who were discussed earlier on in this chapter included Rogo, Makaburi and 
Ali. 
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terrorist group was preoccupied with extending its control in Somalia with the intention of 
controlling key resource-rich areas, such as the port of Kismayo.  
In 2008, Al Shabaab intensified its attacks in Somalia when its leader, Ayro, was 
killed in a US airstrike. This led to a significant increase in the number of Somali refugees 
fleeing into Kenya. According to Human Rights Watch (2009) an increase in violence in 
Somalia in 2008 led to an influx of approximately 165 Somali asylum seekers who sought 
refuge in Kenya each day. The refugees were, however, not welcomed because Kenya had 
closed its borders to Somali refugees in 2006 when the UIC was dislodged from 
Mogadishu. Kenya’s policy towards Somali refugees in 2008 was reminiscent of concerns 
that had been made in 2006 when some members of Kenya’s parliament claimed that 
terrorists were getting into the country disguised as refugees. During a parliamentary 
discussion about the Refugee Bill on November 14, 2006, Herman Omamba told the House 
that:  
Some refugees have given Kenya a bad name since Kenya 
shares a border with Somalia on the east and eastern side 
where some terrorists are believed to originate. Some 
Western countries associate Kenya with terrorism (Republic 
of Kenya. Parliament. November 14, 2006, 3637).  
Other members of parliament linked reports about the growing number of foreign 
fighters in Somalia to increased insecurity in Kenya and the rest of the East African region. 
On July 13, 2010 the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Moses Wetangula, informed parliament 
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that “extremist groups are expanding terrorist activities across this region” (Republic of 
Kenya. Parliament. July 13, 2010, 31).  The Minister for Foreign Affairs went on to say: 
The conflict in Somalia is not a conflict among the Somalis 
but between the people of Somalia and the group of 
international terrorists. The IGAD member states resolved to 
commit themselves to give unwavering support and 
assistance to the TFG in the struggle against extremist 
groups in Somalia. … you may have heard or seen on 
television that the same grouping has issued similar threats 
against Kenya. And we want to send them, as a government, 
a clear warning that we will not sit back and wait for them to 
do any similar acts. We will be ready and available to repulse 
any threats to the security and tranquillity of this country. 
This government and the people of Kenya will neither fear 
to act or act in fear, in fighting against terrorism (Republic 
of Kenya, July 13, 2010, 32).     
In this instance, the Minister for Foreign Affairs referred to Al Shabaab as a group 
of international or foreign terrorists rather than a Somalia-based terrorist group that was 
established and controlled by ethnic Somalis with a significant presence of Kenyan 
fighters. The Minister’s statements about Al Shabaab reflected a long-standing view, 
among several cabinet ministers and members of parliament in Kenya, that terrorists were 
foreigners.  
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Soon after the 1998 US Embassy attack in Nairobi, Kenya’s parliament erupted in 
debates about the presence of foreign terrorists in Kenya.  In a heated exchange two months 
after the August 1998 bombing, several members of parliament including Mohammed 
Galgalo and Stephen Ndicho claimed that the perpetrators of the attack were foreigners 
who had illegally acquired documents to stay in the country. They cited corruption and 
laxity within the immigration department as the root causes of the attack. Others including, 
Ochilo Ayako, Martha Karua and Paul Muite argued that the proper implementation of 
existing immigration laws was the best strategy of securing Kenya from foreign terrorist 
attacks and other crimes (Republic of Kenya. Parliament. November 4, 1998, 2113-2115). 
Inherent in their views was the belief that the attacks were solely directed at Western 
interests and that Kenya was nothing more than a pawn in Al Qaeda’s war against the West.  
To this end, Kenya’s government appeared to be content with major crackdowns in 
areas where foreigners lived in efforts to identify and deport anyone who did not have valid 
documents to stay in the country. When asked about the measures that the government had 
put in place to prevent attacks similar to the 1998 US Embassy bombing, an Assistant 
Minister in the Office of the President, Yusuf Haji, assured Kenya’s parliament that the 
country’s armed forces were on the alert and that law enforcement agencies had “arrested 
quite a number of illegal immigrants in the country” (Republic of Kenya. Parliament. 
October 2001, 2884). The Assistant Minister in the Office of the President also informed 
the House that foreigners who attempted to enter the country through “panya routes” 
(illegal means) were being arrested (Republic of Kenya. Parliament. October 2001, 2883). 
Essentially, the government’s official position on terrorism in Kenya was that increasing 
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security checks at ports of entry, such as airports and other border check points, were 
adequate measures against future terrorist attacks.  
Just as they did after the 1998 US Embassy bombing, Kenya’s cabinet ministers 
and members of parliament blamed the 2002 Kikambala bombing on illegal aliens in 
Kenya. The dominant narrative was that terrorists were foreigners who had illegally entered 
the country so that they could plan and carry out attacks against Western interests in Kenya. 
Two days after the attack, Hamid Mubarak, the mayor of Kikambala, told the press that he 
did not think that “any Kenyan would have done this [the attack]” (Filkins 2002). A 
member of parliament, Najib Balala, who was once the mayor of Mombasa told the New 
York Times that Al Qaeda did not have a base in Mombasa and that the fanaticism that it 
relied on did not exist in the coastal city. He described the terrorists as “people who came 
into Kenya, twice now, to carry out that mission” (Lacey and Weiser 2002, para. 29). 
Adding to this John Sawe, Kenya’s Ambassador to Israel at the time, told a reporter from 
the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) that there was no doubt in his mind that 
foreigners were behind the attack because terrorism was not a domestic problem in Kenya 
(Willacy 2002). 
 Sawe’s, Balala’s and Mubarak’s statements reflected the official government 
position. During a parliamentary debate on terrorist suspects, the Assistant Minister for 
Internal Security, Peter Munya, told the House that the masterminds of the 2002 attacks in 
Mombasa were foreigners who had illegally entered the country. Giving an example, the 
Assistant Minister for Internal Security said that Abdulmalik Mohammed, one of the 
masterminds of the attack who was also implicated in the 1998 US Embassy bombing, was 
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a Somali national who had “crossed into Kenya through Kiunga”83 (Republic of Kenya. 
Parliament. April 3, 2007, 286). He further stated that Mohammed was part of a group of 
fighters of the UIC, in Somalia, who had sneaked into Kenya when the group fought against 
the TFG. It should, however, be noted that despite the government’s claims that 
Mohammed was a foreigner, a family in Mombasa claimed that he was their kin (Gisesa 
2012b).84  
The perception that foreigners and not Kenyans were responsible for terrorist 
attacks in the country, at the time, can be attributed to three key factors. First, it was widely 
believed that Wahhabism, the inspiration for Al Qaeda’s and Al Shabaab’s ideology, did 
not resonate with the predominantly Sunni population in Kenya (Forest 2011; Kresse 
2009). Kresse (2009), for instance, noted that many Kenyan Muslims were highly critical 
of Wahhabi foreigners who they claimed lured those who were less educated and 
financially needy from the true faith. Moreover, Wahhabi doctrine, which rejects cultural 
influences and calls for a modern-day return to the ways of Mohammed and separation 
from non-Muslim societies, did not appeal to Kenyan Muslims. As Ndzovu (2015) 
explained, many African Muslims are reluctant to embrace Wahhabism because they feel 
 
83 Kiunga is an area in Lamu, Kenya that is only 15 kilometres from the Somalia border.  
84 Abdulmalik Mohammed was arrested in February 2007 as he was making his way from Somalia into 
Kenya. He was transported to Nairobi before being handed over to US officials who detained him at 
Guantanamo Bay. Although Kenya’s government denies that he is a Kenyan citizen, a family in Mombasa 
has stated that they are related to Mohammed. One of his sisters, Mwajuma Rajab Abdalla, stated that her 
brother was a Madrassa (Islamic) teacher in Mombasa as well as a cross-border trader who moved goods 
between Somalia and Kenya (Capital News 2008). While his family stated that Mohammed had no 
association with any terrorist groups, the Guantanamo Review Task Force claimed that Mohammed was a 
frequent attendee of Aboud Rogo’s sermons at a mosque in Mombasa. The Task Force also alleged that 
Mohammed confessed to plotting and carrying out the 2002 Kikambala bombing in Mombasa alongside other 
terrorist suspects. At the time of writing this thesis, Mohammed was still a detainee at Guantanamo Bay. The 
full report on Mohammed’s case is available at   
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/guantanamo/detainees/10026-abdul-malik 
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that some of their religious practices, which do not conform to the Wahhabi doctrine, are 
under attack from Arabs.  
Muslim leaders in Kenya were also wary about the spread of Wahhabism. A senior 
official from the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM) stated that “Saudi-
backed Wahhabis, trained in Sudan and Somalia, had taken over previously Sufi 
institutions instead of building their own mosques. He protested against this saying “we 
told them build your own, but they wanted to take our institutions and indoctrinate our 
members” (quoted in Amble and Meleagrou-Hitchens 2014, 526). In this instance, the 
biggest Muslim association in Kenya did not want Muslims to be perceived as a monolithic 
group that supported the Wahhabi jihadist agenda to commit violence. The SUPKEM 
leaders categorically stated that Wahhabism was not part of their identity as Muslims. It, 
therefore, seemed implausible, at the time, that Kenyan Muslims would engage in acts of 
terrorism.  
Second, between 2000 and 2007, there were no indications that people in Kenya 
cared about bin Laden’s anti-Western cause. A Pew poll in 2007 showed that Kenyans, 
irrespective of their religious affiliation, did not have strong opinions about the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict (Pew Research Centre 2007). Furthermore, the US was quite popular 
in Kenya and most of the population was pro rather than anti-American. It is on this basis 
that political leaders believed that Kenyans were not eager to join or support Al Qaeda or 
any of its alleged affiliated cells in East Africa.  
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Third, the limitations of internet access in Kenya,85 between 2001 and 2009, made 
it difficult for Al Qaeda to radicalize young people and recruit them into the terrorist group. 
Al Qaeda metamorphosed into an online terrorist group when its operations were disrupted 
in Afghanistan after the dislodgment of the Taliban regime in 2001. Hamid Mir, one of the 
few journalists to interview bin Laden, was privy to this transformation when he watched 
“every second Al Qaeda member carrying a laptop computer along with a Kalashnikov as 
they prepared to scatter into hiding and exile” (Coll and Glasser 2005, 1). Hence, because 
of the US-led War on Terror after 9/11, the internet became Al Qaeda’s primary tool of 
recruitment and incitement. However, Kenya’s nascent ICT infrastructure, at the time, 
inhibited radicalization through the internet.   
Members of parliament as well as members of Kenya’s cabinet were unconvinced, 
at least during the early 2000s, that Al Qaeda had any conduits of radicalization in Kenya 
or that the organization’s intent was to attack and kill Kenyans. While the discovery of 
sleeper cells after the US Embassy and Kikambala bombings showed that radicalization 
was taking place in the country, they were dismissed as isolated cases, targeted at Western 
interests, that did not warrant extraordinary security measures. For instance, the Assistant 
Minister for East African and Regional Cooperation, Joe Nyaga, cautioned against the 
consequences of supporting the US-led War on Terror. The Assistant Minister for East 
African and Regional Cooperation told parliament that when dealing with terrorism, Kenya 
must be careful so “as not to be perceived to be an extension of Washington. The minute 
 
85 Before 2001, less than 1% of Kenya’s population had access to the internet. The number of internet 
users increased slowly between 2002 to 2009 when 10% of the population had access to the internet. 
By 2012, 32.1% of the population had access to the internet with the figure rising to 45% of the 
population by 2016 (Internet Live Stats 2017).    
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we are perceived as an extension of Washington, we will be attacked” (Republic of Kenya. 
Parliament. July 2004, 2581).  Paul Muite, a prominent human rights lawyer and member 
of parliament at the time, expressed similar views urging his colleagues to “stand up to 
both the Americans and the British” (Gatheru 2003, para. 5) since Western interests had 
made Kenya an innocent victim of terrorism. In this regard, it was Western interests in 
Kenya that were the target of terrorist attacks in the country.   
 In other instances, the credibility of the terrorism threat level, in Kenya, was 
questioned as members of Kenya’s parliament expressed scepticism about the War on 
Terror and the extraordinary measures that it entailed. On July 25, 2003, Amina Abdalla, 
a nominated member of parliament and a member of the Departmental Committee of 
Administration of Justice and Legal Affairs,86 alleged that “it appears as if the president, 
vice president [and] the minister in charge of provincial administration and internal security 
are all out of the country and the Americans are issuing these serious threats of terrorism. 
I read economic sabotage in these threats of terrorism issued by the Americans” (Republic 
of Kenya. Parliament. June 25, 2003, 1619). Abdalla wondered why Israel was not 
accorded the same treatment despite having up to five terrorist attacks per day. Her views 
echoed those of several members of parliament including Noah Wekesa and Peter Munya 
who stated that the American and British governments were using travel advisories to 
cripple the country’s economy and tourism industry (Gatheru 2003).  
 
86 One of the key roles of Kenya’s parliamentary Departmental Committee of Administration of Justice and 
Legal Affairs is to review proposed antiterrorism bills before they are tabled in parliament.    
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Another member of parliament, Fahim Twaha, urged fellow lawmakers not to give 
in to US demands on the War on Terror. Citing Kenya’s history, he recalled how Kenya’s 
first president, Jomo Kenyatta, was labelled a terrorist stating that “Kenyatta’s only crime 
was to tell the British to give back the land and freedom that they had stolen from us, but 
the term terrorism was used to spoil his name and waste seven years of his life”87 (Republic 
of Kenya. Parliament. June 25, 2003, 1634). He also gave an example of Nelson Mandela, 
South Africa’s former president who was jailed for 27 years on accusations of being a 
terrorist. Twaha stated, “we should learn from these historical experiences and not be taken 
in by the foolish propaganda war being waged on us. We should not agree to be intimidated 
and harassed by the so-called superpowers” (Republic of Kenya. Parliament. June 25, 
2003, 1634). 
 The perception that terrorism was a threat that emanated from outside Kenya 
appeared to shift slightly when cases of illegal weapons that could be used to carry out 
terrorist attacks were discovered in the country. On July 13, 2010, several members of 
parliament including John Ng’ong’o, Rachel Shebesh and Dansono Mungatana noted that 
the discovery of an assortment of weapons including 300 bomb detonators in Rongai, 
Nairobi and an arms cache in Narok was an indication that terrorist were residing in the 
country. Although no evidence was provided to prove that the weapons were part of a 
terrorist plot, the members of parliament were steadfast in their claims (Republic of Kenya. 
Parliament. July 13, 2010).  
 
87 The British colonial administration imprisoned Kenyatta for his alleged role in the Mau Mau, a Kikuyu-
based freedom fighters’ group in Kenya.  
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However, it is also important to note that at this time, some members of parliament 
still believed that foreign terrorists who were able to gain entry into Kenya rather than 
Kenyan citizens posed the greatest security threat to the country. They were especially 
concerned about Somali refugees who had made their way into a suburb in Nairobi known 
as Eastleigh. The suburb is often referred to as little Mogadishu or Muqdisho Yarye in 
Somali because of the high number of Somali refugees who started moving to Eastleigh 
when Somalia’s civil war began in 1991.88 One member of parliament, Bonny Khalwale, 
claimed that the unprecedented increase in the number of Somalis from Somalia had left 
the country vulnerable to terrorist attacks (Republic of Kenya. Parliament. July 13, 2010, 
36).89 Even though Kenya’s law enforcement agencies had arrested a number of Somali 
nationals and charged them with terror-related activities (Capital News, 2009), there was 
no evidence that Somali refugees were getting into Kenya with intentions of committing 
acts of terrorism.  
The view that foreigners and not Kenyans were the perpetrators of terrorism attacks 
started changing after Kenyans of non-Somali lineage were implicated in terrorist attacks 
in Uganda. On July 11, 2010, Al Shabaab militants carried out the group’s first major 
attacks outside Somalia killing 74 people and injuring 71 others in Uganda’s capital 
Kampala (Kron and Ibrahim 2010). Two bombs were detonated when revelers at a popular 
restaurant and rugby field in Kampala were watching a world cup match between 
Netherlands and Spain. At face value, it appeared as though Uganda was attacked because 
 
88 Despite the nickname little Mogadishu, Eastleigh is not homogenous and is also inhabited by Kenyans 
from other ethnic groups (Carrier 2016).    
89 As stated earlier in this chapter, there was an increase in Somali refugees who sought asylum in Kenya 
when the UIC and Ethiopian forces were engaged in battle in 2006 and when Al Shabaab started gaining 
territory in 2008.   
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its troops were part of the AMISOM peacekeeping mission in Somalia (Williams 2018). 
However, video footage that emerged soon after the attacks showed that Al Shabaab had 
changed tact and was planning to attack other states in East Africa, including those that did 
not have troops in Somalia such as Kenya. Part of the message in the video stated:  
“Jana vita vimekuwa Mogadishu. Leo vita viko Nairobi, 
Kampala na Bujumbura … hizi ni vita za kupambana na 
makafiri mpaka dini la Kiislamu isimame, alhamdulillah!” 
(Yesterday, we fought in Mogadishu. Today we shall fight 
in Nairobi, Kampala and Bujumbura.90 This is a war against 
all infidels until Islam is established, praise be to Allah! (Al 
Shabaab 2010c, 10:12; Al Shabaab n.d).  
The objective of the message in the video was to inform governments in East Africa that 
from that point forward, Al Shabaab was at war with non-believers in the entire region. 
While this may have appeared to be a major change in the group’s strategic objective it is 
likely that Al Shabaab harboured intentions to retaliate against any state that supported the 
Western-backed TFG all along. Uganda’s and Burundi’s forces were part of AMISOM 
whose key objective was to ensure that Somalia was peaceful and stable enough for the 
TFG to govern effectively. As explained earlier in this chapter, Kenya which did not have 
troops in AMISOM at the time was at the forefront of providing the TFG with the support 
 
90 Bujumbura is Burundi’s capital city.  
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that it needed to set up a government in Somalia. For these reasons, Al Shabaab perceived 
Kenya, Uganda and Burundi as legitimate targets.   
 It is unclear whether officials in Kenya knew about the video footage. 
Nevertheless, the coalition government’s reaction to the Kampala attacks showed that 
government leaders had become wary of the possibility of threats from domestic terrorists. 
During a parliamentary address on the new dimensions of international terrorism, the Prime 
Minister of Kenya at the time, Raila Odinga, said that “terrorism was no longer limited to 
liberation struggles [but that the new form of terrorism was] a weapon for economic 
competition, cultural conflicts, narcotics trafficking and to some, a trade” (Republic of 
Kenya. Parliament. December 22, 2010, 14). The Prime Minister acknowledged that “years 
ago, known acts of global terrorism involved bombing Western targets such as embassies, 
hotels, airlines, sporting events, military assets, et cetera. Today, the focus is on soft targets 
such as restaurants, music festivals, public transportation systems, schools, shopping malls 
and so on” (Republic of Kenya. Parliament. December 22, 2010, 14). The Prime Minister 
noted that “perpetrators of terrorist acts are no longer trained soldiers, but now include 
male and female children below the legal age for criminal responsibility” (Republic of 
Kenya, December 22, 2010, 14). Most importantly, the Prime Minister stated: 
The public must exercise utmost vigilance to help in the 
detection and prevention of acts of terrorism. The public 
must not provide safe refuge to terrorists. We must not 
glorify the perpetrators of acts of terrorism. We must not 
provide an environment suitable for the induction of our 
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children into terrorist networks. We must not preach the 
ideology of religious or ethnic hate to our children. We must 
not use religion; whether Christianity, Islam or Hinduism to 
radicalize our youths. The fight against terrorism must, 
therefore, start within our homes, mosques, churches, 
temples and schools (Republic of Kenya. Parliament. 
December 22, 2010, 15). 
The Prime Minister urged parliament to “strengthen our state of legal preparedness 
and operational tools necessary to respond effectively to these new dimensions of 
international terrorism” (Republic of Kenya. Parliament. December 22, 2010, 15). He told 
his colleagues not to block efforts to pass an anti-terrorism law because of misconceptions 
that the law was targeting some Kenyan communities, stating:   
This government has the responsibility to ensure that every 
Kenyan, irrespective of their religion, is protected. We are 
doing it as a matter of course. So, let our citizens not stop us 
from coming up with proper legislation that will make us 
more effective in fighting terrorism (Republic of Kenya. 
Parliament. December 22, 2010, 19).  
Following the Prime Minister’s cue, members of Kenya’s parliament gradually 
became receptive to the idea of enacting counterterrorism measures in Kenya. The first step 
in this direction was supporting the deployment of Kenya Defence Forces in Somalia under 
what came to be known as Operation Linda Nchi (Operation Defend the Nation). A few 
~ 152 ~ 
 
months before Kenya’s military went to Somalia, there were indications that the 
government was planning to launch an offensive against Al Shabaab. On May 10, 2011, 
Kenya’s Minister for Provincial Administration and Internal Security, George Saitoti, told 
Kenya’s parliament that there were terrorists in every part of the African continent. The 
Minister for Internal Security unequivocally stated: “We have terrorists along our borders 
who are threatening our country, including our own strategic installations. We will deal 
with this matter effectively. We are going to do everything possible to ensure that we 
provide security to every Kenyan” (Republic of Kenya. Parliament. May 10, 2011, 56).  
Indeed, Kenya’s incursion into Somalia on October 16, 2011 was framed as the 
right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter91 (Republic of Kenya. Parliament. 
December 7, 2011, 21). The Minister for State Defence, Yusuf Haji, explained that Kenya 
Defence Forces went to Somalia to defend “the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of 
the Republic” (Republic of Kenya. Parliament. December 7, 2011, 21). In this sense, Kenya 
was literally fighting for its survival. When the Minister of Defence informed parliament 
that the Commission of the AU had made a formal request for Kenya’s forces to join 
AMISOM, there was applause in the House indicating that Kenya’s members of parliament 
were on board with the new direction that the country was taking in its counterterrorism 
policy. Several members of parliament also spoke up to praise and support Kenya Defence 
 
91 Article 51 of the UN Charter states: Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until 
the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures 
taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security 
Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the 
present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore 
international peace and security (United Nations, n.d). 
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Force’s incursion into Somalia. Among them was Kiema Kilonzo who congratulated the 
armed forces for the good work that they had been doing in Somalia and Farah Maalim 
who described the force’s actions in Somalia as one of the ways through which Kenya 
could protect its strategic interests (Republic of Kenya. Parliament. December 7, 2011, 21-
25).   
As Kenya’s military engaged with Al Shabaab in Somalia, there was mounting 
evidence that Kenyan citizens were planning, supporting and carrying out terrorist attacks 
in Kenya. For instance, on October 28, 2011, a Kenyan court sentenced Elgivia Bwire 
Oliacha (aka Mohammed Seif, aka Seif Deen), who was until his arrest a medical intern 
and former student of Maseno University in Kenya, to life imprisonment92 for taking part 
in two grenade attacks on Race Course road in Nairobi. Oliacha, who looked unperturbed 
and happy during his sentencing, admitted to committing the offenses. Law enforcement 
agencies also found an assortment of weapons in his apartment, including an AK 47 rifle, 
two pistols, two revolvers, one sub-machine gun, 13 hand grenades and 717 rounds of 
ammunition (Mkutu, Mogire and Alusa 2018; Associated Press in Nairobi 2011; Kenya 
Citizen TV 2011).  During his trial, it emerged that Oliacha had converted to Islam in 2005 
and proceeded to Somalia for training with Al Shabaab in 2007. Once he was trained, 
Oliacha was dispatched to Kenya where he recruited members for Al Shabaab and waited 
for instructions on where and how to carry out terrorist attacks (Elgivia Bwire Oliacha v 
Republic 2018).  
 
92 Kenya’s Court of Appeal reduced Oliacha’s sentence to 15 years on February 9, 2018 (Elgivia Bwire 
Oliacha v Republic 2018).  
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Oliacha’s case was not isolated as law enforcement agencies uncovered more cases 
of young Kenyans who had sneaked into Somalia, mainly through a town at the border of 
Somalia and Kenya called Liboi, before making their way back to Kenya to engage in 
terrorist activities (Interview with Kenya Defence Forces personnel D November 15, 
2017). This information is substantiated in a leaked report from Kenya’s National 
Intelligence Service (NIS) which gives details of about 30 Al Shabaab militants who were 
spotted spying on Kenyan security personnel between Abdi Sugow area and Deg Elema 
area in Liboi.93 The report goes on to describe the gravity of the terrorist threat in Kenya 
stating, “in 2011, the threat of terrorism in the country rose up drastically largely from the 
threats we recorded and the attacks we began experiencing” (National Intelligence Service 
n.d, 1). The report contains Situation Reports (SITREPs) that provide specific details about 
28 Al Shabaab terror plots that were uncovered in Kenya between 2011 and 2013. Several 
Kenyan citizens, who had spent time at Al Shabaab training camps in Somalia and found 
their way back to Kenya, were implicated in planning all the 28 terror plots that were listed 
in the report (National Intelligence Service n.d, 1-23; Appendix 4).  
 The most alarming aspect about Kenya’s Al Shabaab recruits was that they 
included school-aged children who had ran away from school to join the terrorist group. In 
several cases, parents from Isiolo County recounted how they had sent their children to 
school only to receive phone calls from their children informing them that they were in 
Somalia and had joined Al Shabaab. In other instances, parents received phone calls from 
law enforcement officers informing them that their children had been arrested while trying 
 
93 Town at the border of Kenya and Somalia.  
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to sneak into Somalia (Interview with KDF personnel D November 15, 2017; Yusuf 2015; 
Kenya Citizen TV 2015b).    
Another trend in Al Shabaab’s recruitment of young Kenyans was the increase of 
recruits from non-Muslim regions. No longer was Al Shabaab focusing on recruiting the 
stereotypical young, Muslim male from Kenya’s Somali or Coastal communities. Instead, 
the terrorist group expanded its outreach to include young people from the Rift Valley, 
Central, Nyanza and Western parts of Kenya (Mkutu, Mogire and Alusa 2018). A 
government report on Al Shabaab recruitment in Kenya pointed out that Al Shabaab had 
targeted children from schools in these regions for recruitment. Among the schools cited 
in the report were Koseka secondary school, Birunda PAG primary school and St. Patrick’s 
Bumula secondary school. While boys from the schools joined Al Shabaab as fighters,’ 
girls were recruited as sex slaves94 for Al Shabaab fighters (Mukinda 2015; Wabala 2015 
Al Jazeera, 2018). Indeed, in October 2011, Kenya’s Police Commissioner Mathew Iteere 
officially confirmed the extent of youth radicalization in Kenya and the threat that Kenya 
faced from home-grown terrorists. Addressing a press conference, the Police 
Commissioner stated, “we have credible information [that] we have got quite a number of 
young people [Kenyans] who had crossed to Somalia to fight alongside the Al Shabaab. 
These are Kenyans, not necessarily of Somali origin” (Kenya Citizen TV 2011b, 1:27). 
 
 
94 The girls were told that they would be getting married to Al Shabaab fighters.  
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Table 1: Perpetrators of Terrorist Attacks in Kenya: January 1, 1975 – November 5, 
2012 









Al Qaeda 3 240 4000 
Al Shabaab 87 99 433 
Forum for the Restoration of Democracy-Kenya (FORD-
Kenya) 
2 1 0 
God’s Oppressed Army  2 0 0 
Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK) 3 0 5 
Kenya African National Union (KANU) 5 5 8 
Kisii Activists  1 4 0 
Maasai (Ethnic group in Kenya) 1 3 4 
Maskini Liberation Front 3 27 100 
Merille Militants  3 6 4 
Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) 3 4 5 
Mungiki Sect 4 8 2 
Mwakenya Dissident Movement  2 4 0 
Nandi (Sub-ethnic group of the Kalenjin ethnic group in 
Kenya) 
4 0 32 
National Development Party (NDP) 1 0 2 
Oromo Liberation Front 2 143 1 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) 3 15 85 
Sabaot Land Defence Force (SLDF) 4 19 11 
Sabaot (Sub-ethnic group of the Kalenjin ethnic group in 
Kenya) 
2 40 0 
Sungu Sungu 1 5 0 
Toposa and Dongiro (Sub-ethnic groups of the 
Karamajong ethnic group in East Africa) 
2 89 0 
United Somali Congress (USC) 1 1 2 
Unknown/Other 109 320 378 
Total  248 1033 4972 
Compiled using data from the Global Terrorism Database (2018)95  
By 2012, Kenya was the target of most Al Shabaab attacks outside Somalia. Data 
from the GTD (2019) estimated that 22.7% of Al Shabaab attacks took place in Kenya 
 
95 This table was generated based on confirmed cases of terrorist attacks in Kenya that were recorded in the 
GTD. However, the table may not include all terrorism incidences in Kenya because the GTD only records 
confirmed and verifiable cases of terrorism incidences.  
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(START 2013). This made Al Shabaab the group with the highest number of terrorist 
attacks in Kenya between 1975 and 2012 as per Table 1 above. However, its affiliate Al 
Qaeda retained the position of the terrorist group with the highest number of fatalities and 
deaths because of the magnitude of the US Embassy bombing in 1998. Nevertheless, the 
frequency of the Al Shabaab attacks in Kenya compelled law enforcement authorities to 
become more vigilant.  
Due to increased surveillance, law enforcement agencies in Kenya thwarted several 
attacks that were not revealed to the public (Interview with KDF personnel D November 
15, 2017). Among the attacks that were foiled were multiple plots to attack Kenya’s 
parliament buildings in Nairobi, a plot to attack an Ethiopian restaurant in Nairobi that was 
a popular eatery for TFG delegates from Somalia, a plot to attack a United Nations office 
in Nairobi and several plots “to assassinate top Kenyan politicians and security officials” 
(National Intelligence Service n.d, 25). All the attacks, which had been planned for several 
months, were set to take place towards the end of December 2011 and throughout 2012. 
The full details of the foiled attacks including the estimated month of each attack, the names 
of alleged/convicted perpetrators of the attacks and descriptions of the terrorist plots and 
targets are available in appendix 4.     
Given these developments, the time was right for Kenya’s government to act on 
terrorism. When the Prevention of Terrorism Bill, 2012 was presented to parliament, it 
received overwhelming support. Several members of parliament enthusiastically listed the 
merits of the Bill and proclaimed their support for it. The Minister for Justice, National 
Cohesion and Constitutional Affairs, Eugene Wamalwa, described the Bill as a “very 
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positive development” (Republic of Kenya. Parliament.  September 26, 2012, 43) noting 
that for the first time, Kenya had a mechanism that would enable law enforcement agencies 
to monitor and prevent the recruitment of young Kenyans into terrorist groups. Fred 
Kapondi, who had been the member of parliament for Mt. Elgon Constituency since 2007, 
said that the Bill was overdue and that it was time that Kenya joined the league of states 
that had passed anti-terrorism laws. The Assistant Minister for Defence, Joseph Nkaissery, 
asked parliament to pass the Bill because it was not possible to fight terrorism using 
conventional methods. Another member of parliament, Joseph Kiuna, lauded the Bill as 
bipartisan and warned that Kenya risked falling into anarchy if parliament did not take the 
Bill seriously. Kiuna urged all members of parliament to support the Bill as “principled 
and patriotic Kenyans” (Republic of Kenya. Parliament.  September 26, 2012, 49).  
The language that was used to debate the Bill denoted that Kenya’s existence as a 
peaceful state depended on the passage of the anti-terrorism Bill. Hence, dissenting voices, 
like that of Aden Duale who raised concerns about the impact of the proposed law on civil 
liberties (Republic of Kenya. Parliament. September 26, 2012, 49-50), could not sway the 
majority who had securitized terrorism as an existential threat and were more than willing 
to enact extraordinary security measures to address the threat. The coalition government 
had achieved consensus about the terrorism threat in Kenya and the need for 
counterterrorism measures. It took less than two months, between its first and third 
readings, for Kenya’s parliament to pass the Prevention of Terrorism Bill, 2012 (Kenya 
Law 2012).  
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Conclusion  
The rise of Al Shabaab in Somalia had significant implications for Kenya’s 
counterterrorism policy. When the group emerged in 2007 it was welcomed in Somalia as 
a nationalistic organization that was striving to restore peace in the country and free 
Somalia of foreign interference, especially from Ethiopia. Within months of controlling 
parts of Southern Somalia, Al Shabaab had installed order with the establishment of much 
needed institutions and social services. Al Shabaab’s success made it popular and young, 
mostly uneducated, Somali men joined the group to fight for its cause. However, the 
group’s popularity in Somalia started waning when it became clear that Al Shabaab was 
intolerant of important Sufi traditions that had been practiced in Somalia for hundreds of 
years. From that point, the number of young Somalis who were willing to join the group 
declined and Al Shabaab opened its membership to foreign fighters who included young 
people from Kenya. The group’s international outlook was also a result of change of 
leadership from Ayro to Godane. Godane declared that Al Shabaab was part of the global 
jihad network and sought to increase the number of foreign fighters within its ranks.  
 As a transnational terrorist group, Al Shabaab used radicalization conduits 
including Rogo, Makaburi and Ali to recruit young Kenyans who were trained to not only 
fight in Somalia but also carry out terrorist attacks in Kenya. By 2012, domestic terrorism 
in Kenya had increased to a level, whereby, Kenya’s government acknowledged that it was 
a serious threat that could not be tackled using conventional methods. There were also 
worrying trends of young Kenyans, including school-aged children, falling prey to 
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radicalization conduits who facilitated their travel to Somalia for training before they were 
dispatched back to Kenya to engage in terrorist activities.  
These developments marked a critical juncture in Kenya’s counterterrorism policy. 
They drew attention to domestic radicalziaiton as a new variable that explains the change 
in Kenya’s counterterrorism policy. Terrorist attacks in Kenya were not confined to 
American and Israeli installations. It became clear that Kenya, as a referent object, was 
under significant threat on three fronts as radicalization conduits encouraged their 
followers to attack Kenya’s institutions, kill its citizens and assassinate its leaders. It was 
then that Kenya’s president and prime minster as well as most of its cabinet ministers and 
members of parliament unified to enact counterterrorism measures that would protect the 
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Chapter Five 
From Autocracy to Democracy: The Impact of Kenya’s 2010 
Constitution on Counterterrorism Policy 
 
Introduction 
Chapter four determined that Kenya’s approach to countering terrorism changed when 
there was growing evidence that Al Shabaab was recruiting and radicalizing Kenyan 
citizens who were then dispatched to engage in terrorism activities in Kenya. The shift 
from foreign attackers to Kenyan jihadists contributed to consensus among Kenya’s 
president, prime minister, cabinet ministers and members of parliament that the methods 
that were designed to keep foreign terrorists out of the country would not be effective in 
stemming the activities of home-grown terrorists. Ultimately, Kenya’s government enacted 
counterterrorism measures to protect the country from foreign and home-grown terrorists. 
Even so, the consensual process that resulted in the enactment of counterterrorism 
measures in Kenya cannot be solely attributed to growing evidence of an increase in home-
grown terrorists in the country. Other contextual factors also played a significant role in 
the country’s counterterrorism making process. As McDonald (2008) pointed out, 
securitization does not automatically occur when a problem is designated as a security 
threat. “Those interested in the construction of security must pay attention to the social, 
political and historical contexts in which particular discourses of security, even those 
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defined narrowly in terms of the designation and articulation of [a] threat, become 
possible” (McDonald 2008, 573).   
This chapter examines the effects that Kenya’s transition from autocracy to 
democracy had on the country’s counterterrorism policymaking process. It argues that 
when NARC became the first opposition party to win an election in Kenya in 2002, 
Kibaki’s government was under considerable pressure to democratize the country after 40 
years of KANU’s despotic rule. Hence, during its first few years in power, Kibaki’s 
government was preoccupied with the mechanizations of power-sharing. Furthermore, 
Kibaki’s government, which had pledged to lead Kenya into a new era of national 
integration in the aftermath of ethnopolitical polarization that had plagued Kenya during 
the Moi era, was reluctant to enact laws that appeared to target a section of Kenya’s 
population. The proposed anti-terrorism laws in 2003 and 2006 were, therefore, rejected 
primarily because they contained clauses that were deemed discriminatory towards 
Kenya’s Muslim community.  
In 2012, Kibaki’s government garnered enough support for it to pass the Prevention 
of Terrorism Bill, 2012. Many parliamentarians who had opposed attempts to pass anti-
terrorism laws in 2003 and 2006 voted for the 2012 Bill even though it had clauses that 
were similar to previously rejected anti-terrorism Bills. This chapter argues that the 
promulgation of a new constitution in Kenya in 2010 instituted democratic changes that 
led to the securitization of terrorism and subsequent shift in Kenya’s counterterrorism 
policy. The changes included reforms to Kenya’s security agencies and institutions as well 
as the inclusion of a Bill of Rights in Kenya’s constitution.  
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To clearly explain the significance of the democratic changes on Kenya’s 
counterterrorism policy, this chapter begins with a vivid account of how KANU entrenched 
despotic rule using Kenya’s security agencies and institutions over a period of 40 years. 
This is followed by discussions about attempts to pass the 2003 and 2006 anti-terrorism 
Bills amidst a growing rift within the NARC government. The rift in the NARC 
government spiralled into bitterly contested elections in 2007 and the ensuing violence in 
2008. In the aftermath of the violence, Kibaki and Odinga, the two main presidential 
candidates in the 2007 elections, agreed to form a government of national unity and 
embarked on the development of a constitution that was based on democratic values and 
principles. The last two sections of this chapter expound on the impact of the 2010 
constituent on Kenya’s counterterrorism policy.   
The Role of Security Agencies and Institutions in the Making of an Autocratic State  
Jomo Kenyatta’s Presidency 
 
For almost 40 years, the office of the president in Kenya had absolute control over the 
country’s security agencies and institutions including its intelligence agency and police 
force. As was the case during the colonial period, state agencies and institutions in post-
colonial Kenya were used as tools to protect the interests of the president and his close 
allies. Presidential control of Kenya’s state agencies and institutions began through a series 
of constitutional amendments when Jomo Kenyatta became the country’s first president in 
1964. That year, Kenyatta and those close to him introduced amendments that consolidated 
power in the office of the president and paved the way for Kenya to become an autocratic 
state. These amendments included Amendment No. 28 of 1964 which dismantled the 
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decentralized (majimbo) political system that would have allowed regions in Kenya to be 
more autonomous and to have control over key aspects of their economy and social services 
(Republic of Kenya 1964; Okoth-Ogendo 1972). 
At the time, advocates for the centralization of power and a stronger presidency, 
such as Mwai Kibaki, argued that the decentralized system would have escalated political 
tensions over land and increased the likelihood of violence between ethnic groups fighting 
over regional boundaries (Okoth-Ogendo 1972). This view appeared to be valid as clashes 
over regional boundaries had already taken place between the Luhya and Kalenjin when 
Kitale District was transferred to the Rift Valley region in 1963. Other clashes between the 
Luhya and Luo over the boundary of Maseno Division, in 1963, resulted in several deaths 
and the destruction of property (Republic of Kenya. Parliament. October 8, 1965; Ogot 
1967).  
The creation of a centralized political system also received support because Kenya 
was grappling with the threat of irredentism from its Somali population as well as several 
communities residing at the Kenyan Coast. In the Northeastern region of Kenya, ethnic 
Somalis attempted to curve out the area and integrate it with Somalia during the Shifta war 
that took place between 1963 and 1968.96 At the Kenyan Coast, the Mwambao United 
Front (MUF) became the first group in the region to demand for autonomy from Kenya in 
 
96 It is important to note that throughout the colonial period, the people of NFD (Northern Frontier District) 
had no contact with the rest of Kenyans. Until 1960, other Kenyans needed a special permit to visit the NFD. 
During the 1962 Lancaster House conference, the British Colonial Secretary proposed a referendum to 
determine whether the people of NFD wanted to remain with Kenya or join Somalia. An overwhelming 
majority voted to join Somalia, but the British government decided not to let them go so close to Kenya’s 
independence.   
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1963, on grounds that the inhabitants of the region were a distinct social group who should 
establish their own independent state or re-join Zanzibar (Brennan 2008; Presthold 2014; 
Patterson 2015). In view of the precarious status of Kenya’s newly acquired independence, 
Kenyatta and his cabinet were convinced that stability in Kenya would be achieved if the 
country had a powerful unified government (Republic of Kenya 1964. Parliament. 3879-
3992; Maxon 2016).  
In 1964, Kenya’s only opposition party, the Kenya African Democratic Union 
(KADU), was dissolved and its members including its chairman and Kenya’s future 
president, Moi, joined KANU. The dissolution of KADU sealed the fate of decentralization 
in Kenya since it was KADU that was at the forefront of championing for greater autonomy 
for Kenya’s regions. In addition to this, KADU’s demise made Kenya a de facto one-party 
state. Jomo Kenyatta and his allies welcomed this development arguing that multiparty 
democracy was ethnically divisive and economically unviable. Indeed, even months before 
Kenya became independent in December 1963, KANU members had expressed 
reservations about working alongside other political parties such as KADU. On August 2, 
1963, Tom Mboya, who went on to become Kenya’s first post-colonial Minister for Justice 
and Constitutional Affairs stated that KANU was committed to “the building and unifying 
of Kenya into one nation … even if this was perceived as a threat to the opposition” 
(Republic of Kenya. Parliament. Aug 2, 1963, 1668-1669).  Jomo Kenyatta made similar 
statements. First in 1963 when he stated that “[the] negative and destructive opposition can 
only do harm to democracy” (Hornsby 2012, 95) and later in 1964 when he described 
KADU as a “splinter club of conceited grasshopper politicians with nothing to contribute” 
(Hornsby 2012, 95). In his view, a one-party state was desirable and inevitable.  
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When KANU became the only political party in Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta embarked 
on constitutional amendments that would solidify his hold on power. On June 3, 1966, 
Kenya’s parliament assented to constitutional amendments which made significant 
changes to the Preservation of Public Security Act. Part of the amendments made it lawful 
for the president to order for:  
a) the detention of persons …  b) the registration, restriction 
of movement (into, out of or within Kenya)  c) the 
imposition of curfews … d) the censorship, control or 
prohibition of the communication of any information, or 
of any means of communicating or of recording ideas, or 
information, including any publication or document … 
e) the prevention of the dissemination of false reports … 
and, f) the control or prohibition of any procession, 
assembly, meeting, association or society (The 
Constitution of Kenya Amendment Act No. 3 Act 1966, 
Part III) 
The amendment also made it lawful for the president to decide on “any matter, not being a 
matter specified in any of the foregoing paragraphs of this subsection for which provision 
is necessary or expedient for the preservation of public security” (The Constitution of 
Kenya Amendment Act No. 3 1966, Part III 2m).   
Based on the provisions mentioned above, the president no longer needed 
parliamentary approval to exercise emergency powers and Jomo Kenyatta was at liberty to 
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order Kenya’s security forces to detain anyone without trial at his own discretion.  As Ghai 
(2002) observed, such actions demonstrated that Jomo Kenyatta and his close associates 
were unwilling to deconstruct the oppressive institutions of the colonial state and create an 
environment where professional and neutral security agencies and institutions could be 
established in Kenya. The ruling party KANU, under the leadership of Jomo Kenyatta, had 
backflipped on the promises that it had made in the run-up to independence. KANU’s 
manifesto in 1961 had declared:  
The preservation of Public Security Ordinance (1959) and 
the Detained and Restricted Persons (Special Provisions) 
Ordinance (1959) are other legislation currently employed to 
detain Africans for eight years without trial. Not only are 
these leaders detained without trial, but they are also 
detained under conditions which are inhuman. The 
restriction of our leaders at Lodwar, Lokitaung, Marsabit, 
Hola, Manyani, suggests that, not only are they to suffer the 
deprivation of their liberty, but are deliberately confined to 
areas which are extremely hot, mosquito-ridden and 
deserted. KANU has pledged to remove all these 
undemocratic, unjust and arbitrary practices (quoted in wa 
Thiong’o 1989, 50). 
However, instead of ending the repressive colonial detention laws as promised in its 
manifesto, KANU entrenched the repressive laws and failed to transform Kenya’s law 
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enforcement agencies and institutions from oppressive protectors of the ruling elite to 
providers of security for all Kenyan citizens.  
Until his death in August 1978, Kenyatta used Kenya’s law enforcement agencies 
as a bulwark against political opposition. Those who dared to criticize the president or the 
ruling party KANU, as Martin Shikuku and Jean Seroney did in 1975, were promptly 
arrested and detained without trial (Kamau 2015). In these cases, Shikuku was detained for 
declaring, in parliament, that there were individuals trying to kill parliament as they had 
killed KANU. When Shikuku tried to explain what he meant, Seroney who was the Speaker 
of the House at the time, told him that he did not have to substantiate the obvious – a 
statement that led to Seroney’s immediate arrest outside parliament. During an interview 
years later, Shikuku explained that he made the statement because the ruling party KANU 
had not had elections for over 10 years (Press 2006).  
The case of Shikuku and Seroney was just one of many cases where Kenyatta’s 
government used the amended Preservation of Public Security Act, 1966, to silence 
political dissent. Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o, a political satirist and author of fictional works, was 
imprisoned in 1977 because of claims that excerpts from one of his books, Ngaahika 
Ndeenda, could be interpreted as the thoughts of someone who had ill intentions towards 
the Kenyatta regime (wa Thiong’o 1989). It was also alleged that a play that wa Thiong’o 
wrote and directed about how politicians and civil servants exploited peasants was a threat 
to Kenya’s national security (Kaufman 1978; wa Thiong’o 1998). In total, the Kenyatta 
government imprisoned 26 political detainees without trial (Adar and Munyae 2001). 
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Daniel arap Moi’s Presidency   
 When Moi became president after Kenyatta’s death in 1978, he announced that the 
surviving detainees had been freed during a speech commemorating the fifteenth 
anniversary of Kenya’s independence on December 12, 1978. Moi, nevertheless, warned 
that Kenya’s detention law remained in force and stated that “the government will not 
hesitate in taking immediate and firm action against anyone whose activities threaten our 
peace, unity and stability” (Kaufman 1978, para. 8).  As time went by, it became clear that 
Moi, like his predecessor Jomo Kenyatta, believed that one of the roles of Kenya’s security 
agencies was to muzzle political dissent, more so after the failed coup d’état in 1982. At 
midnight on August 1, 1982, a group of junior officers from the Kenya Air Force tried to 
overthrow the Moi government. Their coup lasted for about six hours before they were 
arrested and indicted on several capital offense charges (McGowan and Johnson 1984; 
Ross 1982).  
Even though investigations revealed that only a few low-ranking officers were 
involved in planning and executing the coup, Moi took the opportunity to expand his 
powers and gain control of institutions that could be used to challenge his authority. The 
coup provided what Leonard (1991) described as “a piece of good luck for Moi” (Leonard 
1991, 176). It gave him the justification that he needed to get rid of anyone who threatened 
him politically and replace them with loyalists. After the coup, Moi reorganized the 
command structures of the police and armed forces making sure that only individuals who 
were loyal to him were at the helm of the security agencies and institutions. Adar (2000), 
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N’diaye (2001) and Lynch (2011) concurred that the leadership changes made Kenya’s 
security agencies and institutions beholden to the draconian wishes of the president.   
 The most feared of the security agencies were the GSU which was made up of 
highly trained paramilitary forces and the Special Branch97 which was supposed to collect 
intelligence for the government. Both the GSU and the Special Branch were part of the 
Kenya police force and became infamous for acting as Moi’s repressive law enforcement 
arm. They were primarily responsible for ensuring that laws such as the Public Order Act 
and the Preservation of Security Act, which gave Moi unilateral powers over Kenya’s 
security matters, were implemented in accordance with the president’s orders (Human 
Rights Watch 1993; Branch 2011).98  
While the GSU brazenly carried out its operations, the Special Branch was secretive 
and engaged in the detention and torture of hundreds of Kenyans who were brave enough 
to challenge Moi’s autocratic rule or criticize his government’s policies.99 They ranged 
from politicians such as Raila Odinga, Kenneth Matiba and Charles Rubia for allegedly 
sowing discord among Kenyans and threatening national security (KTN News 2018b) to 
university lecturers including Al Amin Mazrui, Willy Mutunga and Katama Mkangi who 
were accused of “plotting the downfall of the government and distributing seditious 
 
97 The Special Branch changed its name to the Directorate of Security Intelligence and later to the National 
Security Intelligence Service. It is currently called the National Intelligence Service (NIS) (National 
Intelligence Service 2017).    
98The GSU was used to clamp down on protests against Moi’s oppressive policies. An example of this is the 
Saba Saba event held at Kamkunji grounds on July 7, 1990 in support of multiparty democracy in Kenya and 
the ensuing riots that took place when crowds were dispersed.   
99 Special Branch detainees were interrogated and tortured in rooms located in the basements of Nyayo House 
and Nyati House in Nairobi. For accounts from the survivors of torture see Nyabola. August 17, 2017. Nyayo 
House: Unravelling the Architecture and Aesthetics of Torture 
https://www.theelephant.info/features/2017/08/17/nyayo-house-unravelling-the-architecture-and-aesthetics-
of-torture/. 
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literature” (Branch 2011, 153). Prominent lawyers and human rights activists were not 
spared with some of them such as Paul Muite and John Khaminwa being detained for 
advocating for Kenya to become a multiparty political system or representing those who 
had been detained (Branch 2011; Kuria 1991).    
The professionalism of Kenya’s security agencies and institutions was eroded when 
they were used to clamp down on political activists.  Several reports and studies on Kenya’s 
security agencies and institutions showed that many Kenyans perceived law enforcement 
agencies as tools of oppression rather than institutions that strove to promote law and order 
(Amnesty International 2013; Osse 2016). Hence, NARC inherited a state with 
unprofessional and dysfunctional security agencies and institutions when it won the 
elections in 2002. The new government also had to deal with the issue of ethnopolitical 
polarization and violence.100  
New Beginnings, Old Challenges  
 
Just over a year after 9/11, NARC won the general elections in Kenya on December 27, 
2002.  There were great expectations that the new government was just what Kenya needed 
to put 40 years of despotic rule behind it and strengthen its nascent democracy. During his 
inauguration speech on December 30, 2002, Kenya’s newly elected president, Kibaki, told 
the country that the coalition’s success, during the elections, proved that it was possible for 
Kenyans from diverse ethnic backgrounds, races and creeds to work together. Kibaki stated 
 
100 An analysis of ethnopolitical violence in Kenya was done in chapter two.  
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that it marked the first time in Kenya’s history that its leaders had come together as one 
indivisible entity to save the country (Kibaki 2002).     
Given the country’s history of divisive politics and state-sponsored political 
violence, NARC leaders were under pressure to transcend ethnically-based politics that had 
plunged the country into a cycle of ethnopolitical violence since 1992. Nevertheless, within 
weeks of NARC’s election victory ethnic cleavages began to appear between key members 
of the party. Raila Odinga and his affiliates were unhappy that he had not been appointed 
as the prime minister of Kenya in line with the MOU on power-sharing that was negotiated 
during the formation of the NARC alliance (Nyong’o 2007).  
Other members of the alliance, such as Charity Ngilu, were disgruntled about key 
government appointments which they felt were not done according to pre-election 
agreements. Moody Awori, one of the founding members of NARC and Kenya’s former 
vice president, recalled that instead of appointing cabinet ministers from a list that was 
agreed upon during the campaign period, the president appointed some individuals who 
were not on the list and had not campaigned for NARC. Further rifts appeared in the 
alliance when heads of parastatals were announced as many of them were from the 
president’s ethnic group (Awori 2017). This signalled that NARC was failing in its pledge 
to end the culture of public appointments based on ethnicity. 
Although there were rifts within the alliance, there was a lot of goodwill from the 
electorate who were optimistic that NARC leaders were genuine about uniting the country. 
Ndegwa (2003) noted that the euphoria following NARC’s victory was similar to the 
excitement witnessed when the country became independent in 1963. Kenyans were 
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hopeful that the new NARC government would improve their lives by entrenching 
democracy, revamping the economy, clamping down on corruption and ending ethnic 
factionalism and the political violence that emanated from it. Hence, despite their 
dissatisfaction about political appointments, the coalition’s top brass, known as the 
Summit,101 spent the better part of 2003 struggling to remain unified while attempting to 
resolve their differences. During a victory dinner that was hosted on February 19, 2003 for 
a section of NARC MPs from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Raila Odinga reassured 
the attendees that the coalition was stronger than ever and that “those assuming the 
coalition will collapse are engaging in wishful thinking” (Daily Nation 2003, para.6).  
Amid public pronouncements of unity some of the NARC leaders including 
Anyang Nyongo, Kalonzo Musyoka, Charity Ngilu and Raila Odinga, who were all part of 
the NARC cabinet, strategized on how to push for reforms that would ensure that the pre-
election power-sharing agreement was honoured. They turned to the Constitution of Kenya 
Review Commission (CKRC) that the Moi government had established in 2001 to review 
Kenya’s constitution and make recommendations for the creation of a new constitution 
(Constitution of Kenya Review Commission 2005). It was believed that the Commission’s 
recommendations for a new constitution, known as the Bomas Draft, would partly reflect 
NARC’s pre-election agreement, wherein, executive power that was vested in the president 
would be cut back through the creation of the position of a prime minister as well as the 
devolution of power to local authorities (Nyong’o 2007; Awori 2017). Hence, the 
enactment of a new constitution became the primary focus of cabinet ministers who were 
 
101 The Summit members included Mwai Kibaki, Raila Odinga, Charity Ngilu, George Saitoti, Moody 
Awori, Kijana Wamalwa and Kalonzo Musyoka.  
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allied to Odinga and other policy issues such as antiterrorism legislation were not 
enthusiastically pursued.  
Meanwhile, cabinet ministers who were close to president Kibaki, including the 
Minister for Justice and Constitutional Affairs, Kiraitu Murungi, and the Minister for 
Provincial Administration and National Security, Chris Murungaru, tried to garner support 
for the passage of the Suppression of Terrorism Bill, 2003. However, their efforts appeared 
to be attempts to reassure Kenya’s development partners that the government supported 
the US-led War on Terror rather than a NARC-driven initiative to take a stance against 
terrorism in Kenya. Just before the Bill was tabled in parliament, Murungi held a press 
conference in which he reassured Western states, especially the US, that the government’s 
efforts to draft anti-terrorism legislation demonstrated its commitment to the War on 
Terror. He also admitted that US officials had helped his office to draft the Bill (Lacey 
2003; Maharaj 2003). 
The divisions within the cabinet, scepticism about the terror threat in Kenya as 
discussed in chapter three, efforts to unify the country in the wake of ethnopolitical 
violence and opposition to the US’s role in drafting Kenya’s antiterrorism law meant that 
the Bill was dead in the water by the time it arrived in parliament. The parliamentary 
Departmental Committee of Administration of Justice and Legal Affairs that was chaired 
by Paul Muite and tasked with the role of reviewing the Bill also sealed its fate before its 
final reading in parliament. In addition to rejecting the Bill for disregarding fundamental 
rights and freedoms, the Committee criticized the Bill for “compromising the sacrifices 
made by our gallant freedom fighters in order to appease the exigencies of foreign powers, 
~ 175 ~ 
 
who want to introduce modern-day colonialism through the back door” (Staff reporter 
2003, para. 11). There was also concern that the Bill threatened to “tear apart the very 
fabric of one nation” (Staff reporter 2003, para. 2). 
Concerns about the divisive nature of the Bill stemmed from the language that was 
used in some sections of the Suppression of Terrorism Bill, 2003. While it is important to 
note that terrorism is a form of political violence that has been used by groups and 
individuals from varying religious, ethnic and national backgrounds, the fact that most 
terrorist attacks in Kenya were carried out in the name of Islam drew attention to Kenya’s 
Muslim community. Data from the GTD shows that Al Qaeda and Al Shabaab, which are 
self-professed Islamist groups, were responsible for 90 out of approximately 173 terrorism 
incidences that were reported in Kenya between 2001 and 2012. Furthermore, the attacks 
linked to the two groups resulted in the highest number of fatalities accounting for 
approximately 625 out of 1013 deaths and injuries reported during that period (Global 
Terrorism Database 2018; Appendix 1).  
Based on Kenya’s experience with Islamist groups, the presumption was that 
Kenyans who identified with the Islamic faith were more likely to carry out and support 
terrorism activities. The 2003 Suppression of Terrorism Bill, therefore, claimed that it was 
possible to identify terrorists based on the items of clothing that they were wearing. Part 
three, section 10 of the Bill stated:  
a person who, in a public place wears an item of clothing, or 
wears or carries or displays an article in such a way or in 
such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that he 
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is a member or supporter of a declared terrorist organization 
is guilty of an offence (Republic of Kenya 2003 as quoted in 
Kamau 2006, 136). 
The absurdity of this claim elicited uproar from members of Kenya’s Muslim 
community as well as a section of civil society (Bachmann and Hönke 2010; Kamau 2006; 
VOA 2009a; Mulama 2003).102 Many Muslims felt that they were being unfairly vilified 
because a few individuals who identified as Muslims had carried out terrorist attacks in 
Kenya (Ndzovu 2015). As a result, Kenya’s government withdrew the Bill and promised 
to address the issues that had been raised. 
A similar fate awaited Kenya’s Anti-Terrorism Bill, 2006 in the wake of political 
turmoil that had gripped the NARC government in 2005. Towards the end of that year, 
NARC had unravelled into two main factions identifiable through their support or 
opposition to a proposed new constitution known as the Wako Draft. The Wako Draft, 
named after Kenya’s Attorney General at the time - Amos Wako, was a government-
amended version of the CKRC’s Bomas Draft. The biggest point of contention between 
the two drafts was the issue of executive power. While the Commission’s Bomas Draft had 
proposed that executive power should be divided between the president and a new position 
of prime minister (Constitution of Kenya Review Commission 2005) the government’s 
Wako Draft sought to consolidate executive power in the position of the president 
(Government of Kenya 2005).   
 
102 The most vocal civil society groups were Amnesty International, People Against Torture and Release 
Political Prisoners (VOA 2009a).  
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Several cabinet ministers and assistant ministers, including Raila Odinga, Kalonzo 
Musyoka, Charity Ngilu, Fred Gumo, Anyang Nyongo, Ochillo Ayako, William Ole 
Ntimama, Linah Kilimo and Najib Balala, who were opposed to the Wako Draft, convened 
under the banner of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM).103  ODM successfully 
campaigned against the Wako Draft leading to its rejection during a plebiscite in November 
2005. The win emboldened the group which had declared itself to be Kenya’s third 
liberation force. They criticized Kibaki and ministers who were close to him for reneging 
on the promises made to Kenyans when NARC took over in 2002 (Namunane and Agutu 
2005). Incensed by their disloyalty, Kibaki fired his entire Cabinet and only reappointed 
those who had supported the Wako Draft (Mugonyi 2005). From that point on, all members 
of ODM became de facto members of Kenya’s opposition.       
It is against this backdrop that the government introduced the Anti-Terrorism Bill, 
2006.  The first hurdle that the Bill had to go through was the Departmental Committee of 
Administration of Justice and Legal Affairs. The Committee’s members who had rejected 
attempts to enact an antiterrorism bill in 2003 took the same position against the proposed 
legislation in 2006. Amina Abdalla, one of the Committee members, told journalists that 
the content and policy issues that led to the Committee’s rejection of the Suppression of 
Terrorism Bill in 2003 had not been addressed in the new Bill. Other members of the 
Committee stated that they were opposed to the Bill because fighting terrorism was not a 
priority for a country like Kenya which had more serious security issues to deal with, such 
as armed robberies, car jackings and cattle rustling among other non-terrorism crimes. 
 
103 The movement’s members also included influential politicians who were not members of the NARC 
Cabinet at the time such as Uhuru Kenyatta, William Ruto and Mutula Kilonzo.   
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They were especially critical of suggestions that Kenya’s Attorney General and Police 
Commissioner should share intelligence with foreign powers on issues related to terrorist 
crimes stating that such actions would be akin to colonialism. The Committee members 
vowed to campaign against the Bill if it was tabled in parliament without being amended 
(PANA 2006).     
In addition to this, the failed 2005 constitutional referendum had repercussions on 
the Kenyan government’s attempts to formulate policies. Not only was it difficult to get 
consensus on future policies among NARC politicians who had either supported or rejected 
the Wako Draft, failure to pass a new constitution meant that Kibaki was at liberty to rule 
using the old constitution which gave him unlimited powers as the president of Kenya. 
These included the power to appoint and dismiss the heads of Kenya’s security agencies 
and institutions at will and the power to order the indefinite detention of anyone who was 
accused of treason (Makinda 2006; Khadiagala 2010).  
Since previous regimes had abused these powers and used them to interfere with 
Kenya’s security agencies and institutions for personal gain, there were fears that Kibaki 
would backtrack on his election promise to lead Kenya towards a new era of democracy 
and instead carry on with the imperial legacies of his predecessors. Kibaki’s attempts to 
pass an altered version of the Bomas Draft and his refusal to honour aspects of the NARC 
MOU contributed to suspicions that he would not break away from Kenya’s autocratic past 
(Awori 2017).  This partly explains why some members of parliament were wary about 
supporting counterterrorism measures in an era where Kenya’s president had the power to 
arbitrarily control the activities of Kenya’s security agencies and institutions.  There were 
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concerns that counterterrorism measures would be used to clamp down on political activists 
rather than protect the country against terrorism threats.  
Indeed, some of the members of parliament who rejected the proposed laws in 2003, 
such as Koigi Wa Wamwere, Paul Muite, James Orengo and Wanyiri Kihoro, were former 
political detainees who were voted into Kenya’s parliament during the historic 2002 
elections (Amnesty International 1990, 1994,1999; Press 2006). Others who had been 
threatened and/or detained for criticizing Moi’s regime such as Kiraitu Murungi, Raila 
Odinga and Anyang Nyong’o served as members of Kibaki’s Cabinet during the time that 
the Suppression of Terrorism Bill, 2003 was formulated and presented for debate.  
In fact, Kiraitu Murungi, who served as the Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Affairs between 2003 and 2005, was a partner in a law firm that had filed a law suit against 
Moi’s government in February 1987 for torturing political activists. After filing the law 
suit Murungi’s close friend and the lead lawyer in the case, Gibson Kamau Kuria, was 
detained without trial for 9 months before he and his family were able to flee from Kenya 
and acquire political asylum in the US (Harden 1988; Kuria and Vazquez, 1991; Branch 
2011). Even though Murungi was not detained104 Moi’s government stationed policemen 
at the entrance of his law firm to intimidate clients who sought his services in a bid to 
cripple the firm economically (Press 2006). Once again, Moi had used Kenya’s police force 
 
104 During an interview in 2006 Kiraitu Murungi stated that he was not detained because he distributed copies 
of lawsuits that challenged the detention of Kuria and other political activists to local and international media 
houses. The key issues in the lawsuits were made public which drew attention to the autocratic practices and 
human rights abuses of the Moi government. In addition to this, political activists including lawyers and other 
professionals showed their support for political detainees by showing up to all their court appearances en 
masse.  With the spotlight on it, Moi’s government realized that detaining Murungi would have drawn more 
negative attention to it (Press 2006)    
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to try and silence dissent. Given the negative image of Kenya’s security agencies and 
institutions, coupled with NARC’s failure to pass a new constitution, Kibaki’s government 
could not consolidate the consensus that was needed to pass the Anti-Terrorism Bill in 
2006. 
   In addition to this, Kenya’s members of parliament were reluctant to support the 
controversial Bill because it was proposed on the eve of an election year. Politicians who 
were running for elective offices did not want to alienate a section of the electorate by 
supporting the Bill. Indeed, Muslims who criticized the Bill warned leaders who held 
elective offices that they risked losing support from Kenyan Muslims if they enacted laws 
that were perceived to be discriminatory (VOA 2009b). This partly explains why Kibaki’s 
government did not make any attempts to revive the Bill after it was rejected at the 
parliamentary committee level. Instead, in anticipation of the upcoming elections in 
December 2007, Kibaki tried to pacify the Muslim community once the Bill was 
withdrawn. In July 2007, Kibaki invited a delegation of Muslim leaders from SUPKEM to 
discuss issues that were of concern to Kenyan Muslims (Nation Reporter 2007). Soon after 
the meeting Sheikh Juma Ngao, SUPKEM’s vice chairperson, stated that Kibaki had 
rejected the anti-terrorism Bill because he cared about Kenya’s Muslim community 
(Jopson 2007; Mayoyo 2007). Through his statement Sheikh Ngao had endorsed Kibaki’s 
bid for the presidency.   
Members of the opposition, most notably ODM, also went to great lengths to 
distance themselves from the Bill and reassure Kenyan Muslims that they would protect 
their interests. In August 2007, Raila Odinga, the presidential candidate for ODM, signed 
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an MOU with the National Muslim Leaders Forum (NAMLEF) - an umbrella organization 
for several Muslim groups in Kenya.105 Part of the MOU stated: 
This MOU is made in utmost good faith and trust between 
Hon. Raila Odinga and NAMLEF with the common 
objective of transforming our country Kenya into a proud, 
prosperous and just nation where all Kenyans live in 
harmony realizing their full potential without discrimination, 
subjugation or fear (Odinga and NAMLEF 2007, 1)  
Through the MOU, NAMLEF pledged to do all that it could to get Odinga elected 
as Kenya’s fourth president. The organization asserted that it would “support no other 
candidate for the presidency of the 2007 general elections … and mobilize the Muslim 
constituency countrywide to support Hon. Raila Odinga’s candidature for presidency” 
(Odinga and NAMLEF 2007, 1). In return, the organization expected him to:    
Initiate within the first year [of his presidency if elected] 
deliberate policies and programs to redress historical, current 
and structural marginalization and injustices on Muslims in 
Kenya. This will include the entrenchment in the Kenyan 
constitution provisions that will outlaw the targeting and 
profiling of any Kenyan community (including Muslim) and 
subjecting them to human rights abuses, violations and 
 
105  NAMLEF members included the Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya (CIPK), the Muslim 
Educational and Welfare Association (MEWA) and the Kenya Association of Ulamaas and Imams (KAULI).  
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discrimination under any guise whatsoever, as has 
specifically been witnessed by the Muslim community in the 
past (Odinga and NAMLEF 2007, 2). 
The agreement that Odinga signed with NAMLEF gave him a slight edge over 
Kibaki among Muslim voters. An opinion poll that was conducted in November 2007 
showed that 45% of Muslims who were interviewed would vote for Odinga compared to 
43% who selected Kibaki as their preferred candidate (BBC News 2007). Even though 
Odinga was ahead, the closeness of the opinion poll indicated that Muslims were not a 
cohesive voting bloc and that the divisions among them made it impossible for any of the 
presidential candidates to bank on their support.  
Indeed, a section of the Muslim community was quite critical of the deal that 
Odinga had made with NAMLEF. In November 2007, two branches of SUPKEM namely; 
the National Youth Group and the Central Province branch publicly stated that they did not 
support the MOU. During a press conference Hassan Omar, the Chairperson of the National 
Youth Group and his colleague Mohammed Msallam claimed that “NAMLEF leaders are 
laymen in Islam” (Wachira and Namunane 2007, para. 7). They went on to say that 
NAMLEF had “no right whatsoever to speak on behalf of Muslims and [that] they are only 
associated with two regions – Coast and Northeastern provinces (Wachira and Namunane 
2007, para. 7).  
Those who opposed the MOU did not highlight any faults in its contents. Rather, 
they criticized and rejected the agreement because of the ethnic affiliations of its authors. 
From that point on, several Muslim leaders became polarized along ethnic lines when faced 
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with the choice of electing leaders who could safeguard their interests. The focus of 
discussions on Kenya’s counterterrorism policy ceased to be about the effects that 
counterterrorism measures could have on Kenya’s Muslim community. Instead, Kibaki and 
Raila Odinga supporters, within the Muslim community and other communities, focused 
on how to get their favourite candidate elected. There were no meaningful discussions on 
how to secure Kenya from terrorist attacks or deliberations on the concerns that had been 
raised about counterterrorism measures. Political leaders made empty promises to the 
Muslim community and efforts to enact counterterrorism measures in Kenya were 
relegated to the backburner as the election date drew closer.  
The cavalier approach that political leaders had towards counterterrorism 
policymaking can also be attributed to attempts to appease a section of Kenya’s Christians. 
Efforts to woe Muslim voters, such as the MOU between Raila Odinga and NAMLEF, had 
a counteracting effect of putting-off non-Muslim voters. Among them were Christians who 
strongly condemned the MOU when they found out about its contents. Under a coalition 
of several churches known as the Evangelical Alliance of Kenya, some Christian leaders 
demanded the withdrawal of the MOU. Realizing that he may lose some support from 
Kenya’s largest religious group Odinga stated that he had not signed any MOU with any 
Muslim group. He instead claimed that Muslim leaders “only came to me to register their 
complaints about constant harassment and discrimination against them” (Siele and Omondi 
2007, para. 3). Odinga later admitted to the existence of the MOU but only after Christian 
leaders from his home area in Kisumu issued a statement in his defence that stated: 
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As Kenyans head towards the General Election, we as 
Nyanza leaders note with great concern the partisan 
involvement of a section of Kenya’s religious leaders in the 
country’s political issues… it is on this note that we express 
our disgust with our Nairobi-based evangelical brothers’ 
attacks and unnecessary criticism of the agreement made 
between NAMLEF and Mr. Odinga (Munene 2007, para. 8-
9).  
The opposing views about the MOU became part of the widening schism between 
Kibaki and Odinga supporters. In addition to weighing in on the MOU religious leaders 
took sides on different policy agendas that Kibaki and Odinga proposed. Like the case of 
the MOU, statements about the presidential candidates’ policies were usually made along 
ethnic lines. For instance, two catholic archbishops publicly disagreed on Odinga’s 
proposal to make Kenya a majimbo (decentralized) state. While John Njue, the archbishop 
of Nairobi who hailed from Kibaki’s region, vehemently criticized majimboism 
(decentralization), his counterpart from Kisumu, Zacchaeus Okoth, insisted that Njue’s 
views did not represent the stance of the catholic church (Kilonzo 2014; Allen 2008).  
The ethnically charged environment in which the 2007 campaigns took place 
culminated in a bitterly contested presidential election in December that year. While cases 
of violence were rare during the campaign period,106 violence broke out in various parts of 
 
106 It is however important to note that as far back as April 2007 some communities in parts of Kenya’s Rift 
Valley, the epicentre of post-election violence in 2008, had been warned that they would not be welcome in 
the area after the 2007 elections. Some of them were advised to “go back to Central Kenya” (wa Mungai 
2010, 219) which is traditionally considered to be a region for the Kikuyu. 
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the country when the election results were announced (Rice 2008; Mueller 2011). There 
was confusion over who had won amid allegations of rigging from members of political 
parties, civil society organizations and Kenyan citizens (Kanyinga, Long and Ndii 2010). 
Tensions escalated when both Kibaki and Odinga claimed that they had won the election 
and their supporters took to the streets, unleashing indiscriminate violence against anyone 
who was suspected of supporting the opposing side. Approximately 1100 people were 
killed and another 600, 000 became internally displaced (Waki Report 2008).  
It took the intervention of the African Union Panel of Eminent Personalities 
comprising of Kofi Annan, the former UN Secretary General, Graça Machel, a 
humanitarian and former first lady of Mozambique and South Africa and Benjamin Mkapa, 
the former president of Tanzania, to negotiate a power sharing agreement between Kibaki 
and Odinga. In addition to demanding that Kibaki and Odinga supporters immediately 
cease violence, the panel created three commissions to make recommendations on changes 
that were needed to prevent the recurrence of political violence in Kenya. Upon completion 
of their work, the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, the Commission of 
Inquiry on Post-election Violence and the Independent Review Commission on Post-
election Violence concurred that a cycle of abuse of power and impunity was at the heart 
of political violence in Kenya and that institutional reforms were needed to end the cycle. 
The commissions recommended, that a new constitution, developed from the Bomas and 
Wako drafts, should form the legal foundation of institutional reforms in Kenya (Waki 
Commission 2008; Junk 2016; International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect 
n.d).  
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On December 11, 2008 Kenya’s parliament passed the Constitution of Kenya 
Review Act, 2008 which established a committee of experts that was mandated to: 
 
Identify the issues which are contentious or not agreed upon 
in the existing draft constitutions; articulate the respective 
merits and demerits of proposed options for resolving the 
contentious issues; make recommendations to the 
Parliamentary Select Committee on the resolution of 
contentious issues in the context of the greater good of the 
people of Kenya; prepare a harmonized draft constitution for 
presentation to the National Assembly; … facilitate civic 
education in order to stimulate public discussion and 
awareness of constitutional issues; liaise with the Electoral 
Commission of Kenya to hold a referendum on the draft 
constitution  (Constitution of Kenya Republic of Kenya 2008 
part III[23]).  
The Committee of Experts wrote a draft constitution and presented it to the 
Parliamentary Select Committee which reviewed the draft and agreed on key issues in 
January 2010. The draft was then presented to Kenya’s parliament which approved it in 
April 2010 leading to the publication of the Draft Constitution in May 2010. On August 4, 
2010, a referendum was held during which 67% of Kenyans voted for the Draft 
Constitution (Ndegwa et. al, 2012).   
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The 2010 Constitution and Reforms in Kenya’s Security Agencies   
The 2010 constitution placed democracy at heart of governance in Kenya. It marked a 
departure from 40 years of authoritarianism where Kenya’s first and second presidents used 
the country’s security agencies and institutions to consolidate power and eliminate anyone 
who challenged their despotic rule (Kramon and Posner 2011).  Whereas, the historic 
election of NARC in 2002 symbolized the end of despotic rule in Kenya, the 2010 
constitution provided a tangible change that laid the foundations for democratization in 
Kenya. 
The 2010 constitution changed the nature of the presidency from a position that 
ruled through decrees to one that had to rule through consultations and consensus 
(Kanyinga, Long and Ndii 2010). By putting constraints on presidential powers, the 2010 
constitution waylaid the president’s capacity to use the country’s security agencies and 
institutions for personal gain. Under the repealed constitution, Kenya’s president solely 
appointed leaders of the country’s security agencies and institutions including the police 
commissioner, the head of Kenya’s intelligence agency and the head of the military.107 
This meant that holders of these offices served at the president’s pleasure and could lose 
their positions if they did not act in accordance with the president’s wishes. The 2010 
constitution changed this with clauses that prevented the president from arbitrarily 
appointing and dismissing key holders of state offices. This gave the leaders of Kenya’s 
security agencies and institutions autonomy in decision making which in turn reoriented 
 
107 For instance, under the old constitution the Kenya Police Service was headed by the Commissioner of 
Police who was appointed by the president under the provisions of section 108 of the Constitution of Kenya. 
(The Kenya Police Service 2007, 5) 
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their focus from clamping down on political dissidents to investigating matters of national 
security.   
Even though the 2010 constitution was hailed as the most important political 
development in Kenya’s history since the country’s independence in 1963 (Kramon and 
Posner 2011), it is important to note that it was a product of several years of political 
campaigns for reforms. Within law enforcement, political activists pushed for the overhaul 
of the Kenya police force which was subservient to the office of the president.108  Among 
the changes that were implemented, prior to the promulgation of the new constitution in 
2010, was the recreation of the Special Branch which was infamous for the detention and 
torture of political activists during Moi’s presidency. The Special Branch was first created 
as the intelligence-gathering arm of the Criminal investigations Department (CID) charged 
with investigating Mau Mau activities and any other threats to the colonial government in 
Kenya in 1952 (Anderson 2017). 109  In 1998, it was renamed the National Security 
Intelligence Service (NSIS) before its name was changed to the National Intelligence 
Service (Boinett 2009).  
The establishment of the NSIS led to much needed reforms in Kenya’s intelligence-
gathering agency. In December 1998, Kenya’s parliament passed the National Security 
Intelligence Service Act, 1998 which came into operation on January 19, 1999. Soon after, 
the professionalization of the NSIS began under the leadership of Brigadier (Rtd) Wilson 
Boinett. The NSIS was separated from the Kenya police force and Boinett oversaw the 
 
108 The office of the Attorney General and the judiciary were also targeted for reforms.  
109 Each police force in British colonies had a Special Branch. However, the way they were deployed varied 
from one colony to another.    
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relocation of about 170 Special Branch officers to the Kenya police force after they were 
deemed unfit to be intelligence officers (Boinett 2009).  
The redeployment of intelligence officers was probably done because of concerns 
that had been raised about the conduct of Special Branch intelligence officers. During a 
parliamentary debate on the National Service Intelligence Bill Anyang Nyong’o, who was 
a member of Kenya’s opposition at the time and a vocal critic of the Moi regime, stated:  
The title of this Bill, which will be an Act reads: National 
Security Intelligence Service. I hope it will indeed be a 
National Security Intelligence Service because the manner 
in which the security system has extracted information from 
innocent citizens like myself in the past has been in the least 
intelligent version. I do hope that this body will be divorced 
from the political wing of the government. I also hope that it 
will serve the Republic of Kenya professionally, 
intelligently and with competence. I hope that the archaic 
method of extracting information from citizens through 
torture and intimidation will definitely not be part of 
intelligence gathering anymore. I do hope that as the House 
puts a stamp of approval on this Bill which will become an 
Act, that stamp of approval will be a strong message to the 
Executive that from now on the intelligence wing of the 
government will be intelligent. I hope that it will be impartial 
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in serving both those who agree with the government and 
those who stand, as a matter of principle, in critic to the 
policies of that government (Republic of Kenya. Parliament. 
December 10,1998, 2844).  
Other opposition members expressed similar sentiments and demanded that intelligence 
officers who were implicated in the suppression and torture of dissidents and other innocent 
Kenyans should be weeded out of the new intelligence body before it became operational 
(Republic of Kenya. Parliament. December 10, 1998, 2844).  
The reforms that were started in the 1990s got a major boost when the 2010 
constitution was promulgated on August 27, 2010. The 2010 constitution provided a 
framework for significant reforms in Kenya’s security agencies and institutions. The key 
objective of the reforms was to infuse credibility and professionalism in the agencies and 
institutions. The 2010 constitution also identified national security as an important 
component of governance in Kenya. It established the National Security Council (NSC) as 
the country’s topmost security organ, making it possible for the Chiefs of security agencies 
and institutions to have direct dialogue about security matters with the president.  
The NSC 
The NSC exercises a supervisory role over Kenya’s national security organs namely; the 
National Intelligence Service, the Kenya Police Service and the Kenya Defence Forces. It 
is made up of the President, the Deputy President, the Secretary for Internal Security, the 
Secretary for Defence, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, the Chief of the Kenya Defence 
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Forces, the Director General of the National Intelligence Service, the Attorney General and 
the Inspector General of the Kenya Police Service. Article 240 (6) of the Constitution of 
Kenya (2010) states that the NSC’s key responsibilities are to:   
a) Integrate the domestic, foreign and military policies 
relating to national security in order to enable the 
national security organs to cooperate and function 
effectively; and; (b) Assess and appraise the objectives, 
commitments and risks to the Republic in respect of 
actual and potential national security capabilities. (The 
Constitution of Kenya 2010, article 240 [6]). 
The provisions in the Constitution of Kenya (2010) as well as other parliamentary 
Acts make the NSC the most powerful security institution in Kenya. However, Kenya’s 
constitution also has provisions that allow Kenya’s parliament to scrutinize the NSC’s 
functions and policies. Article 240 of the constitution states that the NSC should present 
an annual report to parliament on the status of security in Kenya. This gives Kenya’s 
parliament oversight over the security policies that the NSC develops which is in line with 
efforts to promote accountable practices in Kenya’s security agencies and institutions. 
Furthermore, Article 239 (3) of the Constitution of Kenya (2010) states: 
In performing their functions and exercising their powers, 
the national security organs and every member of the 
national security organs shall not (a) act in a partisan 
manner; (b) further any interest of a political party or cause; 
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or (c) prejudice a political interest or political cause that is 
legitimate under this Constitution or an Act of Parliament 
(The Constitution of Kenya 2010, Article 239 [3]).    
These provisions not only compel office holders in security agencies and 
institutions to act with integrity, but also provide a basis through which any unsavoury 
behaviour, on the part of Kenya’s security agencies and institutions, can be questioned and 
legally challenged. The Constitution of Kenya (2010) and other Acts of parliament also 
provide clear guidelines on the functions of each security organ in the NSC as well as the 
procedures that are to be followed when appointing and dismissing the office holders of 
the security organs.  
National Intelligence Service 
According to the National Intelligence Service Act, 2012, the National Intelligence 
Service’s key function is to gather, analyse and share “security intelligence and 
counterintelligence to enhance national security in accordance with the Constitution” 
(National Intelligence Service Act 2012, part II section 5[1]). In addition to this, the 
National Intelligence Service advises the president and the government on how to address 
“any threat or potential threat to national security” (National Intelligence Service Act 2012, 
part II section 5[1c]) and makes “recommendations to the NSC on policies concerning 
security intelligence” (National Intelligence Service Act 2012, part II section 5[11]).   
At the helm of the National Intelligence Service is the Director General who is 
appointed from top-ranking personnel from the Kenya Defence Forces. The Director 
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General oversees the operations and administration of the National Intelligence Service 
and is the principal advisor to the president and Cabinet on matters related to national 
security (National Intelligence Service Act 2012).  Unlike its predecessor, the Special 
Branch, which operated under a presidential charter, the National Intelligence Service is 
subject to parliamentary oversight. It is not beholden to the wishes of the president and is 
mandated to operate within the limits prescribed in the 2010 constitution and National 
Intelligence Service Act, 2012. For instance, even though the president appoints the 
Director General of the National Intelligence Service, the appointment is subject to 
parliamentary approval.  Furthermore, Article 238(b) of the 2010 constitution led to the 
creation of an Intelligence Service Complaints Commission that caters for: 
 
Any party that may be aggrieved by the actions of the 
Director General or any member of the Service. The 
Intelligence Service Complaints Commission, which is 
chaired by a person with qualifications of a High Court 
Judge, is mandated to inquire into complaints against the 
Service and has the powers of the High Court to summon 
witnesses, administer oaths, and order the production of any 
documents relevant to the investigation (National 
Intelligence Service 2014, para. 10).  
 To ensure accountability and transparency, the Intelligence Service Complaints 
Commission Board is made up of members who are appointed by the Cabinet Secretary for 
Internal Security upon recommendation from the Public Service Commission. The Public 
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Service Commission’s nominees must comprise of a chairperson who qualifies to be a 
judge of the High Court and four other members who must include: 
1) A person nominated by the Kenya National Human 
Rights Commission; 2) an advocate of not less than 
seven years standing; 3) a retired senior intelligence 
officer; and 4) a person who has at least seven years’ 
experience in public service (National Intelligence 
Service 2014, para. 10).  
 To a large extent, the provisions in Kenya’s 2010 constitution transformed the image of 
the National Intelligence Service from an agency whose key objective was to stifle political 
dissent to one that could detect and identify critical threats to Kenya’s security. During a 
parliamentary session about the mandate of the National Intelligence Service, the Minister 
for Trade at that time, Moses Wetangula, reflected on changes in Kenya’s intelligence 
gathering agency. The Minister for Trade stated: 
Previously, the intelligence service better known in those 
days as Special Branch was notorious for doing everything 
but gathering intelligence. They were part of the brute side 
of the police force … Times have changed. The intelligence 
service does not have to man, keep or own cells to 
incarcerate or torture people. They do not have the capacity 
to torment people. All they have is to gather intelligence and 
give early warning to the system, so that we are able to nib 
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in the bud any dangers to our country. Mr. Temporary 
Deputy Speaker, Sir, you have seen what has been 
happening of late. I am sure if the intelligence service 
redoubled their efforts, these young extremists and intolerant 
characters that have been tossing explosive devices in houses 
of worship and social places could be tracked down, arrested 
and stopped (Republic of Kenya. Parliament. August 22, 
2012, para. 23).   
The Minister for Trade’s comments reflected the changing views that several 
members of parliament and cabinet ministers had about Kenya’s intelligence agency. They 
believed that Kenya’s intelligence service was critical to the country’s social, political and 
economic stability. They fully supported the restructuring and expansion of the National 
Intelligence Service which had already began with the recruitment of more than 300 
intelligence officers who were posted to each sub-county in Kenya. Furthermore, as a result 
of reforms that Brigadier (Rtd) Wilson Boinett started when he became the Head of 
intelligence in Kenya, many of the new recruits went through an additional year of training 
with British, American and Israeli intelligence experts (Shaffer 2019; Boinett 2009). 
The professionalization of the National Intelligence Service played a significant 
role in Kenya’s decision to send its military to Somalia in 2011. According to proceedings 
from the Kenya Hansard, Kenya’s decision to send its military to Somalia was based on 
information obtained by the National Intelligence Service. A few members of parliament 
such as Bhoni Khalwale commended the National Intelligence Service for providing 
information that contributed to the Kenya Defence Forces’ success in Somalia when the 
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incursion commenced in October 2011. Khalwale further stated that Kenya’s national 
intelligence agency had demonstrated its competence and professionalism by unearthing 
and stopping several Al Shabaab terrorist plots in Kenya 110  (Republic of Kenya. 
Parliament. August 22, 2012). In this regard, the metamorphosis of Kenya’s intelligence 
agency redirected the efforts of its officers from spying on political dissidents to collecting 
and analysing information that shaped Kenya’s counterterrorism policy. In addition to this, 
securitization actors in Kenya comprising of members of parliament and cabinet ministers 
had a more positive outlook of the National Intelligence Service. They were, therefore, 
more receptive to the intelligence that the agency provided and used it to inform their 
decisions about Kenya’s counterterrorism policy.      
Kenya Defense Forces 
The second security agency that the NSC oversees is the Kenya Defence Forces which is 
made up of the Kenya Army, the Kenya Airforce and the Kenya Navy. Its mandate, 
outlined in Article 241(3) of the Constitution of Kenya (2010) states that the Kenya 
Defence Forces: 
 
(a) Shall be responsible for the defence and protection of the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic; (b) shall 
assist and co-operate with other authorities in situations of 
emergency or disaster and report to the National Assembly 
 
110 Information about some of the terror plots uncovered by the National Intelligence Service is available in 
Appendix 4.  
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whenever deployed in such circumstances; and (c) may be 
deployed to restore peace in any part of Kenya affected by 
unrest or instability only with the approval of the National 
Assembly (The Constitution of Kenya 2010 Article 241 [3]).    
According to the Kenya Defence Forces Act, 2012 (Revised 2016) the Chief of the 
Kenya Defence Forces is responsible for controlling and managing the force; complying 
with any lawful direction issued by the Cabinet Secretary under the authority of the 
President; formulating military policy and strategy in consultation with the Service 
Commanders; providing the Cabinet Secretary and Defence Council with information 
regarding the Defence Forces upon request; and, implementing the deployment of members 
of the Defence Forces when authorized to do so by the National Intelligence Service in 
accordance with all relevant Articles of the 2010 Constitution111 and the Kenya Defence 
Forces Act (Kenya Defence Forces Act 2012). Additionally, the president of Kenya is the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Kenya Defence Forces.  
As mentioned earlier, intelligence about the threat that Al Shabaab posed in Kenya 
prompted the Kenya Defence Forces’ decision to go to Somalia. However, it is not possible 
to give comprehensive details about the intelligence that the NSC or Kenya Defence 
Forces’ received. Intelligence reports and the NSC’s proceedings are not available in the 
public domain due to provisions in Kenya’s Official Secrets Act, 1970 (Revised 2016). 
 
111 Articles 240(8) and 241[3](c) of the Constitution of Kenya (2010) contain the provisions governing the 
responsibilities of the Chief of the Kenya Defence Forces.  
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Despite this, a general understanding of the NSC’s perceptions about terrorism can be 
inferred from statements that its members made in public.  
Several months before the NSC was constituted, Kenya’s Minister for Internal 
Security George Saitoti held a press conference where he told Kenyans that “we cannot run 
away from what is happening in our neighbouring countries and we have to face the fact 
that we have also been a victim of terrorist attacks” (Kenya Citizen TV 2009, 0:53). During 
another press conference on January 16, 2010, the Minister for Internal Security warned 
that there were elements sympathetic to Al Shabaab’s cause in Kenya (KTN News 2010). 
Nine months later, the Minister for Internal Security announced that “[Kenya] had been 
provoked … its territorial boundary had been violated and that it had the right to deal 
effectively with the aggressors [Al Shabaab] wherever they are” (KTN News 2011a, 0:03). 
The last statement was a declaration of war against Al Shabaab in Somalia.  
Kenya’s incursion into Somalia, dubbed Operation Linda Nchi (Operation Defend 
the Nation), was a clear sign that Kibaki’s government had securitized terrorism as an 
existential threat and was willing to use extraordinary security measures to address the 
threat. The decisiveness with which Kenya Defence Forces executed the military offensive 
in Somalia was an indication that Kenya’s military had carefully planned the incursion. It 
also gives insights as to why the NSC securitized terrorism as an existential threat to Kenya 
and pushed for the enactment of counterterrorism laws.  
One of the first objectives of the Kenya Defence Forces was to dislodge Al Shabaab 
from Hoosingo, a town that is in the Juba region of Somalia. Hoosingo was strategically 
important to Al Shabaab in two ways. First, the town acted as “a gateway for goods from 
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Kismayo using the Kismayo-Bagdad-Hoosingo-Amuma route and the Kismayo-Bagdad-
Hoosingo-Degalema route” (Kenya Defence Forces 2014, 175). It was in Hoosingo where 
Al Shabaab militants collected revenue for the group through taxes that were levied on 
traders who were using the routes. Second, Al Shabaab used Hoosingo as a logistics and 
operational base. The terrain in Ghelef forest, located about 20 kilometres from Hoosingo, 
provided cover for Al Shabaab’s operations against its enemies. Kenya Defence Forces in 
conjunction with the Ras Kamboni Brigade and Somalia’s Transitional Federal 
Government Forces successfully executed the Battle of Hoosingo on April 4, 2012. It took 
slightly over six hours for Al Shabaab to be defeated in Hoosingo (Kenya Defence Forces 
2014).  
The next major offensive that Kenya Defence Forces launched against Al Shabaab 
was in Kismayo. Kismayo was an important financial hub for Al Shabaab and the group’s 
last urban stronghold. It is through the port of Kismayo that Al Shabaab earned millions of 
dollars from Somalia’s charcoal industry. According to estimates, Somalia exported 
approximately USD 500,000 worth of charcoal from Kismayo every month when the port 
was under the control of Al Shabaab (United Nations Security Council 2011c; Kenya 
Defence Forces 2014). Al Shabaab also collected millions of dollars’ worth of taxes from 
businesses that were operating in Kismayo (Ploch 2010). The port was, therefore, integral 
to Al Shabaab’s financial stability. 
  To defeat Al Shabaab in Kismayo, the Kenya Defence Forces launched Operation 
Sledge Hammer on September 25, 2012. The Chief of the Kenya Defence Forces at the 
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time, General (Rtd) Julius Karangi, explained that it was a mission designed to incapacitate 
Al Shabaab’s operations in Somalia. The Chief of the Kenya Defence Forces stated: 
We have been hitting the tail and the body of the Al Shabaab. 
We now want to hit the head and the best weapon to do so is 
a hammer; a sledge hammer. You [Kenya Defence Forces] 
are the sledge hammer which is going to hit the head (Kenya 
Defence Forces 2014, 204).  
 As was the case in other towns, Kenya’s military captured Kismayo from Al 
Shabaab. Kenya Defence Forces’ successive dislodgment of Al Shabaab from towns in 
Somalia were the result of careful planning which required intricate knowledge about the 
terrain that Al Shabaab was operating in as well as intelligence about the threat that the 
military was up against.  A military official who served in Somalia for three years provided 
insights on the intelligence that Kenya’s military gathered on Al Shabaab. The official 
stated that the decision to go to Somalia was based on not less than two years of intelligence 
about Al Shabaab’s objectives and capabilities. The official further revealed that Al 
Shabaab’s objective is not limited to establishing an Islamic state in Somalia. The group is 
also using Somalia as a training ground for transnational terrorists from different parts of 
the world. After training, recruits are dispatched to different parts of the world, including 
Kenya, to wait for instructions on where and how to carry out terrorist attacks (Interview 
with KDF personnel D, November 15, 2017). This information was collaborated by another 
military official who pointed out that by the time Kenya decided to go into Somalia in 
~ 201 ~ 
 
October 2011, Al Shabaab had set up a training camp in Doble, a town that is very close to 
the Kenyan border (Interview with KDF personnel E, November 20, 2017). 
 Kenya’s position that terrorism was an existential threat was re-affirmed in a joint 
communique issued after a meeting held on October 18, 2011 between Sheikh Shariff, the 
president of the TFG at the time, and a Kenyan delegation which included two members 
of the NSC - Kenya’s Minister for Foreign Affairs at the time Moses Wetangula and, 
Kenya’s Defence Minister at the time Yusuf Haji. The communique revealed that Al 
Shabaab had relocated to Lower Juba after the TFG and AMISOM forces pushed them out 
of Mogadishu in August 2011. Al Shabaab’s relocation to Juba posed a serious threat to 
“public safety and security within Kenya [creating] anxiety among the populations and 
negatively [impacting] Kenya’s economy” (Republic of Kenya and Transitional Federal 
Government of Somalia 2011, para. 8).  This statement echoed a pledge that Kenya’s 
Foreign Affairs Minister had made about two weeks before the joint communique was 
issued. On October 2, 2011, the Minister for Foreign Affairs told reporters that “Kenya will 
defend its people and its visitors without any compromise and terror groups from Somalia 
will be pursued anywhere and everywhere.”   He further stated, “I seat in the National 
Security Council and we can say very loudly and clearly, enough is enough!” (KTN News 
2011b, 0:10). These statements encapsulated the NSC’s position that terrorism was an 
existential threat to Kenya and that the government would use extraordinary security 
measures to address the threat.  
Kenya’s military incursion into Somalia was the first extraordinary step that 
coalition government took to secure the country against terrorism. The next step was the 
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enactment of a counterterrorism law. During the drafting of the Prevention of Terrorism 
Bill, 2012, members of the NSC expressed their unwavering support for the Bill. Just before 
the Bill was presented to the Cabinet for approval, the Minister for Internal Security George 
Saitoti stated that “the passage of the Prevention of Terrorism Bill will greatly help the 
fight against terrorism” (K24 TV 2012, 1:14).  
After Kenya’s Cabinet approved the Bill, the government steadfastly presented a 
unified position that the passage of the Bill was a critical step in securing the country. 
During a parliamentary debate about the status of security in Kenya, the country’s Prime 
Minister, Raila Odinga, informed parliament that when it came to matters of securing the 
state against terrorism “the government is reading from the same page” (K24 TV 2012, 
1:03). The coalition government’s unified voice in support of extraordinary security 
measures was a big contrast to the disarray witnessed in 2003 and 2006. The shift towards 
support for counterterrorism measures which resulted in the enactment of the Prevention 
of Terrorism Act, 2012 can be attributed to consensus building, among the president, prime 
minister, cabinet ministers and parliamentarians. The intelligence that Kenya’s reformed 
security agencies provided convinced these securitization actors that terrorism was an 
existential threat to Kenya leading to the enactment of counterterrorism measures.    
National Police Service 
The last security agency under the supervision of the NSC is the National Police Service. 
The National Police Service Act, 2011 (Revised 2012) designates the Inspector General as 
the overall and independent commander of all its branches. These include the Anti-
Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU) and the paramilitary General Service Unit (GSU) which are 
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responsible for the police services’ counterterrorism functions. The Inspector General is 
responsible for, among other things, implementing policy decisions, coordinating all police 
operations and advising the government on policing matters and services (The National 
Police Service Act 2011).  
 The ATPU was established in February 2003 with funding from the United States 
East African Counter-Terrorism Initiative and Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program. The 
ATPU’s main roles are to: 
Interdict terrorist activities within the country; investigate all 
terrorism related cases; lead other agencies at all scenes of 
terrorist related incidents; create profiles for suspected 
terrorists and keep an updated databank; share intelligence 
with other stakeholders; review and monitor security of vital 
installations and soft targets and sensitize the public about 
terrorism threats (Directorate of Criminal Investigations 
2015, para. 2). 
 
Working alongside the ATPU is the GSU whose roles include countering terrorism 
activities and insurgencies. Within the GSU is an elite force known as the Recce squad. 
The Recce squad comprises of GSU recruits who demonstrate exemplary skills during 
GSU training sessions. The exemplary recruits undergo further training in Kenya before 
being taken to Israel, the US and the UK for specialized counterterrorism training. Some 
of the skills that Recce squad recruits are trained in include detonating and handling 
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explosives, securing critical installations, sky marshalling and carrying out rescue 
operations (Nyamweya 2019). Because its members receive highly specialized training, 
the Recce squad is highly regarded and compared to other elite forces around the world 
such as the British Special Air Service, the US Delta Force and Israel’s Sayeret Matkal. 
Consequently, the Recce squad’s expertise is reserved for combat operations where other 
police units need the support of a specialized force. The Recce squad can also be deployed 
as an independent combat unit whenever a crisis arises such as the Dusit hotel attack in 
Nairobi on January 15, 2019 (Nyamweya 2019). 
In line with efforts to professionalize Kenya’s security agencies and institutions, 
Kenya’s Police Service went through a series of reforms. The reforms began in 2009 when 
the National Task Force on Police Reforms made recommendations on how to “transform 
the Kenyan Police and Administration Forces into efficient, effective, professional and 
accountable security agencies that Kenyans trust for their safety and security” (Republic of 
Kenya 2009b, 3). The recommendations were later codified in the 2010 constitution and 
other laws that govern Kenya’s police conduct. They included the National Police Service 
Act, 2011 (Revised 2012), the Independent Policing Oversight Authority Act, 2011 
(Revised 2012) and the National Police Service Commission Act, 2012 (Revised 2014).   
The reformed police service is mandated to carry out its duties with “the highest 
possible standards of competency and integrity and respect human rights and fundamental 
freedoms and dignity” (The Constitution of Kenya 2010, Article 244 [d]). To ensure that 
the police service operates in line with the new legal framework outlined in the Constitution 
of Kenya (2010), for the first time in Kenya’s history, an Independent Policing Oversight 
Authority (IPOA) was created in November 2011. IPOA’s key objective is to record and 
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investigate serious injuries and deaths that occur in police custody, carry out independent 
investigations of complaints against Kenya’s police service and monitor police activities 
(IPOA 2019). 
    Working alongside IPOA is the National Police Service Commission (NPSC). 
The Commission’s mandate is outlined in the 2010 Constitution as well as the National 
Police Service Commission Act, 2012. The key functions of the NPSC, as outlined in 
Article 246 of the 2010 constitution, are to recruit and appoint persons in the police service, 
determine promotions and transfers within the police service as well as determine “the 
removal of persons holding or acting in offices within the Kenya Police Service” (The 
Constitution of Kenya 2010, Article 246). 
  According to the Minister for State Provisional Administration and internal 
Security at the time, George Saitoti, transparency in the recruitment and retention of police 
officers was not only done to ensure fairness in the recruitment process, but also to 
transform the culture of Kenya’s Police Service. The Internal Security Minister emphasized 
the importance of having a police service that respected democratic principles and human 
rights stating, “police officers have to learn to be friends of the citizens” (Republic of 
Kenya. Parliament. September 6, para. 233). The Internal Security Minister also assured 
members of parliament that the police training curriculum had been revised to 
“fundamentally ensure that aspects of human rights and democracy are embedded in the 
new curriculum” (Republic of Kenya. Parliament. September 6, 2011, para. 233). 
All these reforms were a big step in the right direction but would have fallen short 
of the Kenyan government’s pledge to undo KANU’s autocratic legacy without reforming 
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other key institutions that worked closely with Kenya’s Police Service. Among them was 
the office of the Attorney General. The provisions in the repealed constitution gave the 
Attorney General discretionary powers that were open to abuse. Indeed, Musila (2007) 
noted that Kenya’s “history is replete with examples of prosecutions conducted for reasons 
other than public interest, thus amounting to political witch-hunts and in some cases to 
settle personal scores” (Musila 2007, 31).  
The 2010 constitution abrogated the draconian provisions by separating the office 
of the Director of Public Prosecution from the office of the Attorney General. Under Article 
157 of the Constitution of Kenya (2010), the Attorney General’s role is limited to giving 
legal advice to the government and representing it in legal proceedings while the Director 
of Public Prosecution is designated as the only office that can launch prosecutions on behalf 
of the state. To prevent the abuse of prosecutorial powers, the Director of Public 
Prosecutions needs to obtain permission from the court to discontinue prosecution and is 
obliged to exercise its powers in the interest of the public and the administration of justice 
(The Constitution of Kenya 2010, Article 157). For the first time in Kenya’s history, the 
safeguards in the new constitution prevented the president from having direct control over 
the Attorney General. Consequently, the president no longer had the power to direct the 
office of the Attorney General to open charges against political dissidents.  
 Although reforms in the police service and other security agencies and institutions 
had not been completed by the time the Prevention of Terrorism Bill, 2012 was tabled in 
parliament, they were perceived as the government’s candid acknowledgement of the 
shortcomings in the way Kenya’s security agencies and institutions operated. Furthermore, 
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efforts to address the shortcomings indicated that the reforms were not just rhetorical. They 
were genuine attempts to professionalize Kenya’s security agencies and institutions. In 
fact, in early 2012, the Panel of Eminent African Personalities that helped to broker the 
power sharing agreement after the 2007 post-election violence and made recommendations 
for the overhaul of Kenya’s agencies and institutions acknowledged that while a lot 
remained to be done, Kenya had made some important institutional reforms since 2008. 
During a press interview in Nairobi on October 11, 2012, Kofi Annan, the Chair of the 
Committee of Eminent Personalities stated: 
Kenya has been struggling to get a new constitution for 
twenty years. Now they have it; the people believe in it; it is 
one of the most progressive constitutions on the continent 
and the envy of many countries. What is important is to give 
it life – to believe in it, to implement it, and implement it 
faithfully” (Office of the AU Panel of Eminent African 
Personalities n.d.,163). 
 
The perceived genuineness of the reforms coupled with constitutional provisions that 
limited presidential powers meant that Kenya’s police service and other security agencies 
and institutions focused on their mandates instead of spending time and resources 
buttressing the office of the president. As a result, they were able to identify terrorism as 
an existential threat and pass on the information to securitization actors in Kenya.  In 
addition to providing the framework for reforming Kenya’s security agencies and 
~ 208 ~ 
 
institutions, the 2010 constitution has several provisions that protect the democratic rights 
of all Kenyans including, a Bill of Rights.  
 Counterterrorism Policymaking and Democratic Rights in Kenya  
As explained earlier, Kenya’s government failed to garner support to enact 
counterterrorism measures in 2003 and 2006 because of concerns that the proposed laws 
would infringe on the democratic rights of Kenyans, particularly Muslims. The challenge 
for the government therefore, was to build consensus around the idea that a balance could 
be struck between national security and democracy. The promulgation of a new 
constitution in Kenya in 2010 provided the rationale that was used to waylay fears that 
enacting counterterrorism measures was akin to eroding the democratic gains that Kenya 
had made when NARC was elected in 2002. Indeed, Article 238(1) of Kenya’s constitution 
defines national security as “the protection against internal and external threats to Kenya’s 
territorial integrity and sovereignty, its people, their rights, freedoms, property, peace, 
stability and prosperity, and other national interests” (The Constitution of Kenya 2010, 
Article 238[1]). Article 238(1)[b] goes on to state, “national security shall be pursued in 
compliance with the law and with the utmost respect for the rule of law, democracy, human 
rights and fundamental freedoms” (The Constitution of Kenya 2010, Article 238(1)[b]).  
Furthermore, the 2010 constitution has an entire chapter112 that is dedicated to the 
Bill of Rights. Article 19(2) of the Bill of Rights states, “the purpose of recognising and 
protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms is to preserve the dignity of individuals 
 
112 Chapter four of The Constitution of Kenya (2010).  
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and communities and to promote social justice and the realisation of the potential of all 
human beings” (The Constitution of Kenya 2010, Article 19[2]). 
Ideally, the Bill of Rights protects Kenyan citizens from “unwarranted interference 
from the state and [provides them with] a legal basis upon which to challenge government 
actions that violate [their rights]” (Kenya National Commission on Human Rights 2011, 
3). Unlike Kenya’s repealed constitution where all citizens’ rights were subject to clawback 
clauses,113 as determined by the executive, the 2010 constitution stipulates that the rights 
of citizens must be upheld and provides specific conditions for limiting the provisions in 
the Bill of Rights. Article 24 of The Constitution of Kenya (2010) provides that:  
A right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights shall 
not be limited except by law, and then only to the extent that 
the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including: 
(a) the nature of the right or fundamental freedom; (b) the 
importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature 
and extent of the limitation; (d) the need to ensure that the 
enjoyment of rights and fundamental freedoms by any 
individual does not prejudice the rights and fundamental 
freedoms of others; and (e) the relation between the 
 
113 Clawback clauses refer to restrictions that are incorporated into human rights provisions which either 
weakens them or renders them null and void.  
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limitation and its purpose and whether there are less 
restrictive means to achieve the purpose (The Constitution 
of Kenya 2010, Article 24). 
The limitations above are guided by what is referred to as the Oakes Test114 which 
sets out the conditions under which rights and freedoms can be limited in a democratic 
state. Essentially, any limitation on the Bill of Rights in Kenya is considered 
unconstitutional and must undergo a process of inquiry, usually through the courts, to 
determine whether it is justified (Kenya National Commission on Human Rights 2011). 
Within the context of counterterrorism policymaking in Kenya, the Bill of Rights 
took centre stage during parliamentary debates on the 2012 Prevention of Terrorism Bill. 
Several members of parliament perceived the Bill of Rights as the panacea that would 
enable Kenya to enact counterterrorism measures as it protected its nascent democracy. 
During his inaugural address as the Minister for Provincial Administration and Internal 
Security Katoo Ole Metito spoke extensively about the protection of human dignity and 
freedom that the Bill of Rights guaranteed to all residents in Kenya, including terrorist 
suspects. He noted that the provisions in the Prevention of Terrorism Bill, 2012 conformed 
to the requirements in the Bill of Rights (Republic of Kenya. Parliament September 26, 
2012, 36-37).  
 
114 The Oakes Test was developed as a legal test during the R v Oakes (1986) case when Canada’s Supreme 
Court had to decide what factors warranted limitations on the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
(Chapman 1986; Golder and Williams 2006). In addition to Kenya, many other states such Australia, South 
Africa and Israel have used the Oakes Test as a model to establish limitations on human rights (Australian 
Law Reform Commission 2015; Peterson 2017; Weinrib 2010).   
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For instance, part IV of the Prevention of Terrorism Bill, 2012 contained a section 
designated as “limitation of certain rights” which laid out the procedures that were to be 
followed before a terrorist suspect’s rights were curbed. The section stated that “subject to 
Article 24 of the Constitution [the Bill of Rights], the rights and fundamental freedoms of 
a person or entity to whom this Act applies may be limited for the purposes, in the manner 
and to the extent set out in this section” (Prevention of Terrorism Act (Republic of Kenya) 
2012, Part IV(35)[1]). Accordingly, limitations on a terrorist suspect’s rights “shall apply 
for purposes of ensuring a) the investigations of a terrorist act; b) the prevention and 
detection of a terrorist act or; c) that the enjoyment of rights and fundamental freedoms by 
an individual does not prejudice the rights and fundamental freedoms of others (Prevention 
of Terrorism Act (Republic of Kenya) 2012, Part IV(35)[2]).  
Given the provisions above, the Internal Security Minister argued that the proposed 
counterterrorism law contained “administrative and judicial mechanisms to ensure that 
[counterterrorism] powers are not exercised in a capricious manner and are subject to 
judicial oversight” (Republic of Kenya. Parliament. September 26, 2012, 36). The Internal 
Security Minister’s observation suggested that the proposed anti-terrorism legislation 
would be applied in accordance with the Oakes Test. Consequently, law enforcement 
agencies would not have the authority to limit anyone’s rights without fulfilling the 
requirements in the law.  
The Internal Security Minister further noted that the main difference between the 
Prevention of Terrorism Bill, 2012, the Suppression of Terrorism Bill, 2003 and the Anti-
Terrorism Bill, 2006 was that the 2012 Bill was being proposed at a time when Kenya had 
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undergone significant reforms in its criminal justice system. The reforms had led to what 
he described as “an advanced judicial system which will not shy away from addressing 
legitimate concerns that may be raised [about Kenya’s counterterrorism law]” (Republic 
of Kenya. Parliament. September 26, 2012, 36). In this context, the Internal Security 
Minister was reassuring Kenya’s lawmakers that despite the similarities in some of the 
provisions in the three anti-terrorism Bills, judicial oversight would prevent and redress 
any legal abuses that arose from the proposed 2012 anti-terrorism law. In the Internal 
Security Minister’s view, it was unlikely that the law would be used to clamp down on 
political dissidents under Kenya’s new democratic dispensation.      
The Internal Security Minister’s arguments resonated with several members of 
parliament. Gitobu Imanyara, a human rights lawyer who was arrested and detained in the 
1990s for publishing critical articles about the Moi regime was among leaders who 
supported the Prevention of Terrorism Bill, 2012.115 Speaking in parliament, Imanyara 
stated: 
Had this Bill come during the era of the old constitution, I 
would have opposed it. Fortunately, we are living under a 
new dispensation. The new constitution has extensive 
provisions for the guarantee and protection of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms of Kenyans. Had this Bill come 
during the old constitution, I would have agreed with our 
 
115 On March 1, 1991, Gitobu Imanyara who was then the editor of The Nairobi Law Monthly was arrested 
in his office in Nairobi and taken to an undisclosed location. Imanyara spent more than two years in a 
maximum-security prison for publishing material that criticized the Moi government. The High Court 
awarded him Ksh. 15 million (USD 146, 462) for unlawful detention in 2013 (Amnesty International 1991; 
KTN News Kenya 2013).      
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Muslim brothers and sisters that this is a Bill we should have 
opposed. But given the guarantees that are contained in the 
new constitution, given the institutions that have been 
created under that constitution … I see absolutely nothing 
wrong in supporting this Bill (Republic of Kenya. 
Parliament. September 26, 2012, 37). 
 Like Imanyara most members of parliament were optimistic that the proposed 
counterterrorism law would comply with the human rights provisions in the 2010 
constitution even when inconsistencies were highlighted in the Bill. A few members of 
parliament pointed out that some sections of the Prevention of Terrorism Bill, 2012 were 
vague and too broad. For instance, Millie Odhiambo, an outspoken lawyer and human 
rights activist, noted that the proposed law did not specify the conditions under which law 
enforcement officers could conduct searches without acquiring a warrant (Republic of 
Kenya. Parliament. September 26, 2012, 47). The concerns that she raised about the 2012 
Bill were similar to concerns that had been raised about proposed anti-terrorism laws in 
2003 and 2006. In 2006, for example, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Protection and 
Promotion of Human Rights while Countering Terrorism wrote a letter urging the Kenyan 
government to reconsider some of the sections in the Anti-Terrorism Bill, 2006.  Among 
the concerns raised in the letter was the vagueness of the clause that enabled law 
enforcement officers to search a terrorist suspect without a warrant (United Nations 2007, 
22).  
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As discussed, some of the concerns that had been raised about proposed anti-
terrorism laws in Kenya in 2003 and 2006 were not resolved in 2012. Nevertheless, 
members of parliament in Kenya assented to the Prevention of Terrorism Bill. Many of 
them, such as Millie Odhiambo, described the Bill as a very good law because of the 
provisions that guaranteed the protection of individual rights and freedoms in Kenya’s 
constitution (Republic of Kenya. Parliament. September 26, 2012, 47). Others including 
the Minister for Justice, National Cohesion and Constitutional Affairs Eugene Wamalwa, 
the Minster for Energy Maalim Mohammed and the Minister for Defence Yusuf Haji 
praised the Bill for finally providing Kenya with the legal framework that was crucial to 
countering terrorism (Kenya parliament September 26, 2012, 36-52).  
 Ultimately, Kenya enacted counterterrorism measures because its president, prime 
minister, cabinet ministers and parliamentarians agreed that democratic changes in Kenya 
provided an environment in which counterterrorism measures and human rights could co-
exist. This finding raises an important question about the effects of democracy on 
counterterrorism policymaking in Kenya and beyond.  
 
Several studies have pointed out that Kenya did not enact counterterrorism 
measures in 2003 and 2006 because its leaders wanted to protect the country’s emerging 
democracy (Whitaker, 2007; 2008; 2010; 2014; Lind and Howell, 2010; Mogire and 
Mkutu, 2011).  While the arguments in these studies are probable, the findings of this study 
show that Kenya’s leaders enacted counterterrorism measures because the country had 
instituted changes that introduced and reinforced democratic values. The changes were 
founded on Kenya’s 2010 constitution.  Therefore, democracy not only inhibits but also 
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facilitates the enactment of counterterrorism measures that may undermine democratic 
values.    
Conclusion 
Perceptions about Kenya’s security agencies and institutions as well as their ability to 
influence security policy decisions had a profound impact on the securitization of terrorism 
as an existential threat and the enactment of security measures in Kenya. Prior to the 
promulgation of the Constitution of Kenya (2010) Kenya’s security agencies and 
institutions were perceived as oppressive tools that were used to protect the despotic 
regimes of Kenyatta and Moi. Kenyatta and Moi instigated a series of constitutional 
amendments that usurped the independence and eroded the credibility of security agencies 
and institutions in Kenya. A consequence of this was that both Kenyatta’s and Moi’s 
legacies were permeated with cases of using security agencies and institutions to torture, 
arrest, intimidate and detain political activists or anyone who was perceived as a threat to 
their presidency.  
Although NARC’s election victory in 2002 was widely welcomed as a new start 
for Kenya, reality soon set in as Kibaki’s government grappled with some of the same 
problems that had afflicted Kenya during KANU’s 40-year autocratic rule. Among the 
problems was in-fighting among ministers in Kibaki’s government which eventually split 
NARC into two major camps – one that supported Kibaki and another that was aligned to 
Raila Odinga. The rift between the two leaders not only weakened NARC’s capacity to 
build consensus on issues of security policy, such as the Suppression of Terrorism Bill, 
2003 and the Anti-Terrorism Bill, 2006, but also led to bitterly contested elections in 2007. 
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Soon after the election results were announced, pro-Kibaki and pro-Odinga supporters 
went on the rampage – killing, maiming and destroying the property of anyone who was 
suspected of supporting the opposing side.  
Violence was eventually quelled and Kibaki and Raila Odinga formed a 
government of national unity under the watchful eye of the AU Panel of Eminent 
Personalities. In addition to agreeing to share power, Kibaki and Raila Odinga pledged to 
institute reforms that would address the issues that had contributed to the cycle of post-
election violence in Kenya among other vices. A new constitution that was founded on 
democratic ideals was fronted as the foundation for reforms. The new constitution which 
was promulgated in 2010 introduced substantive changes to Kenya’s security agencies and 
institutions enabling them to carry out their mandates rather than focus on the whims of an 
autocratic president as had been the case in the past. As a result, the security agencies and 
institutions, most notably the National Intelligence Service, were able to present 
intelligence about the terrorist threat that supported the coalition government’s assertion 
that terrorism was an existential threat to Kenya. Consequently, Kibaki, Raila Odinga and 
their Cabinet were able to successfully securitize terrorism as an existential threat and build 
consensus among members of parliament in support of enacting counterterrorism 
measures.    
The 2010 constitution also included a Bill of Rights. Members of the coalition 
government viewed the Bill of Rights as a panacea that would enable them to act tough on 
terror and safeguard Kenya’s emerging democracy. The confidence that Kenya’s 
parliamentarians had in the guarantees that were outlined in the Bill of Rights made many 
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of them oblivious to the similarities between the 2012, 2006 and 2003 anti-terrorism bills. 
As a result, some of the issues that contributed to the rejection of anti-terrorism bills in 
2003 and 2006 were ignored in 2012, leading to the enactment of the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act.  
In retrospect, Kenya’s law enforcement agencies have been criticized for violating 
human rights with many critics laying blame on the country’s Prevention of Terrorism Act, 
2012. While Kenya’s anti-terrorism law, like many others around the world, does not 
epitomize democratic principles, it is not the cause of human rights violations in Kenya. 
The culture of impunity and disregard for the law, among several Kenyan law enforcement 
officers, is the main culprit of human rights violations in counterterrorism policing.  Simply 
watering down Kenya’s counterterrorism law will not stop human rights violations such as 
torture and the extra-judicial killing of terrorist suspects. Instead, law enforcement officers 
should be compelled to work within the law and those who do not should be held 
accountable for their actions.     
 
It is also important to note that the consensus which led to the enactment of anti-
terrorism legislation in 2012 disintegrated as it became clear that respect for fundamental 
rights and freedoms was not the guiding principle of counterterrorism measures in Kenya.  
In 2014, Kenya’s government introduced new anti-terrorism provisions that gave greater 
powers to law enforcement agencies. They included a provision that banned the publishing 
or broadcasting of “insulting, threatening or inciting material and images of injured or dead 
people that could cause fear” (BBC  2014, para 9). While the new provisions were passed, 
albeit, amidst chaos in parliament, it was soon challenged at Kenya’s Hight Court. Among 
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those who challenged the new provisions were Kenya’s former Prime Minister Raila 
Odinga and the former Minister for Foreign Affairs, Moses Wetangula. Under a new 
opposition party known as the Coalition for the Restoration of Democracy (CORD), 
Odinga led his supporters to the High Court where a case against the new law was filed. 
Odinga and his supporters also pledged to take to the streets if the new law was not 
rescinded. 
While CORD framed its opposition to the new law as a moral undertaking to protect 
Kenya’s democratic principles, it is also likely that the decision to challenge the 
government was part of CORD’s strategy to reinvent itself after losing the General 
Elections in 2013. Hence, the realpolitik that dominated counterterrorism discussions in 
Kenya in the aftermath of 9/11 re-emerged when the national accord and reconciliation 
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Chapter Six 
Kenya’s Emerging Economic Interests: The Lamu Port South-
Sudan Ethiopia Transport Project, Tourism and Oil Discovery 
 
Introduction 
 So far, this thesis has discussed several factors that led to the unsecuritization and 
securitization of terrorism in Kenya. Chapter four focused on the rise of homegrown 
terrorists while chapter five explained how Kenya’s transition from autocracy to 
democracy contributed to the securitization of terrorism as an existential threat. This 
chapter focuses on the last contextual factor that contributed to the enactment of 
counterterrorism measures in Kenya. The main argument in this chapter is that the success 
or failure of a securitization process depends on how securitization actors, especially those 
who hold elective positions, perceive the costs and benefits of enacting extraordinary 
security measures (Schultz 2001; Balzacq 2005; Balzacq, Léonard and Ruzicka 2016).  
While it is difficult to give a precise figure for the cost of security measures, several 
studies indicate that states must allocate a substantive amount of government expenditure 
to counterterrorism activities (Mueller and Stewart 2014; Gold 2004; Dunne and Tian 
2013; Dunne and Nikolaidou 2012; Zycher 2003). Hence, in Kenya’s case, securitization 
actors were faced with the task of justifying the astronomical costs that the government 
was going to incur if it enacted counterterrorism measures.  Even though funding for 
counterterrorism activities can be obtained from taxation revenue, new sources of 
government funding, such as the discovery of oil, incentivises states to spend more on 
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security (Castillo et al. 2001). Consequently, a change in a state’s economic outlook will 
have an impact on the securitization of terrorism as an existential threat and the enactment 
of counterterrorism measures. This chapter investigates the effects that old economic 
interests and new economic developments in Kenya had on the securitization of terrorism 
in the country.  The economic developments that will be discussed are the construction of 
the Lamu Port South Sudan Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) corridor project, tourism and 
the discovery of crude oil in Kenya.      
Lamu Port South-Sudan Ethiopia Transport Project  
In 2009, Kenya’s government embarked on East Africa’s largest infrastructure project 
known as the LAPSSET corridor project. Upon completion, LAPSSET will consist of 
interregional highways, ports, airports, crude oil pipelines, interregional standard gauge 
railway lines and fibre optic cables between Kenya, Ethiopia and South Sudan. On a 
grander scale, LAPSSET will open up a new gateway between East Africa and other parts 
of Africa with its railway lines set to be connected to West Africa’s Doula-Lagos-Cotonou-
Abidjan corridor. It is anticipated that the railway lines will facilitate trade between 
multiple East and West African states by giving businesses in these states access to a 
combined population of approximately 835 million people in the two regions (LAPSSET 
Corridor Development Authority 2017a and b).116 LAPSSET, is also projected to be part 
of China’s One-Belt One-Road (OBOR) initiative that will create approximately USD one 
trillion infrastructural links between Africa, Asia and Europe and enhance trade between 
 
116 In 2015, the African Union endorsed the project as part of its Presidential Infrastructure Championship 
Initiative (PICI). The main objective of PICI is to promote infrastructural development in African states in a 
bid to facilitate economic growth and development in Africa (NEPAD n.d).  
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these regions.  Kenya has been earmarked as the gateway to other African states for this 
project (Cai 2017).    
In addition to the economic benefits that are to be accrued from interregional trade, 
the LAPSSET project is integral to Kenya’s plans to become an industrialized middle-
income state by 2030. A key component of the strategy of achieving middle-income status 
involves developing marginalized areas of the country that colonial and subsequent post-
colonial governments had neglected as discussed in chapters three and four. According to 
the Commission on Revenue Allocation,117 the ten most marginalized counties in Kenya, 
starting from the poorest, are Turkana, Marsabit, Mandera, Lamu, Wajir, Samburu, Isiolo, 
Tana River, West Pokot and Garrissa (Commission on Revenue Allocation 2012, 2018). 
These counties lag behind their counterparts in various socio-economic indicators such as 
infrastructure development, health, security and education. The LAPSSET project is set to 
roll back decades of neglect through the construction of a seamless infrastructure corridor 
consisting of highways and railway lines that either pass through the counties or provide 
connections to roads that lead to the counties.118  
There are also plans to build major cities along the LAPSSET corridor in Garissa, 
Marsabit, Mandera, Lodwar, Moyale, Wajir and Maralal as well as three resort cities in 
 
117 The Commission on Revenue Allocation (CRA), is an independent Commission set up under Article 215 
of the Constitution of Kenya (2010). Its core mandate is to recommend the basis for equitable sharing of 
revenues raised nationally between the national and the county governments, and among the county 
governments (Commission on Revenue Allocation 2018). 
118 For instance, the LAPSSET corridor includes a 2000-kilometer mega highway. Construction of 505 
kilometers between Isiolo and Moyale is complete and this has reduced travel time between Nairobi and 
Moyale to 10 hours down from 3 days. The construction of other sections of the corridor’s road network 
including the 860-kilometer Lamu-Garissa-Isiolo-Lokichar section and the 738-kilometer Isiolo-Lokichar-
Nakodok road are set to be complete by 2020 (LAPSSET Corridor Development Authority 2017a).    
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Lamu, Isiolo and Lake Turkana (LAPSSET Corridor Development Authority 2016, 2017a 
and b). The construction of cities in these counties is projected to create jobs among other 
economic opportunities for the counties’ residents.  
Based on the discussions above, Kenya’s long-term economic interests are tied to 
the successful completion of the LAPSSET project. As Kenya’s president, Uhuru Kenyatta, 
stated during the official opening ceremony of a section of the LAPSSET railway line,119 
“this railway is not just for us. It is for the many … generations that will come after we are 
gone” (Al Jazeera 2017b, 0:36).  Uhuru Kenyatta made this statement to reassure Kenyans 
that the astronomical cost of the LAPSSET project, which was estimated at USD 24.5 
billion (Kabugi 2017), was a necessary trade-off for Kenya’s development and economic 
interests.  
While Kenya had been the trade gateway for goods that were transported within 
East and Central Africa for several decades, it risked losing this strategic and economic 
advantage because its infrastructure was outdated and unreliable. The country’s railway 
system had not been upgraded for close to a century and some of its railroads were 
impassable. As a result, goods within Kenya and other parts of East Africa had to be 
transported by road which was slower and quite costly (LAPSSET Corridor Development 
Authority 2016; Elliot 2016).120 The LAPSSET corridor project gave Kenya an opportunity 
 
119 The Nairobi-Mombasa railway.  
120 For instance, it is estimated that the LAPSSET project will facilitate the transportation of goods by train. 
A train can carry over 200 containers transporting them from the port of Mombasa to Nairobi at a reduced 
time of 8 hours compared to the 24 hours that each highway truck takes to get from the port of Mombasa to 
Nairobi (LAPSSET Corridor Development Authority 2016).    
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to retain its position as East Africa’s preferred transportation hub, improve infrastructure 
within Kenya and attract investment in underdeveloped regions in the country (Kabugi 
2017). Figure 2 below, outlines the areas earmarked for LAPSSET’s infrastructural 





Figure 2: LAPSSET Areas of Development 
 
(The Mipakani Project 2015) 
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Security Threats to the LAPSSET Corridor Project  
Given the cost of its construction and its strategic importance, it was crucial for Kenya’s 
government to successfully complete the LAPSSET project and ensure that it operated 
smoothly. A key component of ensuring LAPSSET’s success was to address any threats 
that could stall the construction of the project or undermine its operations once it was 
complete. By the time the foundation stones for the LAPSSET project were laid in March 
2012, Al Shabaab had carried out two deadly attacks in Lamu - a tourist town at the Kenyan 
Coast which was also the location of LAPSSET’s flagship port. During the first attack, on 
September 11, 2011, a British man was shot dead and his wife was kidnapped when Al 
Shabaab militants invaded their beach hut at the Kiwayu Safari resort in the Lamu 
archipelago (Gettleman 2011; Jones 2011).  The second attack was carried out on Manda 
island, which is also located in the Lamu archipelago. On October 1, 2011, a group of Al 
Shabaab militants kidnapped a Frenchwoman from her house (Rice and Willsher 2011).  
The attacks in Lamu profoundly changed how the town was perceived and added 
to fears that Al Shabaab was a serious threat to Kenya’s national interests. Lamu lost its 
reputation as a safe and serene tourist destination and several countries including the United 
States, Britain and Australia issued travel warnings against non-essential travel to the 
region. The travel warnings sparked an exodus from Lamu. Within days of the advisories, 
several tourists, in Lamu and other surrounding coastal areas in Kenya, checked out of their 
hotels and boarded planes back to their countries. Furthermore, hotels in Lamu received 
cancellations and had to lay off hundreds of staff as tourist numbers dwindled (ABC News 
2011; Chonghaile 2011; BBC 2011).  
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The attacks not only threatened the recovery of Kenya’s tourism sector which had 
slumped after the 2007 post-election violence but also raised questions about the viability 
of constructing a major infrastructural project that passed through areas that were 
vulnerable to Al Shabaab attacks. The kidnappings drew the world’s attention to the 
proximity between Al Shabaab’s areas of operation, in Somalia, and LAPSSET’s proposed 
areas of infrastructural development along Kenya’s Eastern border. Lamu, for instance, is 
only 129 kilometres from Kolbio in Somalia where Kenya Defence Forces uncovered an 
Al Shabaab hideout during a military operation in November 2013 (Kenya Defence Forces 
2014; Barnett 2018).  
Garissa, another county in Kenya that was selected as one of the locations for a 
major city under LAPSSET’s city development plan, is close to several towns in Somalia 
where Al Shabaab had set up logistics and operational bases. The towns, which include 
Hoosingo, Kismayo, Fafadun, Afmadhow, Miido, Harbole, Biibi, Sooyac and Jana 
Cabdalla, are all between 212 kilometres and 438 kilometres from Garissa county. The 
proximity of Garissa to these towns may explain why Al Shabaab frequently carried out 
attacks in several parts of Garissa. It was in Liboi, in Garissa county, where Al Shabaab 
carried out its first-known terrorist attack in Kenya on May 31, 2008. Subsequently, 
Garissa county became the target of approximately 40 terrorist attacks out of 99 attacks 
that Al Shabaab carried out in Kenya between May 2008 and November 2012 when Kenya 
enacted the Prevention of Terrorism Act. Indeed, the extent of the threat that Garissa faced 
was revealed in a leaked Kenya National Intelligence Service report which showed that 
approximately two-thirds of the town was under Al Shabaab’s control (Hidalgo 2014). 
Other counties along the LAPSSET corridor that Al Shabaab attacked included Mandera, 
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Nairobi, Marsabit and Wajir (Global Terrorism Database 2018). The map below shows the 
proximity between Al Shabaab’s bases of operation in Somalia and Kenya’s border 
between January 2011 and October 2012.  
 
Given the proximity between Lamu and Al Shabaab strongholds in Somalia, it was 
only a matter of time before the terrorist group carried out attacks on the island as it did in 
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September and October 2011. In response to the attacks Kenya’s president at the time, 
Kibaki, held three National Security Council meetings in October 2011 to discuss the status 
of insecurity in Kenya. The meetings were extraordinary. As the Minister for Tourism, 
Najib Balala, explained “these are not meetings that are held anytime. They were called 
because the economy is under threat and the country’s borders need to be secured” (BBC 
2011 para. 16).  
The Minister for Tourism’s statement reverberated the seriousness with which 
Kenya’s government was treating the attacks possibly because they threatened the 
successful completion and operation of infrastructural projects along the LAPSSET 
corridor. While tourism had always been an important component of Kenya’s economy, 
earning the country about 10 percent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the projected 
economic benefits of LAPSSET were unlike any other economic venture that Kenya’s 
government had undertaken since the country gained independence in 1963. Through 
LAPSSET, infrastructure that transverses over half of Kenya’s landmass was either going 
to be upgraded or constructed bringing with it a plethora of economic opportunities in the 
areas marked out for development as shown in figure 1.  
Considering the scale of infrastructural development, Kenya had to solicit for 
capital to partially fund the LAPSSET project. It was estimated that the full cost of the 
project would be equivalent to at least half of Kenya’s GDP with an initial investment of 
USD 24.5 billion (Kabugi 2017). At the onset, some of Kenya’s development partners 
including China, Japan, India, Qatar, Brazil, the EU and South Korea pledged to contribute 
towards the initial costs of the project. However, by the time LAPSSET was launched in 
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March 2012, these countries had either pulled out of the project or cut down on the amount 
pledged towards the cost of construction (Kabukuru 2016; Achuka 2016; Browne 2016).  
There were several reasons why Kenya’s development partners became cautious 
about the LAPSSET project. First, landowners whose land had been acquired to construct 
infrastructure were dissatisfied with the compensation packages that they had received 
from Kenya’s government. Many felt short-changed and made demands for additional 
payments (Browne 2016). Second, environmental groups were concerned about the effects 
that the project would have on wildlife and plant species in the areas earmarked for 
development. For instance, environmental activists argued that a power plant that was 
being constructed in Lamu would emit smoke with hazardous material which could kill sea 
animals. They also stated that coal dust from the electric plant that was under construction 
in the area might cause serious health diseases among Lamu residents such as cancer 
(Human Rights Watch 2018; Kabukuru 2016; Laurence, Sloan, Weng and Sayer 2015).   
As work to clear land for construction was going on, environmental activists and 
organized groups that represented the interests of landowners held protests in various parts 
of the country.  In Lamu, a group known as Save Lamu persistently protested against the 
project and ultimately took Kenya’s government to court in a bid to stop the construction 
of the coal-fired power plant in the county121 (Brouwer, Hiemstra, van Vugt and Walters 
2013; Bond 2019). Kenya’s government also faced a legal battle from fishermen, in Lamu, 
after they sued the government for loss of livelihood because of the construction of the 
 
121 According to environmentalists, the powerplant would increase greenhouse emissions by up to 700 
percent (Bond 2019). The case was yet to be decided at the time of writing this thesis.  
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Lamu port. 122  The lawsuits and organized protests highlighted the controversies 
surrounding the LAPSSET project and probably made Kenya’s development partners more 
cautious about investing billions of US dollars in the project.  
Notwithstanding the disputes between Kenya’s government on one hand and 
various stakeholders on the other hand, it was the perennial Al Shabaab attacks, in Kenya, 
that dampened confidence in the LAPSSET project. A study that looked at the impact of 
terrorism on FDI in Kenya showed that foreign investor confidence decreased whenever 
terrorism incidences occurred in the country (Kinyanjui 2014). It is, therefore, likely that 
potential investors were sceptical about Kenya’s capacity to secure infrastructure along the 
LAPSSET corridor.  
In addition to the pull out of investors, Kenya had to contend with the fact that 
neighbouring states that had agreed to transport their oil through the LAPSSET corridor 
were looking for alternative routes for their products. Uganda which, in 2009, had assured 
Kenya that it would transport its crude oil through the LAPSSET corridor started wavering 
in its commitment to the project and did not attend LAPSSET’s ground-breaking ceremony 
in March 2012.123 South Sudan and Ethiopia, though present during the ground-breaking 
ceremony, were both holding talks with Djibouti about the likelihood of jointly 
constructing an oil pipeline. In September 2012, just five months after the ground-breaking 
 
122 Kenya’s High Court ruled in favor of 4600 fishermen from Lamu county on May 2, 2018, ordering the 
government to pay them USD. 1.76 billion as compensation for loss of livelihood (SABC News 2018).     
123 After Tullow Oil discovered crude oil in Uganda in 2006, Kenya and Uganda came to an agreement that 
Uganda’s oil would be transported through the LAPSSET corridor. However, Uganda changed its mind 
because of the persistent terrorism attacks in Kenya. At the time of writing this thesis Uganda had signed an 
agreement with Tanzania to construct a Uganda-Tanzania crude oil pipeline (East African Crude Oil Pipeline 
n.d; Vokes 2012).   
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ceremony in Kenya, the three countries signed an MOU to transport South Sudan’s oil 
using a pipeline that would pass through Ethiopia and Djibouti to the Gulf of Aden (Le 
Billon and Savage 2016; Browne 2015; BBC 2012; Republic of Kenya. Parliament. May 
23, 2012).124  
Like LAPSSET’s potential investors, Uganda and South Sudan were unsure about 
Kenya’s ability to protect itself from Al Shabaab attacks. There were fears that Al Shabaab 
could sabotage LAPSSET’s oil pipelines or attack the Lamu port once it became 
operational. If this were to happen both Uganda and South Sudan, which are landlocked, 
would not be able to export their oil. The seamless functioning of the LAPSSET oil pipeline 
was especially important to South Sudan. In January 2011, South Sudanese 
overwhelmingly voted for independence from Sudan. As an independent state, South 
Sudan considered Kenya, its long-term political ally, to be the preferred route for its oil 
exports as opposed to Sudan, its long-term nemesis (Brosché and Rothbart 2013; Brosché 
2019; Deng 1995). It was also important for the LAPSSET oil pipeline to function without 
any major disruptions because oil was a critical resource that could contribute to South 
Sudan’s economic development. Essentially, neither Uganda nor South Sudan wanted to 
fully commit to the LAPSSET project when it appeared as if Kenya was doing very little, 
if anything at all, about the Al Shabaab threat. As a result, Kenya stood to lose billions of 
dollars’ worth of investment and revenue if it could not demonstrate that it was capable of 
securing LAPSSET’s infrastructure from Al Shabaab attacks. 
 
124 Four years later, on June 23, 2016, Ethiopia and Kenya signed an agreement to construct a product oil 
pipeline from Lamu port to Addis Ababa via Isiolo, Nakuru and Moyale. While Ethiopia will go ahead with 
plans to construct an oil pipeline with Djibouti the pipeline that will link Kenya and Ethiopia is still important 
because it will serve the Southern part of Ethiopia. The Ethiopia-Djibouti pipeline will transport oil to the 
Northern part of Ethiopia (LAPSSET Corridor Development Authority 2017).  
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In addition to serving as a route for its neighbours’ oil exports, LAPSSET became 
a means through which Kenya could transport oil that was discovered in Turkana county 
in 2012. The oil discovery added another impetus for Kenya to go ahead with the LAPSSET 
project. Now that Kenya had struck oil, it could confidently construct an oil pipeline for its 
own use. Soon after the oil discovery in Turkana a consortium made up of the government 
of Kenya, Tullow Oil Kenya, Africa Oil Turkana Limited and Total Oil signed an 
agreement to construct an underground crude oil pipeline from Lokichar, in Turkana 
county, to the Lamu port (LAPSSET Corridor Development Authority 2017; Kazungu 
2018).125  
The discovery of oil, in Kenya, also provided compelling reasons that could be used 
to justify the need for counterterrorism measures. Kenya had to ensure that it had put in 
place adequate security measures to protect its oil installations and infrastructure from Al 
Shabaab attacks. According to Lee (2018) and Tichý (2019) oil producing countries are 
vulnerable to terrorist attacks because of the strategic and economic importance of oil 
infrastructure. Attacking workers in the oil industry as well as sabotaging oil pipelines, 
refineries, tankers or oil fields could have a devastating impact on a country’s geopolitical 
interests.  
Moreover, a country’s oil infrastructure is more likely to be attacked when there 
are underlying grievances that can be used to entice local populations to join and support 
terrorist groups or carry out attacks on behalf of the groups (Lee 2018; Piazza 2016; Jones 
 
125 The construction of the pipeline was ongoing at the time of writing this thesis. According to the LAPSSET 
Corridor Development Authority (2017), the construction of the pipeline will begin in 2022 after the 
completion of three berths at the Lamu port.    
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2012; Yetiv 2011). For instance, groups that used terrorism tactics in Aceh province in 
Indonesia (Piazza 2016; Lund 2018; Chalk 2001), the Niger Delta in Nigeria (Tella 2018) 
and Cabinda province in Angola (Bassil, Hamadi and Bteich 2018) claimed that the 
terrorist attacks were carried out to retaliate against governments that marginalized locals 
living in the resource-rich regions.126    
As discussed in chapter three, home-grown terrorists were on the rise in Kenya. 
There was significant evidence that young Kenyans, from across the country, were going 
to Somalia to be trained as Al Shabaab operatives before crossing back into Kenya to carry 
out terrorism activities (Anderson and McKnight 2015). In many cases, Al Shabaab recruits 
from Kenya were crossing into Somalia via Lamu where recruiters provided them with a 
haven to recuperate before they embarked on the next phase of their journey. The presence 
of Al Shabaab operatives in Lamu and their intentions towards the LAPSSET project came 
to light when graffiti stating “Boko Haram ndio njia (Boko Haram is the way)” was sprayed 
across the walls of Lamu Fort127 (Jorgic 2014 para. 28). Even though Boko Haram is not 
the main protagonist in the Niger Delta conflict, the connotation of the message was that 
locals, in Lamu, should be prepared to engage in acts of terrorism that were similar to those 
that were taking place in the Niger Delta.  
As discussed earlier on in this chapter, the first known attack in Lamu happened in 
September 2011 which was about four months after Kenya’s government released the 
 
126 Aceh province in Indonesia has one of the largest natural gas reserves in the world as well as crude oil.  
The Niger Delta in Nigeria is the location of Nigeria’s crude oil reserves and Cabinda province is the location 
of 70% of Angola’s crude oil reserves.    
127 Lamu Fort is a two-storey fortress that was constructed in the early 1800s. It is an important historical 
building and part of Lamu’s tourist attractions.  
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LAPSSET Corridor and New Lamu Port Feasibility Study and Master Plans Report128 
(Government of Kenya and Japan Port Consultants Limited 2011). From that point on 
Lamu, which had not been an Al Shabaab target since the group started carrying out attacks 
in Kenya in 2008, experienced several well-planned and coordinated terrorist attacks. 
While some analysts have argued that the attacks in Lamu were carried out to retaliate 
against Kenya’s incursion into Somalia (Lind, Mutahi and Oosterom, 2017), the timing of 
the attacks and the discovery of what appeared to be an Al Shabaab village in Boni forest 
in Lamu county give further insights about Al Shabaab’s intentions in Kenya and the reason 
why Kenya enacted counterterrorism measures.  
First, several studies indicate that terrorists select their targets based on their 
economic significance (Ender and Sandler 2012; Hausken 2018). Since Al Shabaab attacks 
in Lamu began before Kenya’s incursion into Somalia, it is more probable that Lamu 
became a target because its importance to the Kenyan economy increased once the county 
was identified as the location for LAPSSET’s flagship port. As previously discussed, 
LAPSSET was Kenya’s most important economic project since the country became 
independent in 1963. Furthermore, the areas earmarked for development along the 
LAPSSET corridor were vulnerable to Al Shabaab attacks. Consequently, it made sense 
for Kenya’s government to enact extraordinary security measures to protect the LAPSSET 
project from Al Shabaab attacks.  
Second, the LAPSSET project symbolized a new phase in Kenya’s development 
strategy, whereby, regions which had been neglected in the past would be incorporated into 
 
128 The report was released in May 2011. 
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the Kenyan economy. In this context, LAPSSET counteracted Al Shabaab’s messages to 
potential recruits in Kenya. As discussed in chapter four, several young people from Isiolo, 
Garrissa, Marsabit, Lamu, Mandera, Wajir and many other regions in Kenya joined Al 
Shabaab because they believed that they came from regions or communities that were 
economically marginalized (Botha 2014). The Al Shabaab recruits were spurred on by 
radicalization conduits, such as Rogo, Makaburi and Ali, who coalesced them as a 
persecuted group of young Kenyans whose economic conditions emerged from decades of 
government neglect and marginalization. Terrorism, therefore, became a method through 
which radicalized young Kenyans retaliated against a state that they believed was 
responsible for their socio-economic problems. While LAPSSET is not a silver bullet for 
curbing radicalization in Kenya, it could address some of the economic grievances that 
terrorist groups, such as Al Shabaab, have used to lure recruits and justify terrorism attacks 
in Kenya.  
Indeed, despite disagreements between Kenya’s government and groups that 
protested against the LAPSSET project, communities that lived along the LAPSSET 
corridor were optimistic that the project would improve their livelihoods. As one of the 
masons in Lamu stated after Al Shabaab claimed responsibility for killing over 60 people 
in Mpeketoni,129 “Our future hinges on getting our port … but if there is no peace here how 
can the Lamu port work out? I am very worried” (quoted in Jorgic 2014, para. 4). The high 
stakes placed on the Lamu port as the focal point of the LAPSSET project drew Al 
Shabaab’s attention to Lamu county. It is likely that Al Shabaab made the decision to carry 
 
129 Mpeketoni is a town in Lamu county.  
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out attacks in Lamu as a strategy to derail and eventually stop the construction of the port. 
Afterall, without the Lamu port Kenya would not be able to develop its marginalized 
counties or become a regional transportation hub as envisioned in the LAPSSET project 
development plan.   
The creation of Al Shabaab camps, in Lamu’s Boni forest, where the militants lived 
with their families further demonstrated Lamu’s, and Kenya’s, vulnerability to Al Shabaab 
attacks. The militants in the camps were members of Jaysh Al Ayman130 (Army of the 
Faithful), a military wing in Al Shabaab, that was created to carry out attacks in Kenya 
(West 2018). Evidence about the group’s origins and intentions were revealed during the 
trial of Malik Jones, a US citizen, who was sentenced to 35 years in prison for providing 
support to Al Shabaab as a member of Jaysh Al Ayman. Jones had travelled to Somalia in 
July 2011 where he was trained for three months before being assigned to Jaysh Al Ayman. 
As a member of Jaysh Al Ayman, Jones revealed that he fought alongside other members 
of the group against the Kenya Defence Forces in the battle of Afmadhow during the first 
year of Operation Linda Nchi131 in late 2011 to early 2012 (United States Department of 
Justice 2018).  
Additionally, Jones’s confession as well as information obtained during 
investigations about Jaysh Al Ayman indicated that the group orchestrated and carried out 
several attacks in Lamu. They included an attack at a bar in Mpeketoni which killed over 
 
130 There are several variations to the group’s name including Jeysh Ayman, Jaysh Ayman Al-Shabaab, Jaysh 
la Imani and Jaysh Ayman Majmo Ayman (West 2018).  
131 The Kenya Defence Forces and Somalia’s Transitional Government Forces launched an offensive to oust 
Al Shabaab from Afmadhow on May 30, 2012 and managed to take control of the town on May 31, 2012. 
An Al Shabaab fighter who was captured during the battle provided intelligence about the group’s activities 
and strategies (Kenya Defence Forces 2014, 188-191).   
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40 people on June 16, 2014 and an attack at a trading centre in Hindi, on July 7, 2014, 
which killed over 29 people (United States Department of Justice 2018; United Nations 
Security Council 2016, 17-18; Al Jazeera 2014; Kenya Citizen TV 2015a). The Monitoring 
Group on Somalia and Eritrea also stated that members of the group took part in the 2013 
Westgate mall attack in Nairobi and the attack at Garissa University in 2015 (United 
Nations Security Council 2016).    
Germany’s investigations into the role of German foreign fighters in Al Shabaab 
corroborates Jones’s and the US Department of Justice’s accounts of Jaysh Al Ayman’s 
activities in Kenya. According to Germany’s law enforcement agencies Andreas Müller 
(aka Abu Nusaybah), a German citizen who converted to Islam, travelled to Somalia and 
joined an Al Shabaab training camp in September 2011. In January 2012, Müller was 
assigned to a group that came to be known as Jaysh Al Ayman (Jokinen 2018; West 2018).  
Although not much is known about Jaysh Al Ayman’s leadership structure, Jokinen 
(2018) suggests that Sheik Ali Mohammed Rage (aka Ali Dhere), Al Shabaab’s 
spokesperson and a member of the terrorist group’s Shura Council, was the group’s leader 
when Müller and Jones became members. It was Ali Dhere who issued several explicit 
statements between 2010 and 2011 urging Al Shabaab’s followers and supporters to carry 
out attacks in Kenya (BBC 2015a).132  
In addition to Jaysh Al Ayman, another Al Shabaab cell referred to as Saleh an-
Nabhan set up camp in Boni forest. The cell is named after Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan133 who 
 
132 Some of the statements included video recordings that featured Müller and Jones. Müller became so 
notorious that Kenya’s government placed a USD 100,000 bounty on him (BBC 2015a). 
133 Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan was the mastermind of the Kikambala hotel attack in Mombasa, Kenya in 2002.  
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was the leader of Al Qaeda in East Africa and a leader in Al Shabaab before he was killed 
in a US airstrike in Somalia on September 14, 2009 (United Nations Security Council 
2012b).  Saleh an-Nabhan was linked to several attacks including: 1) the July 2010 
bombings in Kampala, Uganda, 2) the January 2016 attack at an AMISOM base in Kulbiyo 
near the Kenya-Somalia border and 3) the attack at the Dusit hotel in Nairobi in January 
2019 (Mbaka 2019; Republic of Kenya. Parliament. March 12, 2019). Video footage that 
was released by Al Kataib, Al Shabaab’s media wing, shows Al Shabaab militants driving 
a Kenya police car with an Al Shabaab flag mounted on it and several militants swimming 
in a river in Boni forest (Al Shabaab 2018). The narrator of the video states that Al Shabaab 
will continue its indiscriminate attacks in Kenya. He goes on to state that Osama bin Laden 
sanctioned attacks against civilians in enemy states because “ukafiri unahalalisha damu na 
wala sisi hatutofautishi baina ya raia na mwanajeshi katika kuhifadhi damu… mukitaka 
mwite raia na mukitaka mwite mwanajeshi” (Being a non-believer justifies blood [killing] 
and we will not distinguish between a soldier and a civilian in preserving blood [Muslim 
lives] … it is okay to kill civilians and soldiers (Al Shabaab 2018). The chilling words in 
the video were a clear message that Al Shabaab had set up camp in Boni forest so that it 
could launch attacks against civilians in Kenya.   
  It is likely that Jaysh Al Ayman and Saleh an-Nabhan established settlements in 
the vast 1339 km2 Boni forest134 in 2011 when members of the groups started carrying out 
attacks in Kenya. However, it was not until September 11, 2015 that Kenya Defence Forces 
launched Operation Linda Boni (Operation Defend Boni) to rid the forest of Al Shabaab 
 
134 The Boni forest is part of the Boni National Reserve. It extends from Lamu to Garissa county and is part 
of the Kenya-Somalia border.  
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militants.135 This does not mean that Kenya’s government was unaware of or unresponsive 
to the Al Shabaab threat in Lamu and other parts of the country before the operation was 
launched in 2015. On the contrary, parliamentary discussions, in 2011, which were 
elaborated on in chapter three and four indicate that members of Kenya’s parliament were 
concerned about the presence of Al Shabaab members and supporters in the country and 
the threat that the group posed to Kenya’s economic interests.   
Concerns about LAPSSET’s vulnerability to Al Shabaab attacks were raised when 
a motion to incorporate Kenya Defence Forces as part of AMISOM was tabled in 
parliament on December 7, 2011. Members of parliament, though supportive of Kenya’s 
military incursion in Somalia, wanted to know how Kenya’s government was going to 
protect the country’s economy from homegrown terrorists. For instance, the member of 
parliament for Mathira constituency, Ephraim Maina, pointed out that the government had 
to secure Lamu from terrorist attacks because Kenya’s economic interests hinged on the 
success of the Lamu port. Addressing Kenya’s Minister for Defence at the time, Yusuf 
Haji, the member of parliament for Mathira constituency asked if the government could 
reassure Kenyans that “Al Shabaab is not within our midst” (Republic of Kenya. 
Parliamnet. December 7, 2011, 35) He further stated: “Can this government assure 
Kenyans that what we are doing in Somalia … we are fighting using jets and bombs but 
what have we done about the likely insurgents that may be within us?” (Republic of Kenya. 
Parliament. December 7, 2011, 35).  Other members of parliament including Farah Maalim, 
William Ruto and the Minister for Foreign Affairs at the time, Moses Wetangula, concurred 
 
135 The military operation was launched after Kenya Defence Forces who were investigating a lead that Al 
Shabaab militants were living in the forest stumbled upon their camp. 
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that Kenya’s economic interests would only be achieved if the state also protected itself 
from homegrown terrorist attacks (Republic of Kenya. Parliament. December 7, 2011). The 
sentiments expressed in 2011 marked an important phase in Kenya’s counterterrorism 
policymaking process, whereby, homeland security was identified as the anchor for 
Kenya’s economic interests.  
What followed was the tabling of the Prevention of Terrorism Bill, 2012 as a 
strategy to improve security within Kenya and protect the country’s new economic venture 
– the LAPSSET project. The proposed anti-terrorism law had several provisions that 
expanded the powers of Kenya’s law enforcement agencies allowing them to use security 
measures such as mass surveillance and additional patrols. Accordingly, Kenya’s defence 
budget was set to increase, and it was up to members of parliament to approve the proposed 
budgetary allocations. However, there was no guarantee that parliament would allocate a 
substantive amount of taxpayers’ money to security agencies. 
  In fact, a few months before the Prevention of Terrorism Bill was first read in 
parliament, some parliamentarians objected to the allocation of vast resources to Kenya’s 
security agencies at the expense of other socio-economic needs. On July 27, 2011, a 
parliamentary motion to adopt the Budget and Appropriations Committee’s Report on the 
Estimate of Revenue and Expenditure, 2011/2012 resulted in a heated debate about the 
merits of allocating Ksh. 2.7 billion (approximately USD 26 million) to the National 
Security Intelligence Service when only Ksh. 1 billion (approximately USD 9.8 million) 
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was allocated to the Strategic Grain Reserve. Several members of parliament136  were 
unhappy that in the previous year the Strategic Grain Reserve had an allocation of Ksh. 2.4 
(approximately USD 23 million) which amounted to a reduction of Ksh. 1.4 billion 
(approximately USD 13.6 million) for the 2011/2012 financial year. Those opposed to the 
budget argued that food security was more critical than the intelligence services. They were 
emphatic that “in the hierarchy of needs food is number one and security is number two” 
(Republic of Kenya. Parliament. July 27, 2011, 36). Their views were not swayed even 
after the Minister for Internal Security, George Saitoti, explained that the National 
Intelligence Service needed the money to enhance its intelligence gathering operations 
which were critical to preventing terrorist attacks and other security threats in Kenya.  
Even though those who opposed the allocation of additional resources to security 
activities eventually agreed to the additional spending, the conundrum described above 
shows that contextual factors, which in this case was the allocation of limited resources to 
counterterrorism measures, have an impact on the securitization of a threat. In this regard, 
the Minister for Internal Security had to convince members of Kenya’s parliament that the 
benefits of countering terrorism outweighed the costs of spending resources on 
extraordinary security measures. The projected economic benefits of the LAPSSET project 
provided one of the compelling reasons that was used to justify the economic costs of 
counterterrorism measures. The other was the discovery of oil in Kenya in 2012.  
 
136 Members of parliament who challenged the allocation of more money to the National Intelligence Service 
included John Ng’ong’o the representative for Gwassi constituency, Justus Mugali the representative for 
Shinyalu constituency and Ekwee Ethuro, the representative for Turkana Central constituency (Republic of 
Kenya. Parliament. July 27, 2011).  
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The Discovery of Oil and Counterterrorism Measures  
The discovery of oil, as a new source of revenue, provided additional impetus for Kenya’s 
government to enact counterterrorism measures. In this instance, Kenya’s decision was 
driven by its desire to protect its new precious resource. There was excitement when 
Tullow oil, a UK company that was carrying out oil explorations in Kenya, announced that 
it had struck commercially viable oil in Turkana. Soon after the announcement, the 
Minister for Energy, Kiraitu Murungi, stated that “the oil that was discovered in Uganda is 
much lower than what has been discovered in Kenya” (Opiyo and Wafula 2012, para. 7). 
The Minister for Energy went on to speculate that the oil deposits in Kenya were 
comparable to those in Libya, Iran and the United Arab Emirates (Opiyo and Wafula 2012). 
It was confirmed, a few years later, that the initial estimates of oil production were 
overstated, and that Kenya’s oil reserves were just under one billion barrels137 (Institute of 
Economic Affairs, 2018). Nevertheless, the excitement that the oil discovery had generated 
did not dissipate and provided another compelling reason that could be used to justify the 
enactment of counterterrorism measures.   
Kenya’s behaviour was similar to that of other oil producing states. According to 
Chun (2010), resource-rich states, irrespective of their anticipated levels of oil revenues, 
invest in higher levels of security because they want to protect their resources. Critical 
infrastructure in oil producing states are usually vulnerable to terrorist attacks and there 
were numerous cases that served as examples for Kenya. For instance, oil installations in 
 
137 Kenya’s reserves are meagre when compared to Uganda and Libya which have 6.5 billion and 48.4 
billion barrels of oil respectively (Institute of Economic Affairs 2018).    
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Iraq have been the target of several terrorist attacks which frequently interrupt the 
production and exportation of oil from the country.  In another case, Al Qaeda operatives 
bombed Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq oil field, on February 24, 2006, despite the high level of 
security at the oilfield (Tichý 2019; Masuda 2007; Al Rodhan 2006).  Such attacks, and 
many more, served as stark reminders that states should never take the security of their oil 
facilities for granted.  
Moreover, states with resources, that are within proximity to conflict zones, are 
more likely to resort to extraordinary security measures if other peacemaking strategies 
such as long-term diplomatic efforts fail to yield the desired results (Chun 2010). As 
discussed in chapter three, for several years, Kenya had provided support to the transitional 
government in Somalia hoping that its diplomatic efforts would stabilize the country and 
ultimately weaken Al Shabaab. Furthermore, Kenya had supported groups and states that 
engaged in military campaigns against the UIC and later on Al Shabaab.138 However, peace 
was elusive. Al Shabaab not only continued to operate in Somalia but also established 
terrorist cells in Kenya. Since Al Shabaab had vowed to continue carrying out attacks in 
Kenya, it made sense for the country to boost its security as it prepared to become an oil 
producer.  
There are also indications that Kenya’s government expected to use the revenues 
that it would earn from oil to offset some of the costs of enacting counterterrorism 
measures. This expectation provided another compelling reason that was used to justify the 
 
138 As discussed in chapter three, support was given to Ethiopian forces who passed through Kenya on their 
way to Somalia in 2010. The US also launched several attacks against Al Shabaab from its base in Manda 
Bay, Lamu.    
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enactment of counterterrorism measures. Two major changes in Kenya’s spending patterns 
demonstrate this. First, Kenya’s parliament approved a significant increase in the country’s 
defence budget from USD 587 million in the 2011/2012 budget to USD 821 million in the 
2012/2013 budget when it was announced that oil had been discovered in Kenya. 
Furthermore, an additional USD 156 million was reserved for the National Intelligence 
Service soon after oil was discovered in Turkana (McEvoy 2013, 3-4; Institute of 
Economic Affairs 2013, 7).  This amount was in addition to funding from other sources 
including USD 1 billion from the US government in 2012139 (Stimson Study Group 2018).  
Second, Kenya’s willingness to borrow at an unprecedented rate and get into 
massive debt showed that the government was confident that it would earn enough income, 
in part from oil, to pay off its debts. As discussed above, the oil discovery was hailed as a 
game changer for Kenya’s economic fortunes. Oil, therefore, was not just a valuable 
resource that had be protected but also a source of revenue that could be used to offset the 
costs of securing the state. In Kenya’s case, the discovery of oil in Turkana as well as the 
projected benefits of the LAPSSET project provided the rationale that the government 
needed to justify the sharp increase in defence spending. Although the details of Kenya’s 
debt contracts have never been disclosed, over the years, successive governments have 
repeatedly stated that the LAPSSET project and oil discovery in Turkana will have a ripple 
effect on the economy (Kenya Citizen TV 2019). Hence, Kenya’s president, prime 
 
139 Kenya has been the highest recipient of counterterrorism funding from the US since 9/11 in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Between 2001 and 2017, Kenya received USD 9.2 billion in counterterrorism funding from the US 
government. Other top African states that also received funding during that time were Nigeria which received 
USD 6.1 billion and Somalia which received USD 3.6 billion during that time (Stimson Study Group, 2018).  
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minister, cabinet ministers and members of parliament agreed to enact counterterrorism 
measures in 2012 to protect Kenya’s long-term economic interests.   
 Tourism and Counterterrorism Measures 
 
In addition to securing its new economic ventures, Kenya enacted counterterrorism 
measures to protect its tourism industry. The tourism industry became an integral part of 
Kenya’s economy when the country gained independence. At the time, the bulk of Kenya’s 
foreign exchange was obtained from tea and coffee exports. However, when the 
commodity prices of tea and coffee started declining in the international market, Kenya 
turned to tourism as an alternative source of foreign exchange.  
From 1963, the government embarked on policies that would transform Kenya into 
one of the most popular tourist destinations in Africa. Investors were encouraged to 
construct tourism infrastructure such as resorts and hotels that were designed for a variety 
of tourism experiences (The World Bank 2016). These include safari tours to different 
parks within the country, coastal tours where visitors spend time relaxing in the country’s 
beach resorts and hotels and lastly, business and conference travel, whereby, the country 
hosts international conferences. Kenya’s dedication to its tourism industry is also 
demonstrated through its Wildlife Conservation and Management Act, 2012 (also known 
as the Wildlife Policy Act) which contains provisions that protect wildlife in the country.  
As a result of investments in the tourism industry, tourism became Kenya’s third largest 
source of foreign exchange earnings and contributed to approximately 10 percent of the 
country’s GDP between 1980 and 2015 (The World Bank 2016). Furthermore, the tourism 
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industry accounts for about 11 percent of Kenya’s total formal workforce (Government of 
Kenya 2007).   
In terms of its outlook, the government incorporated tourism into its national 
strategy for economic growth. In 2008, Mwai Kibaki launched Vision 2030 which is a 
strategic plan with various development programs that will propel Kenya into a middle-
income country by 2030. Tourism, was selected as one of six priority sectors that had the 
potential to significantly contribute to the growth of Kenya’s GDP (Vision 2030 Delivery 
Secretariat n.d; Government of Kenya 2007).140  
Despite Kenya’s optimism about the economic potential of its tourism sector there 
were indications that none of the plans in Vision 2030 would materialize if Kenya was 
perceived as an unsafe destination. Studies on the impact of terrorist attacks on Kenya’s 
economy between 2010 and 2013 showed that there was a reduction of approximately 2508 
visitors per year for every casualty in a terrorist attack (Buigut 2018; Buigut and Amendah 
2016). This translated to direct losses of about USD 1.5 million per year in tourism revenue 
(Buigut 2018). To add to this, terrorist attacks could have a long-term negative impact on 
a country’s image as a tourism destination depending on a government’s counterterrorism 
policy. Tourism destinations often experience decline in visitor numbers after terrorist 
attacks but are likely to recover quickly once the crisis is overcome. However, destinations 
that repeatedly experience terrorism attacks with no clear guidelines on how the attacks 
will be prevented are unlikely to recover and the decline in the tourism sector may become 
 
140 The other sectors are agriculture and livestock, wholesale and retail, trade, manufacturing, financial services, 
business process offshoring and IT-enabled services.  
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permanent (Alvarez and Campo 2014, 70). Given the increase in terrorist attacks in Kenya 
coupled with evidence of domestic radicalization Kenya’s government was incentivized to 
enact counterterrorism measures to protect the country’s tourism industry.   
 Conclusion 
Kenya’s decision to embark on the LAPSSET corridor project, the discovery of viable oil 
reserves in Turkana and efforts to protect its tourism industry played pivotal roles in the 
decision to enact counterterrorism measures in 2012. First, the LAPSSET project was the 
biggest economic venture that Kenya had undertaken since the country gained 
independence in 1963 and its success depended on the country’s capacity to demonstrate 
that it could secure LAPSSET’s infrastructure from terrorism threats. LAPSSET’s 
vulnerability to terrorist attacks was laid bare upon the discovery of several Al Shabaab 
camps that were close to areas that had been earmarked for infrastructural development. 
Indeed, an increase in the number of Al Shabaab attacks in some of the areas along the 
LAPSETT corridor, such as Lamu, coincided with the public dissemination of the 
LAPSETT project plans. Kenya’s government, therefore, securitized terrorism as an 
existential threat and enacted counterterrorism measures as part of its strategy to secure the 
LAPSSET project.  
Second, the discovery of oil in 2012 reinforced the need for counterterrorism 
measures. Kenya’s government was wary that Al Shabaab would target the country’s oil 
installations and was determined to protect what it believed was an economic windfall for 
the country. The discovery of oil in Kenya also provided the justification that was needed 
to increase the country’s defence budget. The president, prime minister, cabinet ministers 
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and members of parliament were confident that part of the funds for enacting 
counterterrorism measures would be recovered from Kenya’s future oil revenues. These 
factors led to consensus that enacting counterterrorism measures was a public good that 
was worth its economic costs.  
Third, the negative long-term consequences of terrorism attacks on Kenya’s 
tourism industry were a wake-up call for Kenya’s government. Kenya’s position as one of 
the preferred tourism destinations in Africa was under significant threat from Al Shabaab 
attacks. Not only did the country experience losses in foreign exchange earnings as tourism 
numbers dwindled, other sectors in the tourism industry such as hotels were forced to either 
shut down or lay off workers. It, therefore, made economic sense for the government to 














Overview and Summary  
This research had two main objectives. First, to find out why the Kenyan government failed 
to enact counterterrorism measures between 2001 and 2011 when it had good domestic and 
external reasons for doing so and second, to find out why the Kenyan government shifted 
its position in 2012 and enacted counterterrorism measures. While previous studies 
provided compelling arguments that explained aspects of Kenya’s counterterrorism 
behaviour, they did not explain why those who had previously opposed anti-terrorism 
legislation supported the enactment of a similar law in 2012 even though their views about 
the importance of civil liberties and democracy had not changed. Similarly, previous 
studies which suggested that Kenya enacted anti-terrorism legislation in 2012 because of 
the negative impact that terrorism had on the country’s security and economic interests did 
not explain why these factors did not lead to the enactment of counterterrorism measures 
in 2003 and 2006. 
To narrow the gaps identified in previous studies and extend the findings of these 
studies, this research proposed a hypothesis that was founded on securitization theory. The 
hypothesis stated that Kenya’s enactment of counterterrorism measures depended on 
consensus building among the country’s executive (securitizing actors) and legislative 
(audience) arms of government. Although this research focused on the roles of the 
president, prime minister, cabinet ministers and members of Kenya’s parliament, the role 
of functional actors, including Kenya’s security agencies and institutions, development 
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partners and human rights groups, such as MUHURI and Amnesty International, were 
factored into the analysis. 
However, it is important to note that human rights organizations in Kenya often 
expressed their views about counterterrorism measures through the media or in human 
rights reports, many of which were factored into the analysis of this thesis. Nevertheless, 
the effects of human rights groups’ media briefings about Kenya’s counterterrorism laws 
were not measurable because they never elicited any strong reactions in the masses or the 
political elite. There were a few incidences where a section of Kenyan Muslims carried out 
demonstrations against law enforcement agencies, but such incidences were sporadic and 
did not make direct references to Kenya’s counterterrorism making process. Civil society 
in Kenya was, therefore, not considered to be a critical actor in the country’s 
counterterrorism making process.  
There is also a possibility that a section of civil society lobbied members of Kenya’s 
parliament in attempts to influence their views about counterterrorism measures. This is 
because in a few instances, some members of civil society and members of parliament 
would team-up and publicly support court cases that were filed to challenge aspects of 
Kenya’s counterterrorism measures. However, this was mostly done after the enactment of 
Kenya’s anti-terrorism law in 2012 and was, therefore, not applicable to this research. 
Hence, like Lind and Howell (2010) this thesis argues that the visibility of civil society in 
Kenya’s counterterrorism making process was not pronounced.  
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Findings 
To test the validity of the hypothesis, this thesis proposed six contextual factors that 
contributed to the unsecuritization (lack of consensus) and the securitization (consensus) 
of terrorism as an existential threat. Within the context of unsecuritization, this thesis tested 
whether counterterrorism measures were rejected because of 1) the perception that 
foreigners, who were carrying out attacks against American and Israeli installations in 
Kenya, were the main perpetrators of terrorist attacks in the country; 2) the inability of 
Kenya’s security agencies and institutions to securitize terrorism as an existential threat; 
and 3) the preoccupation of Kenya’s securitizing actors (the president and cabinet 
ministers) with the machinations of power sharing.  
The findings of this research showed that in 2003 and 2006 securitization actors were not 
convinced that terrorism was a serious threat in Kenya. This belief was founded on the fact 
that during that time, Kenya had experienced three major terrorist attacks that were directed 
at Israeli and American installations in the country. Furthermore, most of the perpetrators 
of the attacks were not Kenyan nationals. They were foreigners who, Kenya’s government 
claimed, had entered the country illegally. Hence, the dominant narrative among members 
of parliament and a section of the country’s cabinet ministers was that rather than enacting 
counterterrorism measures, Kenya would be able to protect itself from transnational 
terrorists if it secured its borders and flashed out any aliens who were suspected of 
harbouring ill motives against foreign installations in Kenya. True to form, Kenya’s 
government focused its anti-terrorism activities on matters related to immigration and 
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border security control as it could not achieve consensus to pass anti-terrorism laws in 2003 
and 2006.  
 Kenya’s reaction to terrorism in 2003 and 2006 was not unique. It is not 
uncommon for governments to securitize terrorism as a threat that emanates from outsiders 
- that is, individuals who are born in other states. Several governments focus their 
counterterrorism efforts on either preventing suspicious individuals from entering the state 
or expelling such individuals from the state. The United States for instance, allocates fewer 
resources to countering domestic terrorism when compared to transnational terrorism 
(Rosand 2018). Despite the focus on transnational terrorism, the findings of this study 
indicate that solely focusing security efforts on threats that emanate from outside the state 
is not an effective counterterrorism strategy. Indeed, the belief that foreigners were the 
main cause of terrorism in Kenya inadvertently created a scenario, whereby, very little 
attention was paid to the dangers of homegrown terrorism leading to the radicalization of 
young people from several parts of Kenya.   
Furthermore, the association of foreigners with terrorism, especially individuals 
from Muslim-majority states may make governments derogate from their international 
humanitarian law obligations. In Kenya’s case, the government sealed its borders when 
desperate refugees were fleeing from Somalia in 2006 and 2008 even though Kenya is a 
signatory to the Refugee Convention. Similar approaches towards refugees and asylum 
seekers have been adopted in Belgium, the United States and Israel. The United States, for 
instance, instituted a travel ban on several Muslim-majority states in 2017 despite lack of 
evidence that nationals from the banned states posed a serious threat to US national security 
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interests. This worrying trend where some governments profile vulnerable individuals who 
need humanitarian assistance as terrorist will not secure states against terrorist attacks. On 
the contrary, it provides propaganda material that terrorist groups can use in their 
recruitment campaigns and, therefore, undermines counterterrorism efforts.    
Lack of consensus to enact counterterrorism measures was also a result of 
infighting among leaders in the NARC government. NARC had come to power in 2002 
after a group of 15 opposition parties formed a coalition whose key objective was to make 
sure that KANU, which had ruled Kenya since the country gained independence in 1963, 
did not win the 2002 elections. NARC’s election victory was widely welcomed as a new 
beginning for Kenya. It appeared as if the country was on track to become a prosperous 
democracy. However, cracks started to appear in the coalition almost as soon as the NARC 
government was sworn in. A section of NARC’s cabinet ministers and parliamentarians 
who were allied to Raila Odinga were dissatisfied with the makeup of individuals who had 
been appointed to the Cabinet and selected to head Kenya’s parastatals. Odinga and his 
allies claimed that individuals from Kibaki’s ethnic group were overrepresented on the list 
of appointees.  
The fallout from the appointment of Cabinet and parastatal positions spilled over 
to other policy areas in the NARC government. When the government presented a draft 
constitution to Kenyans in 2005, Odinga and his allies campaigned against it resulting in 
its rejection during a referendum that was held that year. Likewise, Odinga and his allies 
opposed attempts to pass anti-terrorism laws in 2003 and 2006. In 2003, a section of NARC 
cabinet ministers and members of parliament claimed that they would not support a law 
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that threatened the democratic gains that Kenya had made in the preceding years. They 
were also critical of a section of the proposed law which stated that a terrorist could be 
identified from the type of clothing that they were wearing. This, they argued, was 
discriminatory towards Kenyan Muslims. Since the government could not garner support 
for the proposed anti-terrorism law, it was withdrawn. In 2006, Kenya’s government 
proposed another anti-terrorism law. This time around, Kibaki’s government stated that the 
new law had addressed the contentious issues in the 2003 anti-terrorism Bill. However, the 
government withdrew the 2006 Bill before it was debated in parliament.  
The Kenyan government’s quick withdrawal of the 2006 anti-terrorism Bill 
provides insights into the country’s puzzling counterterrorism behaviour that had not been 
explored in previous studies. The 2006 anti-terrorism Bill was proposed on the eve of what 
would become one of the most contentious elections in Kenya’s history. By the time the 
2006 Bill was proposed, NARC had split into two factions led by Kibaki and Odinga. Since 
the two leaders were presidential candidates in the 2007 elections, they used the 2006 Bill 
as a pawn to attract Muslim votes. Kibaki met a few members of SUPKEM and told them 
that he did not support the Bill. The Muslim group that met with Kibaki went on to declare 
that he was their preferred presidential candidate because he cared about Muslims. 
Incidentally, the Muslim representatives who endorsed Kibaki’s presidential bid hailed 
from his home-area in the central part of Kenya.  
No sooner had Kibaki been endorsed by a group of Kenyan Muslims than an 
agreement that Odinga had made with the National Muslim Leaders Forum became public. 
Rather than owning up to the agreement, Odinga tried to downplay it because he was wary 
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of losing Christian votes after the Evangelical Alliance of Kenya criticized the MOU that 
he had signed with a section of Kenyan Muslims. However, in yet another twist of events, 
a group of Christians from Odinga’s home area came out to support his right to enter into 
an MOU with Kenyan Muslims.  In the end, Kenya’s presidential candidates and the 
country’s members of parliament could not have fruitful discussions about the terrorism 
threat that the country faced or the concerns that had been raised about Kenya’s proposed 
anti-terrorism law. From that point on, discussions about policy issues, including the 
enactment of counterterrorism measures, were presented through an ethnic lens. It was, 
therefore, impossible for Kenya’s government which was polarized along ethnic lines as it 
prepared for the 2007 elections, to achieve the consensus that was needed to pass the Anti-
Terrorism Bill in 2006. 
The link between ethnic polarization and policy choices provides an interesting 
approach to understanding counterterrorism policymaking in ethnically diverse states in 
Africa and beyond. While there are several studies about how ethnic identity affects 
preferences for public goods among voters in ethnically diverse states (Easterly and Levine 
1997; Liebarman and McClendon 2012; Alesina, Gennaioli and Lovo 2019), there are no 
studies that investigate how the ethnic affiliation of key government officials influences 
their security policy choices. Factoring in the ethnic identities of members of the legislature 
and cabinet ministers who are involved in counterterrorism policymaking may provide 
greater insights about the securitization of terrorism and enactment of counterterrorism 
measures in other African states.           
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In 2012, Kenya enacted counterterrorism measures when its government garnered 
enough support to pass the Prevention of Terrorism Act.  During the months leading up to 
the enactment of the law, securitizing actors in Kenya, most notably the country’s prime 
minister, Odinga and several cabinet ministers including the Minister for Internal Security, 
George Saitoti, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Moses Wetangula, spoke with 
conviction about the gravity of the terrorism threat in Kenya and the necessity for enacting 
counterterrorism measures. These securitizing actors received overwhelming support from 
members of Kenya’s parliament including individuals who were at the forefront of 
advocating for human rights and democracy during Moi’s despotic rule. Adding to this, 
Kenya’s police commissioner, Mathew Iteere, and the Chief of Kenya Defence Forces, 
Julius Karangi, publicly stated that terrorism was a serious threat in Kenya. The public 
proclamations about terrorism indicated that the country’s securitization actors had 
securitized terrorism as an existential threat.    
Three contextual factors led to the securitization of terrorism. First, Kenya’s 
vulnerability to terrorism attacks increased when Al Shabaab, a terrorist group that 
emerged from the remnants of the UIC in Somalia, started recruiting young Kenyans who 
were trained and radicalized before being sent back to Kenya to engage in terrorism 
activities. At the helm of Al Shabaab’s recruitment process were radicalization conduits 
who galvanized young Kenyans into rebelling and fighting against the Kenyan state. 
Kenyan Al Shabaab fighters were sent back to Kenya as one of three types of 
fighters. The first type of fighters known as the suicide brigade were the most revered. 
They were tasked with carrying out large-scale attacks where they were expected to kill as 
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many people as they could before either being killed or taking their own lives. The second 
type of fighters known as the Amniyat gathered intelligence and offered logistical support 
to other fighters. The third type of fighters, who I refer to as hit-and-run terrorists, carried 
out small-scale attacks before escaping. Given the high number of small-scale attacks in 
Kenya between 2008 and 2012, hit-and run terrorists who went unnoticed before carrying 
out the attacks and seemed to disappear in the aftermath of the attacks were the main 
perpetrators of terrorism attacks in Kenya. This observation supports the argument that Al 
Shabaab attacks in Kenya were mainly carried out by Kenyans who blended into their 
surroundings and knew their way around their targets because they were born and raised 
in Kenya. The presence of homegrown terrorists contributed to the securitization of 
terrorism and the decision to enact counterterrorism measures.   
Even though Kenya’s government recognized radicalization as a serious security 
threat, its counterterrorism policy focused on military and policing strategies to counter 
transnational and homegrown terrorism. During debates about the proposed Prevention of 
Terrorism Bill in 2012, there were hardly any discussions about possible strategies that 
could be developed to prevent the radicalization of young Kenyans. Instead, many 
members of parliament advocated for stringent laws that make it easier for law enforcement 
officers to identify, detain and prosecute terrorist suspects. While law enforcement is an 
integral component of securing the state against terrorist attacks it must be accompanied 
with efforts to undo or address the factors that attract young people to terrorist groups. 
These factors, including perceptions of marginalization and discrimination among Kenyan 
Muslims, were discussed in chapter four. It would, therefore, be logical for Kenya’s 
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government to counter terrorism in a manner that debases the widely disseminated Al 
Shabaab claim that the Kenyan state victimizes its Muslim population.  
To the contrary, there is overwhelming evidence showing that some members of 
the Kenya Police Service have brutalized Kenyan Muslims, especially those of Somali 
descent and those who reside at the Kenyan Coast. Such actions not only contravene 
Kenya’s laws but also provide propaganda material that Al Shabaab and other terrorist 
groups can use to recruit young people. Furthermore, the government’s failure to rein in 
rouge law enforcement officers and prosecute them for torturing and killing terrorist 
suspects fuels resentment and drives more young Kenyans towards terrorist groups. This 
may partly explain why Kenya has not been able to stop the flow of young Kenyans to Al 
Shabaab and, consequently, the number of terrorist attacks in the country. Given Kenya’s 
inability to secure itself form terrorist attacks despite enacting counterterrorism measures, 
a different approach that is grounded in the democratic laws that are enshrined in the 2010 
constitution must become the mantra for counterterrorism policing in Kenya. It is also 
critical for Kenya’s government to evaluate the countering violent extremism programs 
that have been implemented in various communities and use the findings to develop more 
effective ways of creating resilience in communities.    
 The second factor that led to the securitization of terrorism was the promulgation 
of a new constitution in Kenya in 2010. The 2010 constitution contained clauses that were 
used to implement reforms in Kenya’s security agencies and institutions. The key objective 
of the reforms was to dismantle the culture of subservience to Kenya’s president that been 
entrenched in the country’s security agencies and institutions over a period of almost 40 
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years. Advocates of reforms in Kenya, were optimistic that the changes would infuse 
professionalism and accountability in the country’s security agencies and institutions.  
Indeed, through the reforms, agencies that were integral to Kenya’s national 
security, such as the National Intelligence Service, shifted their attention from clamping 
down on political dissidents to investigating matters that were pertinent to Kenya’s national 
security such as terrorism. The result was the production of intelligence about the terrorism 
threat that Kenya faced from homegrown terrorists who were members of Al Shabaab. 
Consequently, members of Kenya’s parliament were convinced that terrorism was an 
existential threat because the executive’s claims about terrorism were supported with 
evidence from Kenya’s reformed security intelligence agency.  It was on this basis that 
Kenya’s government arrived at a consensus to enact counterterrorism measures. Kenya’s 
parliament voted for the inclusion of Kenya’s defence forces in AMISOM and passed the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act in 2012.  
In addition to reforming Kenya’s security agencies and institutions, Kenya’s 2010 
constitution includes a Bill of Rights which was lauded as the panacea that would enable 
Kenya to act tough on terror while safeguarding the individual rights and freedoms of its 
citizens. Indeed, the 2010 constitution mandates the country’s security agencies and 
institutions to carry out their functions in line with the human rights provisions that are 
stipulated in Kenya’s constitution. The guarantees to individual rights and freedoms was 
the dominant reason that the executive used to advocate for the passage of the Prevention 
of Terrorism Bill, 2012. Likewise, it was largely because of the guarantees to individual 
rights and freedoms in Kenya’s 2010 constitution that members of parliament supported 
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the passage of the Bill in 2012. Hence, even though the proposed anti-terrorism law had 
provisions that were similar to those of previously rejected bills, there was consensus 
among Kenya’s president, prime minister, cabinet ministers and members of parliament 
that guarantees in the constitution would not be abridged without due process.   
Nevertheless, as time went by, it became clear that the democratic provisions in the 
2010 constitution were not guiding counterterrorism practices as envisioned during the 
passage of the Prevention of Terrorism Act in 2012. This raises an important question that 
has dominated counterterrorism research for several years. Is it possible to secure a state 
against terrorist attacks while upholding democratic principles, more so in transitional 
democracies where institutions may still engage in undemocratic practices? While the 
balance between counterterrorism and democracy is not easy to achieve, a government’s 
ability to uphold democratic principles as it clamps down on terrorist threats is the ultimate 
sign of successful counterterrorism. This is because one of the key objectives of terrorist 
groups such as Al Shabaab, Boko Haram and Al Qaeda is to undermine democratic rights 
and freedoms by carrying out attacks that may lead to counterterrorism measures that 
violate human rights such as torture and extrajudicial killings. It would, therefore, be 
foolhardy for states to fall into the terrorists’ trap and counter terrorism through measures 
that destroy their democratic systems. As the former United Nations Secretary General, 
Kofi Annan, once observed: 
In the fight against terrorism we cannot compromise core 
[democratic] values … terrorism is in itself a direct attack on 
human rights and the rule of law. If we sacrifice them in our 
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response, we will be handing victory to the terrorists (Annan 
2005, para 5).   
Instead of playing into the hands of terrorists, states should make sure that 
counterterrorism measures do not erode the democratic principles that they are supposed 
to protect. This can be done by having regular and independent reviews of existing 
counterterrorism measures to assess their impact on democratic principles and revise them 
accordingly. Furthermore, transitional democracies, such as Kenya, should inculcate new 
attitudes and cultures, within their law enforcement agencies, that respect democratic 
principles. Civic education should also be incorporated into countering violent extremism 
programs that seek to build resilience to terrorism within communities. In this regard, 
young people should not simply be discouraged from engaging in terrorist activities but 
should also be provided with official avenues through which they can talk about and 
present their grievances. In response, states should proactively engage with young people 
to develop and implement realistic and sustainable solutions that address their grievances. 
If implemented, these measures could end the vicious cycle of violence, whereby, young 
people carry out terrorist activities to avenge real and perceived grievances and law 
enforcement officers carry out inhumane acts that aggrieve young people who are 
susceptible to radicalization.                   
Attempts to protect Kenya’s established and emerging economic interests was the 
third contextual factor that led to the enactment of counterterrorism measures in 2012. 
Shortly after gaining independence in 1963, Kenya’s government positioned the country 
as one of Africa’s top tourism destinations. Laws were enacted to protect the country’s 
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wildlife and investors were encouraged to expand the country’s tourism infrastructure. 
Indeed, tourism became one of the top foreign exchange earners in Kenya and was also a 
source of employment for approximately 11 percent of Kenya’s population. Furthermore, 
tourism was cited as one of the pillars of Vision 2030 which outlines the short-term and 
long-term strategies that Kenya will embark on to become a middle-income economy by 
2030. Tourism, therefore, is a fundamental resource that had to be protected from terrorist 
attacks.        
In addition to tourism, Kenya began a grand infrastructural project that was 
designed to modernize the country’s transportation system. The project, known as 
LAPSSET, was the biggest economic undertaking that Kenya had ever embarked on since 
it gained independence in 1963. In addition to creating a seamless link of roads and railway 
lines across Kenya, LAPSSET also included an oil pipeline for transporting oil from South 
Sudan to the Lamu Port. The discovery of oil in Kenya in early 2012 gave the government 
additional impetus to go ahead with the LAPSSET project even as investors pulled out of 
the project because of concerns that Kenya would not be able to protect its infrastructure 
from Al Shabaab attacks.  
Indeed, the first attack in Lamu, in 2011, happened shortly after Kenya’s 
government released plans detailing the magnitude and economic benefits of the LAPSSET 
project. Hence, Kenya did not simply send its military to Somalia because Al Shabaab 
kidnapped tourists and humanitarian agency workers from Kenya as has been suggested in 
previous studies. Afterall, these were not the first kidnappings that Al Shabaab had carried 
out in Kenya. It is more probable that the stakes for Kenya’s security increased significantly 
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when the country finalized plans to construct the LAPSSET project. It, therefore, made 
economic sense for Kenya to undertake an expensive military expedition in Somalia to 
secure LAPSSET’s infrastructure.  
Additionally, Kenya’s decision to send its military to Somalia was a last resort to 
dislodge Al Shabaab from Somalia. As discussed in chapter six, states, such as Kenya, 
often resort to military operations when other peacemaking efforts fail to yield the desired 
results. Kenya’s peacemaking efforts in Somalia intensified in 2002 when Kenya was 
designated as the Chair of IGAD’s Technical Committee whose key role was to come up 
with a plan that would enable Somalia to establish a government. After about two years of 
negotiations, Somalia’s delegates formed the TFG government. Despite this, the TFG was 
unable to physically establish itself in Somalia and had to operate from Kenya. On its part, 
Kenya’s government supported all efforts to rid Somalia of groups that threatened the 
secure relocation of the TFG to Somalia. Kenya allowed Ethiopian troops to pass through 
its territory on their way to dislodge the UIC whose military wing became the Al Shabaab. 
Kenya also permitted the US military to establish a base in Manda Bay, Lamu which was 
used to launch attacks against the UIC and Al Shabaab. Furthermore, Kenya supported 
militant groups in Somalia that were fighting against the UIC and Al Shabaab.  
Consequently, Kenya’s military incursion in Somalia in 2011 and its inclusion in 
AMISOM in 2012 were not impromptu decisions as some studies have suggested. The 
evidence in this thesis shows that Kenya’s government was keenly watching political 
developments in Somalia especially because Kenya had been propping up the TFG for a 
period of about 10 years. As investigations in this thesis revealed, Kenya’s decision to go 
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to Somalia was based on not less than two years of intelligence gathering about Al 
Shabaab’s activities. Kenya’s involvement in Somalia’s political affairs also explains why 
Al Shabaab viewed the Kenyan state as a serious threat to its objectives. Kenya was a key 
player in Somalia’s political affairs and its dedication to the successful establishment of 
the TFG was a big obstacle to Al Shabaab’s quest to establish a government in Somalia. It 
was, therefore, only a matter of time before Kenya’s military engaged in direct combat with 
Al Shabaab.  
Based on the argument above, it is unlikely that Kenya’s military withdrawal from 
Somalia, as suggested in other studies, will diminish Al Shabaab attacks in Kenya. To 
completely withdraw from Somalia’s affairs and deflect Al Shabaab’s wrath, Kenya would 
have to cease its support for the TFG and stop hosting approximately 263,000 Somali 
refugees (Human Rights Watch 2016) who reside in Kenya in addition to ending its 
military expedition in Somalia. The question then is, would such a withdrawal reduce the 
terrorism threat in Kenya and what would be the repercussions, not just for Kenya, but for 
the entire region in the Horn of Africa?    
Concluding Remarks  
This thesis has made contributions to literature on Kenya’s counterterrorism policy and 
securitization theory. It has identified and expounded on new variables that explain 
Kenya’s puzzling counterterrorism behaviour. These variables are 1) the preoccupation of 
Kenya’s securitizing actors with the machinations of power-sharing; 2) the inability of 
Kenya’s security agencies to securitize terrorism as an existential threat; 3) the rise in 
domestic radicalization; and 4) the enactment of a new constitution in 2010. This thesis has 
~ 264 ~ 
 
also extended literature on Kenya’s economic interests and its impact on the country’s 
counterterrorism policy.  
Within the context of securitization theory, this thesis has made two contributions. 
First, it has extended literature on how contextual factors can be used to understand 
securitization processes. Proponents of securitization theory including Butler (2019), 
Balzacq et al. (2016), McDonald (2008), Salter (2011), Ciută (2009), and Vuori (2008) 
have pointed out that contextual factors are insufficiently incorporated into the analysis of 
securitization processes resulting in quasi-mechanistic explanations of successful 
securitization. Through its analysis, this thesis has demonstrated that examining security 
problems in particular contexts, such as when a new constitution is promulgated, provides 
a better understanding of how securitization actors perceive security threats.  
Second, this thesis addresses what Ruzicka (2019) described as the biased focus of 
securitization research on cases of successful securitization. Ruzicka (2019) noted that 
“there is no a priori to give preference to successful cases and … paying attention to 
unsuccessful cases of securitization may yield important insights for the process of 
securitization as well as desecuritization” (Ruzicka 2019, 365). By investigating Kenya’s 
shifting counterterrorism policy from unsecuritization to securitization, this thesis provides 
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Appendix 1: Al Shabaab Attacks in Kenya May 31, 2008 – November 4, 2012 
Date  Location  Deaths  Injuries  Target  Attack Type 
1) 2008/05/31 Liboi 0 0 Police station/post Armed 
assault 
2) 2009/07/18 Mandera 0 0 NGO Kidnapping 
3) 2010/03/30 Liboi 0 3 Military Explosion 
and armed 
assault 
4) 2010/04/15 Liboi 0 0 Business Armed 
assault 







6) 2010/07/20 Liboi 1 1 Police station/post Armed 
assault 




1 0 Private citizens Armed 
assault 
8) 2010/12/03 Nairobi 2 0 Police station/post, 





9) 2010/12/03 Nairobi 1 0 Police station/post Explosion  
10) 2010/12/20 Nairobi 3 40 Private citizens and 
property  
Explosion 
11) 2011/03/27 Liboi 0 1 Police station/post Armed 
assault 




1 0 Police station/post Armed 
assault 
13) 2011/06/02 Mandera 4 10 Military Explosion  
14) 2011/07/27 Mandera  1 3 Police station/post Explosion 
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Date  Location  Deaths  Injuries  Target  Attack Type 
16) 2011/10/01 Lamu 1 0 Private citizens and 
property 
Kidnapping 
17) 2011/10/13 Dadaab 0 0 NGO Kidnapping 
18) 2011/10/24 Nairobi 2 13 Private citizen and 
property 
Explosion 
19) 2011/10/24 Nairobi 1 18 Private citizens and 
property 
Explosion 
20) 2011/10/27 Mandera  8 0 Government Explosion  
21) 2011/10/28 Garissa  3 0 Military  Explosion 
22) 2011/10/31 Liboi Unknown  Unknown  Military Explosion 




24) 2011/11/03 El Wak 1 Unknown  Government, 
private citizens and 
property  
Unknown  
25) 2011/11/05 Hagadera  0 0 Police station/post Explosion 




27) 2011/11/05 Garissa 0 0 Private citizens and 
property 
Explosion 
28) 2011/11/05 Garissa 0 0 Military  Explosion 
29) 2011/11/07 El Wak 2 0 Police station/post Armed 
assault 





31) 2011/11/19 Dadaab 0 1 NGO Kidnapping  
32) 2011/11/22 Liboi 0 3 Police  Armed 
assault  
33) 2011/11/24 Mandera  1 12 Military  Explosion  
34) 2011/11/24 Garissa 2 1 Business  Explosion 




36) 2011/11/25 Arabia 0 0 Police station/post, 




37) 2011/12/11 Wajir 0 9 Military  Explosion 
38) 2011/12/11 Mandera 1 3 Police station/post  Explosion 
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Date  Location  Deaths  Injuries  Target  Attack Type 
39) 2011/12/15 Garissa 0 0 Police station/post  Explosion 
40) 2011/12/15 Garissa 0 4 Business   Explosion 
41) 2011/12/19 Dadaab 1 2 Police station/post   Explosion 
42) 2011/12/19 Garissa 0 2 Private citizens and 
property    
Armed 
assault  
43) 2012/01/01 Garissa 3 14 Business     Armed 
assault  
44) 2012/01/01 Garissa 2 14 Business     Armed 
assault  
45) 2012/01/11 Gerille 6 6 Police station/post     Kidnapping, 
explosion   
46) 2012/02/03 Garissa 3 1 Business     Armed 
assault  
47) 2012/02/04 El Wak  1 0 Military      Armed 
assault  
48) 2012/02/17 Fafi   1 1 Police station/post     Armed 
assault  
49) 2012/02/28 Mandera  2 0 Military      Armed 
assault  
50) 2012/02/28 Mandera  2 8 Police station/post     Armed 
assault  
51) 2012/03/10 Nairobi  4 40 Transportation       Explosion   
52) 2012/03/31 Mombasa  0 2 Business       Explosion   
53) 2012/03/31 Mtwapa  2 30 Private citizens and 
property        
Explosion   
54) 2012/04/29 Nairobi  2 16 Religious 
institution         
Explosion   
55) 2012/05/15 Mombasa  1 3 Business         Armed 
assault   
56) 2012/05/15 Dagahaley  1 3 Police station/post         Explosion    
57) 2012/05/19 Ifo  1 1 Private citizens and 
property                 
Armed 
assault    
58) 2012/05/20 Ifo  0 0 Police station/post                  Explosion 
59) 2012/05/21 Mandera 0 4 Military                 Explosion 
60) 2012/05/26 Ifo  0 5 NGO                 Explosion 
61) 2012/05/26 Wajir   0 3 Business                 Explosion 
62) 2012/05/28 Nairobi   1 37 Business                 Explosion 
63) 2012/05/29 Liboi    0 4 Police station/post                  Armed
assault    
64) 2012/05/30 Wajir     1 3 Business                   Explosion 
65) 2012/06/23 Mandera      0 2 Police station/post                   Explosion 
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Date  Location  Deaths  Injuries  Target  Attack Type 
66) 2012/06/24 Mombasa      3 12 Business                   Armed 
assault    
67) 2012/06/29 Ifo      1 3 NGO                   Kidnapping  
68) 2012/06/29 Arabia       0 0 Police station/post                    Armed
assault    
69) 2012/07/01 Garissa        9 33 Religious 
institution  
Armed 
assault    
70) 2012/07/12 Mandera         0 2 Police station/post  Armed 
assault    
71) 2012/07/16 Dadaab          1 1 Police station/post  Armed 
assault    
72) 2012/07/18 Wajir          0 2 Business  Explosion     
73) 2012/07/25 Dadaab          0 6 Police station/post  Explosion     
74) 2012/07/29 Mandera         1 0 Business    Armed 
assault    
75) 2012/08/01 Nairobi          3 5 Private citizens and 
property                 
Explosion     
76) 2012/08/03 Nairobi          1 6 Unknown                  Explosion     
77) 2012/09/03 Garissa           2 0 Police station/post                  Armed
assault    
78) 2012/09/30 Eastleigh            1 6 Religious 
institution                   
Explosion  
79) 2012/10/01 Garissa           0 0 Police station/post                   Armed
assault    
80) 2012/10/02 Garissa           0 0 Police station/post                  Infrastructure 
attack    
81) 2012/10/12 Eastleigh            0 0 Private citizens and 
property                 
Explosion  
82) 2012/10/12 Nairobi             0 1 Police station/post                 Explosion  
83) 2012/10/15 Ifo              1 0 Private citizens and 
property                               
Assassination   
84) 2012/10/16 Kulan               1 0 Business  Armed 
assault    
85) 2012/10/17 Kenya 
(Town or 
city not 
listed)             
0 10 Police station/post  Explosion     
86) 2012/10/19 Garissa                0 1 Police station/post   Explosion     
87) 2012/11/04 Garissa                1 11 Police station/post, 
religious institution    
Explosion     
Total  99 433   
Compiled using data from the Global Terrorism Database (2018) 
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Appendix 4: Foiled Terrorist Attacks in Kenya: October 2011-September 2012 







Ikrima. Elgiva Bwire 
Oliacha aka Seyf 
Deen. 
 
Dispatched to Kenya 
in July 2011 to train 
youth, lay down an 
infrastructure for a 





Seyf Deen provided 
grenades for the 
attacks at Kwa 
Mwaura Bar & OTC 
Station on 24th 
October 2011 in 
retaliation over 
KDF’s entry into 
Somalia (which was 















Seyf Deen arrested 
on 25th October 2011 
and 13 grenades,1 
AK 
47 Rifle, 4 pistols, an 
SMG rifle and 717 
rounds of assorted 
ammunition and 
training manuals 
recovered from his 
safe house. 
 
Sentenced to life 
imprisonment upon 
pleading guilty to all 
charges. 
Still engaged in 
attack 
planning in Naivasha 
Maximum Prison. 
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Plot/Date Plot/Description  Key Actors Action/Comment 
JD Plot/December 
2011 
Sanctioned by Al 





alias Ikrima, was a 
Kenyan Al Shabaab 




attacks towards the 
end of December 
2011 and early 2012 
targeting Parliament 
Buildings, the UN 
Office in Nairobi 
(UNON), KDF 
Camps, an Ethiopian 
Restaurant in Nairobi 
mostly patronized by 
TFG delegates from 
Somalia. 
 
Assassination of top 
Kenyan political & 
security officials and 
disruption of the 
Ikrima 
Fahmi Jamal Salim 
aka Jonathan Drake 
– Kenyan/cell leader 
Jermaine John 
Grant aka Peter 






(Fahmi’s wife; using 
stolen identity of 











An operation through 
the Police was 
mounted on 19th 
December 2011. 
 
Grant & Fuad 
arrested (Grant was 
jailed for being in the 
country illegally; 
Fuad 
jumped a Kshs. 20 
million bond and fled 
to Somalia in 2013). 
 
Fahmi & Samantha 
escaped. 
 
Kassim Omolo killed 
in exchange with 
arresting team on 
17th 
June 2013 and a 
Glock 19 Pistol (5 
loaded magazines). 
 
Lens for AK-47 rifle, 
2 
hand grenades, bomb 
making materials 
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trained by Harun 




from a South African 
facilitation network.  
 
By December 2011, 
the planners had 
acquired safe houses 
in Nairobi & 








(sulphuric acid, urea, 
Al wires, Sodium 
Carbonate, Glycerin, 
Nitric Acid) and 1 
AK 
47 - (54 magazines 






Sanctioned by top Al-
Shabaab 
leadership in 
December 2011 for 









Farouk and Omar 
Adan Abdi aka 
Salman arrested, on 
13th September 2012. 
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Plot/Date Plot/Description  Key Actors Action/Comment 
avenging KDF’s 
entry into Somalia. 




House, the then 












(Hilton Hotel, Nomad 




































Recoveries: Four (4) 
suicide vests with 
mobile phones 
attached thereto; 
One (1) IED attached 
to a mobile phone; 
Four (4) AK-47 rifles 
with 16 magazines; 
480 rounds of 




sentenced to 59 years 
in prison after 
admitting to offences. 
 
Musharaff arrested 
in Malindi in October 
2012 while setting up 
a safe house; 
currently in Kamiti 
Maximum Prison still 





~ 324 ~ 
 
Plot/Date Plot/Description  Key Actors Action/Comment 




Plan recalibrated into 
a VBIED & firearm 
assault on 
parliament while in 
full session. 
 





Explosives & other 
weapons amassed & 
stored in Kismayo 
between June & July 
2012. 
 
From July 2012 – 




moved in from 
Somalia. 
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Plot/Date Plot/Description  Key Actors Action/Comment 
12th Sept. 2012 – 
vehicle for 
transporting suicide 
bombers as well as 
for use as VBIED 
purchased. 
 
13th Sept. 2012 
evening – suicide 
bombers put on their 
vests, transferred 
weapons into the 
vehicle but returned 










Plot by foreign 
fighters (Al- 




to enter the 
country for attacks. 
 
Hakeem Al-Masri Plan foiled following 




Hakeem arrested in 
Kenyan in June 2013 
and jailed for illegal 
presence in the 
country. 
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Plot/Date Plot/Description  Key Actors Action/Comment 
Planned to enter 
together with other 
Al-Muhajirin using 
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Appendix 5: Human Ethics Approval Letter 
 










~ 329 ~ 
 
Appendix 6: Participants Information Letter 
 
   School of Business and Governance 
    South Street, Murdoch 
Western Australia, 6150 




Kenya’s Changing Counterterrorism Policy 
 
Dear (participant’s name), 
 
My name is Doreen Alusa and I am a PhD student in the School of Business and 
Governance at Murdoch University, Western Australia. I am currently doing research on 
Kenya’s changing counterterrorism policy.  The research aims to identify the factors that 
have influenced the development of counterterrorism in Kenya. In order to conduct this 
research, I wish to request permission to interview you regarding your views and 
involvement as a stakeholder who has knowledge of the development of counterterrorism 
policies in Kenya.  
It is anticipated that the time required for each interview will be between 60 to 90 minutes. 
The interviews will only be conducted with your signed consent and you can withdraw 
your consent at any time. If approval has previously been granted, your organization also 
has the right to withdraw its authorization of this study at any time.  
I will request that the interview be digitally recorded. If you do not wish to be recorded, 
please inform me and I will make written notes instead. Any form of recording of the 
interview will be stored securely.  
All information given during interviews will be treated as confidential and no names or 
other information that might identify you will be used in any publication arising from the 
research unless you waive your right to anonymity.  
Feedback on the research project will be provided to you in the form of copies of any 
subsequent publications resulting from the research. Where appropriate, these can be 
provided personally or to your organization.  
If you are willing to authorize this study, could you please complete the Consent Form. If 
you have any questions about this project, please feel free to contact me on +61 434 *** 
*** or via email at D.Alusa@murdoch.edu.au. 





This study has been approved by the Murdoch University Human Research Ethics Committee 
(Approval 2017/140).  If you have any reservation or complaint about the ethical conduct of this 
research, and wish to talk with an independent person, you may contact Murdoch University’s 
Research Ethics & Integrity on Tel. 08 9360 6677 (+61 8 9360 6677 for overseas studies) or e-mail 
human.ethics@murdoch.edu.au Any issues you raise will be treated in confidence and investigated 
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School of Business and Governance 
South Street, Murdoch 
Western Australia, 6150 






Kenya’s Changing Counterterrorism Policy 
 
1. I voluntarily agree to take part in this study. 
 
2. I have read the Information Letter provided and been given a full explanation of the 
purpose of this study, the procedures involved and what is expected of me.  
 
3. I understand that I will be asked to discuss:  
• The nature and history of terrorism in Kenya. 
• The factors that have influenced the development of counterterrorism policy in 
Kenya. 
• How different political actors have influenced Kenya’s counterterrorism policy. 
 
4. The researcher has answered all my questions and has explained possible problems that 
may arise as a result of my participation in this study. 
 
5. I am happy for the interview to be audio recorded as part of this research. I understand 
that I do not have to answer particular questions if I do not want to and that I can 
withdraw at any time without needing to give a reason and without consequences to 
myself. 
 
6. I understand that I will not be identified in any publication arising out of this study 
unless I waive my right to anonymity.  
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7. I understand that my name and identity will be stored separately from the data, and 
these are accessible only to the researcher.  
 
8. I wish/ do not wish to receive a copy of the recording or transcript in order to give 
feedback or amend my responses.   
 
9. I understand that all information provided by me is treated as confidential and will not 




Name of participant:  ________________________ 
 
 
Signature of participant: ________________________ Date: ….... /..…../……. 
  
I confirm that I have provided the Information Letter concerning this study to the above 




Name of researcher: _________________________________ 
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Appendix 8: Field Work Semi-Structured Interview Questions 
 
 
1. Briefly tell me about your background and experience within the context of terrorism and 
counterterrorism in Kenya.  
 
2. What are your views about terrorism in Kenya?  
 
a. Is terrorism a significant threat to Kenya’s security? 
b. How has the nature of the terrorism threat in Kenya changed?  
c. How have these changes affected the country’s counterterrorism policy? 
 
3. How has counterterrorism policy been developed in Kenya? 
a. Who are the key actors in counterterrorism policymaking in Kenya? 
b. What impact has each of the aforementioned actors had on counterterrorism 
policymaking in Kenya? For instance, why have these actors supported or opposed 
the development of counterterrorism legislation in Kenya? 
c. Of the aforementioned actors, who is the most important or influential actor in 
Kenya’s counterterrorism policymaking process? What has been the role of this 
actor in the development of counterterrorism legislation (including attempts to pass 
the Suppression of Terrorism Bill in 2003 and The Anti-Terrorism Bill in 2006)? 
 
4. What factors prevented the enactment of the Suppression of Terrorism Bill in 2003 and The 
Anti-Terrorism Bill in 2006? 
 
5. Why were these factors less or more significant when Kenya enacted The Prevention of 
Terrorism Act, in 2012? 
 
6. What other factors could have contributed to the enactment of The Prevention of Terrorism 
Act, in 2012? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
